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From Concept to Objectivity

Thinking Through Hegel's
Subjective Logic

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD



FROM CONCEPT TO OBJECTIVITY



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Introduction

Reason has come to be regarded as either opposed to objectivity or all too immersed within it. As opposed, reason confronts an independently given otherness never conceivable as it is in itself. As immersed within objectivity, reason stands conditioned by particular practices that render thought powerless to grasp reality in its own right. On either account, truth remains beyond reason, which at most can judge the consistency of claims whose veracity it can never establish. Nonetheless, both views offer their thoughts about reason without questioning how an impotent reason can know itself with any authority.

No philosopher can escape dogmatism without considering why thought should enjoy the privilege that philosophy confers upon it by relying on reason. Yet thinking about thinking seems caught in a hopeless circularity. How can valid thinking be established without employing valid thought from the outset? But then, how can valid thinking be any more than an assumption, insusceptible of any validation?

These questions are crucial for logic, whose task is thinking about thinking. Few logical investigations, however, have seriously addressed these problems, let alone even tried to account systematically for the concept, judgment and syllogism, which have played so central a role in logic since Aristotle.

The signal exception to this negligence is Hegel, whose *Science of Logic* remains the most radical and thorough attempt to resolve the dilemmas of thinking about thinking, establish how thought can grasp objectivity, and secure the truth of philosophy's reliance upon reason. Ever since the *Science of Logic*'s publication, critics have focused their attention upon its beginning and the difficulty of developing thought without taking valid thinking for granted. This is a key question and it must be addressed. Yet, of no less importance is Hegel's groundbreaking attempt in the final part of the *Science*, the so-called Subjective Logic, to account for the concept, judgment, and syllogism, and their relation to the categorization of objectivity. Here, the key elements of traditional logic become thematic, together with how the universal and self-determination are conceivable. Although these topics are pivotal for understanding reason and its role in philosophy, Hegel's treatment has received comparatively little attention, either among Hegel scholars or contemporary philosophers in general.

From Concept to Objectivity seeks to remedy that inattention by thinking

through the core categorial development of Hegel's Subjective Logic so as to uncover the special nature and authority of conceptual determination. This requires first clarifying the preliminary logical problems that prepare the way for conceiving the concept. To this end, Chapter 1 examines how systematic logic can overcome the vicious circularity of thinking valid thinking, enabling philosophy to proceed without foundations. Chapter 2 next addresses the perplexities of method as they apply to a science of logic that cannot presuppose any method without question-begging. Following arguments drawn from Hegel's Logic of Being, Chapter 3 shows how systematic logic can account for something determinate without taking determinacy for granted. This sets the stage for considering how the determinacy of the concept can be systematically conceived. Chapter 4 addresses this challenge in view of the problems of conceiving universality and its connection with self-determination and the autonomy of reason. Having shown how the concept is determinable in terms of universality, particularity, and individuality, Chapter 5 examines how these categories give rise to judgment. With the transition from concept to judgment accounted for, Chapter 6 systematically conceives the different forms of judgment in respect of the different types of universality that figure within them. The conclusion of Chapter 6 shows how the forms of judgment achieve closure by engendering syllogism. Chapter 7 thereupon thinks through the successive forms of syllogism that result, showing how they reach exhaustive determination by paving the way for the categorization of objectivity. The perplexities of that categorization are the theme of the final Chapter 8, which shows how subjectivity and objectivity can be logically determined without casting thought in irrevocable opposition to reality.

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Chapter 1

Formal, Transcendental, and Systematic Logic

If philosophy is to legitimate its own quest to conceive truth, it must somehow establish the authority of reason. This requires thinking about thinking, the very challenge giving logic its vocation.

The Problem of Prescriptive Logic

Logic, however, can be either descriptive or prescriptive. Descriptive logic describes how given arguments and given conventions of reasoning are ordered. Since descriptive logic is limited to analyzing the factual operations of reasoning, it is a positive science, addressing a given subject matter with a given standpoint whose relation to its topic is equally taken for granted. Due to these qualifications, what results from descriptive logic can offer nothing binding for determining how reason *should* operate to think the truth. All descriptive logic can provide are estimations of how arguments have been made – estimations relative to the representative character of the data selected for analysis, as well as to the honesty, interpretive astuteness and observational accuracy of the descriptive logician. Not only do these judgments of fact leave undecided how thought should function, but they offer no definitive account of the reality of argument, given the relative character of factual knowledge.

By contrast, prescriptive logic does not describe how reasoning operates, but prescribes how it should proceed to think the truth. Although one may question whether prescriptive logic has been properly developed, it is incoherent to argue that there can be no prescriptive, but only descriptive logic. If one takes such a position, advocated by Quine¹ and many others, one denies thinking any objectively valid standards and instead allows reason only opined standards, based on subjective assumptions, linguistic usage, cultural tradition, pragmatic agreement, or some other unjustified factor. With thought so limited,

¹ See “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in Willard Van Orman Quine, *From A Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

there is no more to do than describe its operations and deconstruct its operative canons in terms of the factors conditioning them. Although this relativizing of reason finds wide acclaim, it is as totally absurd as any form of “radical” skepticism. Those who grant hegemony to descriptive logic to the exclusion of prescriptive logic patently contradict themselves by precluding objectively true reasoning while making putatively objective arguments about the structure of rationality. If they were to be consistent, these thinkers would have to admit that their depiction of reasoning is itself a mere opinion with no more authority than opposing views.

Nevertheless, even if the possibility of prescriptive logic cannot be coherently denied, any attempt to develop prescriptive logic seems caught in a hopeless dilemma. If prescriptive logic provides the canon of thought enabling argument to supply rational justification, then how can prescriptive logic be properly determined without presupposing the standard of rationality it should supply? Can prescriptive logic be a canon of thought if its very principles cannot be rationally justified without already being taken for granted?

This vicious circularity invites skepticism, even if skepticism is paradoxical on its own terms. If no prescriptive logic can be defended without presupposing itself, rational argument seems to be impossible. Insofar as all argument must conform to the canons of prescriptive logic to be certified as rational, there is no way to decide between competing candidates for prescriptive logic since each will satisfy the standards of prescriptive logic by conforming to itself.

Somehow this problem must be surmounted if prescriptive logic is to be possible and philosophical reason is to achieve self-justification. Historically, philosophers have offered three fundamentally different candidates for prescriptive logic that seem to exhaust the possible structures of reason. These alternatives are formal, transcendental and systematic logic.

Formal Logic and the Self-Justification of Reason

Not illogically, the candidate first developed for prescriptive logic is formal logic. Both its motivation and character are defined by the appeal to given determination underlying formal logic’s approach to rational argument. As a normative canon of thought, formal logic rests upon the understanding, so forcefully propounded by Aristotle,² that reasons can justify opinions only if there is some antecedently apprehended given principle upon which

² See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Ch. 6, and *Posterior Analytics*, Book I, Ch. 2.

justification can rest. If justification instead operates without a given principle to serve as an accepted ultimate reason for all other reasons, no justified reason can ever be supplied. The reasons sought to provide justification would always be wanting justification for themselves due to the infinite regress of legitimating reasons requiring others to back them up. To overcome this problem, rational argument would seem to require starting from some given whose authority need not be based on any other, while following some given method whose procedure is similarly unmediated. Only then will the move from the given supporting all further reasons have a form that can be legitimate instead of being undermined by the same infinite regress whose avoidance seems to necessitate some given content at the base of all argument.

This suggests that the reason supplying reasons transforming opinion into truth has a structure characterized by a formal logic where both the primitive terms of reasoning and the form of reasoning are given. Insofar as reasoning will then invariably have certain given premises and functions underlying all its applications, it follows that thinking can be characterized in abstraction from what is thought.

All the other basic features of formal logic as a canon of reason directly derive from the recourse to givens it employs to rescue justification. Since reason is here ascribed primitive terms or premises from which it proceeds, as well as given operations that govern its reasoning, the formal logic of thought is a deductive logic whose results are purely analytic. Insofar as thought has a formal structure, whose primitive terms and functions are not determined by thinking but given prior to its exercise as the ubiquitous scaffold for thinking any thoughts whatever, all further content must derive from an external source, be it intuition, imagination, the given wealth of language, or something else. As a consequence, thought does not generate new content but only arrives at what conforms to its primitive terms and invariable functions. The deductive reasoning of formal logic thus results in purely analytic conclusions contained in the premises and externally supplied propositions, as modified by the given operations of thought. The ensuing reasoning is entirely tautological and, as such, is governed by the principle of contradiction, which, keeps terms self-identical by insuring that, without further qualification, nothing can be what it is not. Demonstrative justification then becomes possible so long as the concluded implication does not contradict any of the premises and given content from which it is derived.

This entails a conception of truth that is entirely formal. If reasoning must operate with given terms and functions and draw analytic conclusions in conformity with the principle of contradiction, the truth it justifies possesses no other distinction from unjustified opinion than that the thinking of it is internally consistent. Such reason contributes knowledge of one thing and one

thing alone: the correspondence of thought with itself. As a whole, logic here comprises nothing but reason's self-understanding of how it can conform to itself. If formal logic be taken as the exclusive arbiter of rationality, reasoning provides only the formal criterion of truth entailed in the coherence or self-consistency of argument.

As common as this characterization of reason may be, its adoption is plagued by conceptual difficulties. The more trivial of these are the dilemmas that arise when formal logic is given ontological status by being treated not just as a canon but as an organon of reason, prescribing not simply how reason can conform to itself but how it can correspond to, and so truly conceive, reality. This position is pursued by dialectical materialism as it is classically formulated by Engels, canonized by Lenin, and ritualized by his successors. Although dialectical materialism pretends to offer a dialectical logic, it characterizes reason in terms of a formal logic of contradiction consisting in an assortment of logical operators and functions that are just as given prior to every exercise of reasoning as the analogous terms in the deductive logic of Aristotle.³ In offering these givens, dialectical materialism does not just stipulate the laws of reason without subjecting them to critique. It further presupposes the correspondence of thought and reality, treating its formal logic of contradiction as a metaphysical principle ordering reality as well as thought. Indeed, even if such a logic of contradiction were common to reality and thought, that logic could not specify the relation of identity *and* difference that correspondence involves. Whatever formal principle may be shared by reality and thought cannot itself define the distinction between them without which there can be no contrasting terms to correspond. Hence dialectical materialism would have to provide some other principle or principles of unity to guarantee the ontological role of dialectics – something it cannot do without canceling the postulated primacy of its formal logic of contradiction.

This problem, however, is secondary to the basic dilemma dialectical materialism faces in justifying the logic it stipulates for reason or the application of that logic to being and the correspondence of thought and reality it is intended to secure. Because dialectical materialism conceives thought to have a given structure defined by various operators and laws, there is no way it can escape the vicious circularity of having to employ those rules in any attempt to justify them.

³ In this vein, Engels lists three laws of dialectics as the most general laws of nature, history and thought: the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the law of the interpenetration of opposites, and the law of the negation of the negation. See Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, J. B. S. Haldane, trans. (New York: International Publishers, 1960), p. 26.

It is this problem that undermines the whole enterprise of advancing formal logic as a canon, let alone an organon, of reason. Logical positivism exhibits this particularly clearly, for unlike dialectical materialism, logical positivism resolutely accepts the formal consequences of characterizing reason in terms of given structures and avoids the fallacies entailed in applying formal logic to reality. Identifying reason and rational argument with deductive reasoning, logical positivism consistently concludes that all *a priori* knowledge is analytic, consisting in tautologies governed by the principle of contradiction. By contrast, all synthetic knowledge is judged to be empirical and subject to all the uncertainties endemic to empirical knowing. Logical positivism recognizes that the presumed analyticity of *a priori* knowledge, codified in formal logic, has by itself no relation to objective truth and rejects as analytically indemonstrable and empirically unverifiable any assumption of the correspondence of thought and reality. Further, in the strict form advanced by Ayer,⁴ logical positivism refrains from claiming that the relations of analyticity expressed in formal logic comprise the essential form of meaningful speech or the universally valid form of reason's correspondence with itself. If logical positivism were to make these claims, it would fall victim to the dilemma of having to justify its candidate for the canon of reason while being unable to do so without taking it for granted.

To avoid this problem, logical positivists like Ayer take the analyticity of reason to be a matter of convention, reflecting the meanings of terms as they are pragmatically fixed in linguistic usage. What is "contained within" or "analytically derivable from" any given term is simply mandated by contingently prevailing communicative behavior. This sets the stage for challenging the whole analytic-synthetic distinction, as Quine and his followers have done,⁵ for it reduces analyticity to something that can only be determined descriptively, rather than prescriptively, by observing the conventions of discourse. Logical positivism accordingly adopts the skeptical view that philosophy must be analytic in the sense of limiting itself to pointing out the consistency or inconsistency of the linguistic usage of terms employed in articulating the synthetic knowledge obtained from experience.

Although logical positivism might thereby appear to abandon prescriptive logic, this is not the case. Logical positivism offers its reduction of reason to deductive inference not as a matter of convention and empirical happenstance, but as the irreducible fate of thought, excluding all theories to the contrary. By giving its blanket characterization of reasoning this *juridical* role, logical positivism puts itself in the self-annulling position of affirming a doctrine of

⁴ See A. J. Ayer's *Logic, Truth, and Language* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1982).

⁵ Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".

reason whose own validity can neither be empirically verified nor analytically established.

This plight of logical positivism underlines the ultimate absurdity of claiming that all *a priori* knowledge is analytic and that deductive reasoning can be the principle of rationality. It is absurd to claim that all *a priori* knowledge is analytic because that very claim is synthetic, depending upon an antecedent acceptance of entailment that first makes it possible to count on any analysis whatsoever. Similarly, deductive reasoning cannot be the model of philosophical argument, for, as Plato and Aristotle point out,⁶ all deduction ultimately rests upon nondeducible premises and canons of deduction that would have to be justified by some other form of cognition. In each respect, the conclusion is the same. Formal logic cannot provide reason with a canon, for reliance upon any givens leaves reason ruled by dogmatically accepted principles for which no justification can be coherently offered. Not even the introduction of an intuitive intelligence to apprehend immediately the indemonstrable premises and procedures of formal logic can salvage the latter's prescriptive role. Plato's and Aristotle's recourse to intuition of first principles in order to ground deductive reasoning may testify to awareness of a serious problem. Yet it only resurrects the same dilemma of rooting justification in something given that is, as such, beyond justification. Just as formal logic cannot account for the legitimacy of its own rules of thought, so intelligence cannot justify its intuitions without introducing reasons that undermine the foundational primacy of what it intuitively as first principle.

The Impasse of Transcendental Logic

Transcendental logic is explicitly designed to resolve the difficulties that come to the fore when formal logic is offered as a prescriptive doctrine of reason. Recognizing the incoherence of restricting *a priori* knowledge to analytic conclusions and the uncritical dogmatism of conceiving reason to be ordered by given terms and functions, the proponents of transcendental philosophy tie the self-legitimation of philosophical thought to the acquisition of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Unlike ancient metaphysical thinkers who claim synthetic *a priori* knowledge of the first principles of being, transcendental philosophers reconceive synthetic *a priori* knowledge to lie in a logic specifying how cognition itself determines necessary features of the objects of knowledge, allowing knowing to secure objectivity without dogmatic appeal to the given.

⁶ See Plato, *The Republic*, Book VII, 533c–d, and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Posterior Analytics*.

This transcendental logic was pioneered by Kant in a manner whereby objective knowledge was limited to objects of experience, leaving the very structure of experience beyond objective knowing. As a result, the rules of the understanding were uncritically drawn from traditional formal logic, while knowledge of the structure of experience was left to a standpoint whose authority was never critically established. Subsequent transcendental logicians, such as Fichte and Husserl, were well aware that if transcendental logic was developed only with regard to objects of experience, then both the rules of the understanding and the reasoning of the transcendental philosopher would be accepted without having their own objectivity established. To remedy this failing, the scope of transcendental logic would have to be radically extended to include determining the conditions of the possibility for knowing not only objects of experience but objects of thought in general, including transcendental logic itself.

The project of transcendental logic is accordingly best understood by leaving aside the peculiarities of Kantian philosophy and considering instead the general project of the transcendental turn in relation to the basic problems of prescriptive logic.

Confronting the failure of previous attempts to base truth in some privileged given, transcendental logic seeks to salvage justification by conceiving rational validity to lie in what is determined by some privileged epistemic determiner. This determiner is the transcendental condition of knowing that plays the same role whether it be characterized as noumenal subjectivity, intentionality, *Dasein*, communicative competence, language games, or the hermeneutic situation. Whatever its guise, the transcendental condition provides for objective knowledge, meaningful speech, or, if one will, just the ongoing conversation of mankind by comprising a cognitive structure determining the object of knowing in its relation to knowing so as to permit knowledge to conform to its object, whether that object be a tangible thing or a conceptual or linguistic content. Instead of taking truth as a given determinacy, discovered in the immediate intuition of passive contemplation, objective knowledge here involves a determined determinacy, constructed, rather than found, by a structure of knowing figuring as a privileged determiner of objective validity.

Transcendental logic turns to develop objective validity in these terms of determined determinacy in response to the basic objectivity problem of knowledge. So long as what is knowable is available to knowing only as knowledge and the object of knowing has a given determinacy to which knowledge must conform to be true, there seems to be no way to certify any correspondence of knowledge and its object. Since knowing must always refer to what it knows to evaluate its knowledge claims, knowing is always left comparing one belief with another, without ever accessing the object in itself.

If, however, the structure of knowing, or reference, if one adopts a linguistic perspective, determines the object so that its very givenness is a content constituted by that structure, then the correspondence between that object and the reference to it can be secured. The object will then conform to the structure of knowing to which it owes its necessary character, and knowing will be in a position to know what it has put into the object. Synthetic *a priori* knowledge would then be possible, for the determined determinacy of the object of knowing would be a new content, rather than an analytic given, and yet be determined by a structure underlying and therefore prior to all particular acts of reference in "experience".

On this basis, objectivity would consist in contents, be they concepts, meanings, or things, that are conditioned rather than unconditioned and self-determined. Indeed, because the object of knowledge is knowable only insofar as it is constructed by the structure of knowing, nothing unconditioned and free can be known. If, following Kant, one acknowledges that a universal that determines its own particulars and an individual that is a law unto itself are both unconditioned, then one would have to grant that the particulars of objectivity would be subject to given laws, just as valid universals would apply to independently given particulars. Significantly, this would hold just as much for corporeal things as for thinking, for if reason is to be an object of knowledge, it must fulfill the same conditions.

When transcendental logic proceeds to specify the conditions of knowing in their determining role, it must avoid both referring to any givenness, be it of the object of knowing or of knowing itself, and falling into solipsism whereby the object of knowledge and all standards of truth are mere postulates. These troubles arise the moment transcendental logic launches its explication of the conditions of objective knowing as something that must be performed before any actual knowledge claims can be justified. In the absence of such preliminary inquiry, all putative knowledge would seem to assume that certainty guarantees truth, that knowing conforms to real and conceptual objectivity. Transcendental logic, however, itself presumes a certain knowledge of its own: that knowing or reference can be examined independently of actual knowledge and its particular objects. In this respect, transcendental logic follows formal logic in taking reason to have a formal character underlying all its operations.

At the same time, though, transcendental logic does aim to show how all that is objective in thought and reality is determined without reliance upon any dogmatically accepted givens. To take this striving seriously, transcendental logic cannot legitimately refer to a thing-in-itself or to any other content given independently of transcendental constitution, wherein knowable objectivity is constructed from the structure of knowing. Conversely, to succeed in

distinguishing objective knowledge from opinion, transcendental logic must somehow determine the object of knowledge without reducing it to an arbitrary construct of knowing. What is an object of thought must be immanent to knowing, yet be more than a subjective representation. This must be true whether the object of thought is a real thing or a concept, for in either case, the absence of distinguishable aspects of immanence and transcendence, or of reference and referent, removes the possibility of establishing objective validity.

Although Kant undermines his own transcendental logic by retaining reference to a thing-in-itself and limiting transcendental constitution to objects of experience, his transcendental deduction of the categories presents a strategy that transcendental logic must follow to secure objectivity of knowledge. Solipsism can be avoided and objectivity retained only if the conditions of knowledge are one and the same as the conditions of the givenness of the object of knowledge. Transcendental logic could then specify the principles of objective truth since what makes knowledge or reference possible would also supply the independent givenness of the referent of knowing and do so such that knowledge would correspond to it. The possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge would be secured since thought would know in a justifiable manner objects that are neither stipulations of thought nor conclusions analytically deduced from such assumptions. If this possibility extended beyond objects of experience to the concepts and procedures of reason itself, then transcendental logic could supply the self-justification of thought philosophy requires.

Try as it may, transcendental logic cannot succeed in this endeavor due to the residual element of givenness that underlies its argument. This element is none other than the content of the transcendental condition. Because it is the determining condition of objective knowledge, it cannot possess the character of being transcendently constituted, which insures that an object of cognition can have validity. The logical reason for this is that a determiner determines what is other than itself and thus has a character antecedent to its act of determination. This unconditioned givenness of its own content precisely allows it to be the condition of what it determines. If, however, objectivity lies in being determined by the conditions of true knowledge, then these conditions cannot themselves enjoy objective validity. Simply by investigating the conditions of knowing as a necessary prelude to attaining objective knowledge, transcendental logic falls into an insoluble dilemma. Although it rightly criticizes the dogmatic acceptance of givens in prescriptive formal logic, transcendental logic cannot remove its own dependence upon givens without forsaking its explication of the transcendental conditions of knowledge. As much as transcendental logic strives to save the autonomy of reason from dogmatism, it reduces that autonomy to a formal liberty operating within a

given framework that reason can never justify or criticize.

Transcendental logic might escape this bind *if* the standpoint of the transcendental logician could be equalized with the knowing it examines. The knowing of transcendental logic would then be constituted with the same objectivity that it mandates for valid knowledge. Reference to the transcendental conditions of knowledge would no longer dogmatically assert a given, unconstituted foundation. If this could be accomplished, allowing the critique of knowing to become identical to the knowing under critique, the element of givenness in the transcendental condition would be eliminated. Instead of determining something else, the transcendental condition would now determine itself. Rather than being something given, it would be determined in accord with the transcendental logic whose substance it is. Transcendental logic would turn into a self-determining logic of objectivity, whose explication of the possibility of true knowledge would satisfy the same requirements it establishes for valid objects of thought.

Although transcendental logic's problems point to such a solution, the latter's attainment would cancel the entire transcendental enterprise. Transcendental logic rests upon the premise that the conditions of knowing can be antecedently investigated without introducing actual knowledge claims about particular objects. Knowing can have transcendental conditions, juridical conditions of knowing rather than conditioned objects of knowledge, only if the object of knowing can be distinguished from the structure of knowing. If transcendental logic were to become self-determining, so that the knowledge it examines were the same knowing exercised by the transcendental logician, the distinction between knowledge and its object would disappear, making impossible any investigation of knowing prior to that of its object. This leaves transcendental logic at an impasse. Either it accepts the given character of the transcendental condition and succumbs to the reliance upon givenness it seeks to repudiate or it eliminates that element and annuls itself. However it proceeds, transcendental logic cannot supply the self-legitimation of reason philosophy demands.

Systematic Logic and Self-Determination

Although the problems of transcendental logic lead it to the brink of collapse, this does not render hopeless reason's quest for self-justification. Together with the failure of prescriptive formal logic, the impasse of transcendental logic teaches instead that philosophy cannot be presuppositionless and self-grounding if it relies on either given or determined determinacy to supply reason with its order and validity. So long as reasoning is stamped with any

residue of givenness, it remains shackled to an assumed content that deprives it of the unconditioned universality needed to provide justification and transform opinion into knowledge. In demonstrating this through its own demise, transcendental logic points beyond itself to an alternative prescriptive logic that does not succumb to such problems.

This is systematic logic, whose mandate follows directly from the central dilemma of the transcendental turn. In order for transcendental logic to avoid dogmatically asserting the conditions of knowing, it had to become self-determining. It could not do this, however, without canceling itself by eliminating the givenness of the transcendental conditions, which alone allows them to be what they are, the antecedent determiners of objectivity. This suggests that prescriptive logic must indeed conceive reason as self-determined to escape dogmatism, but that this solution is achievable only when reason has neither any privileged given nor determiner at its root.

Systematic logic takes up this challenge and attempts to work out a logic with no primitive terms or principles. In undertaking this endeavor, pioneered by Hegel in his *Science of Logic*, systematic logic makes manifest that presuppositionlessness, self-grounding, and unconditioned universality all consist in self-determination. This may sound novel, both before Hegel and after legions of Hegel misinterpreters. Nevertheless, the plausibility of developing prescriptive logic as self-determined determinacy gains credibility once self-determination is examined in light of what reason must be to justify its own privileged role in seeking truth.

First, self-determination enjoys or, indeed, *is* identical with presuppositionlessness in that what is neither given nor determined but self-determined rests on nothing antecedent to itself. Although self-determination gives itself determinacy, it has no givenness whatever. A determiner of determined determinacy, such as the choosing will,⁷ cannot fail to have a character prior to its positing of something other than itself. Otherwise there is no determinate positor in a position to posit something else. Self-determination, by contrast, cannot have any form or content until it has determined itself. If it did, it would fail to be *self*-determined and instead possess a nature given prior to its activity, an activity that would thereby fail to be fully self-informing.

⁷ The choosing will has a nature consisting in not only an animal organism possessing self-consciousness, but the faculty of choice on which all decisions are predicated. Although individuals must have choice to engage in self-determination, in acting autonomously, they give themselves artificial, conventional agencies, such as that of property owner, morally accountable agent, spouse, member of civil society, and self-governing citizen, whose character is determined through their actions towards one another.

Instead of falling prey to such heteronomy, self-determination exhibits a freedom from givenness so radical that it can only be conceived to issue from nothing at all. In other words, self-determination must begin from sheer indeterminacy, for otherwise it would rest on a foundation that it has not determined, leaving it dependent rather than free.

Secondly, self-determined determinacy is self-grounding insofar as whatever form or content it has is a product of itself. Because self-determination proceeds from nothing and generates its own order and substance without reference to anything else, all its aspects and relations rest upon what it has determined itself to be, which is nothing other than self-determined determinacy. What self-determination actually *is*, however, can only be determined at the conclusion of its own process of determination, since until then, the “content” of self-determined determinacy is not yet at hand. Conversely, the “form” or “logic” of its determining is also available no sooner than the conclusion of self-determination, insofar as the ordering principle of the content is what has here given itself its own determination. Indeed, to speak of a “form” and “content” of self-determination is inappropriate since neither can be distinguished from the other. The content of self-determination is its own self-ordering, just as its form is the same content that orders itself.

All this presuppositionless, self-grounding melding of form and content signifies that self-determination is unconditionally universal or, more precisely, unconditioned universality itself. Because self-determined determinacy owes its entire character to itself, nothing conditions it. Even though it has a determinate content, what is particular about it is neither limited by any given circumstance nor relative to anything other than itself. Self-determination instantiates only itself and it is this independent individuality that gives it a universality free of all conditions.

The unity of self-determination thereby has a very special relation to the particular content of which it is the “self”. With respect to this its own determinacy, self-determination is universal because the developed content is nothing but *its* instantiation. The self-identity of the subject of self-determination is not like an abstract quality that inheres in individuals possessing further unrelated character. The self-determined self instead has a universality indistinguishable from its particular content, for it has its free unity by being the very same self-determined determinacy in which that content consists. Such universality is concrete, not abstract, containing every aspect of its particularization within its unity. Accordingly, its particularization is a universal particular, containing the very process of self-determination that it instantiates. If individuality consists in a unification of universal and particular, where the uniqueness of its particular content comprises the general identity of the individual, then self-determination exhibits individuality or, rather, self-

determination is the determinacy of individuality.⁸

One might suspect that ascribing self-determined determinacy the requisite features of presuppositionlessness, self-grounding and unconditioned universality presupposes what self-determination is as well as what philosophy must be to think the truth. If, however, one simply makes no assumptions, eliminates all givens and given determiners, and dispenses with all formal and transcendental logic, one ends up with self-determination and with it, everything enabling self-justification.

To begin without any assumptions is to begin with nothing at all - with indeterminacy. If anything were to follow from nothing without illicit introduction of any given content or given process of determination, it would have to arise from indeterminacy in a totally self-generated way. Since nothing else would be available to provide it with character, what it is would have to be self-determined. Moreover, it would not be the self-determination of any given substrate but a self-determination issuing from indeterminacy, incorporating nothing to start with. It would thus have to be self-determination *per se*. Resting on no determinate foundation, it would then be radically self-grounding. Having no conditions, it would be unconditionally universal. Finally, possessing a character it owes exclusively to itself, it would be individual.

Admittedly, even if the only thing that could arise from indeterminacy were self-determination, this would not guarantee that anything can follow from it. One can well object that beginning from a presuppositionless starting point invites theoretical anarchy and that without given premises and some given procedure, nothing at all could ever possibly result.

Proceeding from indeterminacy by developing self-determination does not, however, amount to conceptual chaos. Foregoing reliance upon all given principles of method and all assumptions about topic is not equivalent to giving free reign to arbitrariness. Allowing both method and content to issue from the caprice of the theorist would hardly be congruent with presuppositionless science and self-determination. Instead it would comprise a science issuing from a privileged determiner, the theoretical anarchist, and would therefore consist not in self-determination but in an externally determined subject matter owing its form and content to the arbitrary stipulating of that theorizer.

While presuppositionlessness and self-determination are not synonymous with conceptual anarchy, there can be no *positive* criteria for judging whether a particular candidate for systematic logic has properly developed its putatively presuppositionless, self-grounding subject matter. Any application of positive criteria must be precluded since it would involve standards of method and

⁸ For a detailed systematic treatment of this connection see Chapter 4.

content given externally instead of being generated within what is to be judged. Such criteria could have no validity for they would be or rest upon assumptions, unlike bonafide elements of the self-determination from indeterminacy that presuppositionlessness could alone entail.

The lack of positive criteria for judging systematic logic does not rob it of necessity nor leave it beyond critical validation. What allows for theoretical necessity in the first place is just the liberation from prior standards. All criteriological knowing is victim to skeptical challenge due to the dilemma of evaluating truth on the basis of given criteria, which, as merely given, are always open to question. A candidate for systematic logic can be evaluated instead in a purely negative fashion by ensuring that none of its determinations owe their character or order of presentation to extraneously given material or an extraneous determiner.

Excluding all appeal to external criteria and procedures is tantamount to following the purely immanent development by which self-determined determinacy would constitute itself from an indeterminate starting point. The logic that presents this development would be systematic in that the order of terms would be bound up with their content. Instead of introducing topics by external fiat, turning arbitrarily from one to any other, presuppositionless logic would systematically follow an ordering dictated by how each determination along the way transforms itself into some specific successor that builds a further stage in the self-development issuing from indeterminacy. Indeed, the entire development would comprise a system in its own right, where each element has its proper place as a component in the immanent process by which the whole constitutes itself.

These programmatic considerations may suggest how self-determined determinacy could be developed presuppositionlessly without theoretical anarchy. They do not, however, indicate how any move can be made beyond indeterminacy to something determinate. Why there should be determinacy is not yet answered. Nevertheless, that question can only be asked by systematic logic. Any theorizing that instead operates with given determinacy takes determinacy for granted and so cannot account for this most basic and pervasive assumption. So long as determinacy is presupposed, dogmatism cannot be escaped.

Systematic Logic and the Question of Determinacy

The first part of an answer to the question of determinacy can be found in the opening argument of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, a work that still is the only comprehensive attempt to present the presuppositionless, self-grounding

development of self-determined determinacy in which systematic logic consists. Tracing being, nothing, and becoming as the successive terms with which *Logic* unfolds, Hegel offers the initial steps in an account of determinacy that takes no determinacy for granted.⁹

This might seem preposterous, given the all too determinate stature that seems to bar being from figuring as the indeterminate starting point of systematic logic. After all, being has perennially served ontology as the fundamental foundation common to everything that is, inviting competing descriptions. Nonetheless, every attempt to give being some determinate character falls into the dilemma of characterizing being as such in terms of some particular being. No matter how legions of ontologists may have tried to give being determinacy, they can only escape this dilemma by granting being utter indeterminacy. For this reason, Hegel has aptly chosen “being” to name the indeterminacy with which systematic logic begins, just as what follows confirms how he has appropriately chosen “nothing” and “becoming” to designate what develops from being. This development gives a first taste of how systematic logic departs so radically from the foundational reasoning of formal and transcendental logic.

An insurmountable dilemma seems to bar the way. An advance from indeterminacy to something determinate cannot be caused or grounded or have any reason behind it at all. To search for any would impute a definite character to indeterminacy – being a determining principle. This would violate the constitutive nothingness of indeterminacy and reintroduce an element of givenness precluding presuppositionlessness. The only alternative seems hopelessly paradoxical. Because indeterminacy can have nothing determinate underlying it to serve as a mediating reason, if anything follows from indeterminacy it must arise utterly immediately without any grounds for doing so.

The proper answer to the question, “*Why* is there determinacy?”, is therefore that there is and can be no reason, for any attempt to assign one presupposes determinacy by treating indeterminacy as if it were a definite determiner. All that can be offered in answer is an account of *how* indeterminacy gives rise to something else. The real dilemma consists not in being unable to find a reason for the development, but in even seeking one in the first place. What follows from indeterminacy must do so immediately, which is to say, without reason and without being determined by anything.

Analogously, what follows from indeterminacy must be uncaused,

⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), ed. Hans-Jürgen Gawoll (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), pp. 71–2; G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, A. V. Miller, trans. (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 82–3.

ungrounded and undetermined in any way. It must be whatever it is without involving contrast to anything determinate and without containing any element of givenness, which, having no ground in indeterminacy, could only be present by some illicit introduction.

With all recourse to givens and given determiners excluded, what alone can follow from indeterminacy is *nothing*, which can only arise *immediately* from indeterminacy. When Hegel moves from “being” to “nothing” in his *Science of Logic*, he is tracing just this groundless passage from indeterminacy to an indistinguishable nothingness.

Admittedly, the groundless advent of nothing hardly signifies an emergence of determinacy. It does, however, engender something more than itself and the sheer indeterminacy from which it cannot be differentiated. With nothing one has a second category that, because it cannot be differentiated from indeterminacy (or “being” as Hegel aptly identifies it), immediately passes over into indeterminacy. Indeed, since there can be no intermediary between nothing and the indeterminacy from which it immediately arises, nothing is at once indeterminacy without any passage at all. Similarly, being no less passes over into nothing, for its indeterminacy is utterly identical to what alone can immediately follow from it without further support.

As a whole, then, the groundless succession of nothing from being simultaneously involves the immediate transitions of being into nothing and nothing into being. This process has nothing determinate within it among its component elements. Nonetheless, as a whole it comprises something distinguishable from the twin indeterminacies figuring within it. Consequently, this whole process can be separately designated “becoming” and comprise something distinguishable from being and nothing, out of whose transitions into one another it is composed. In this regard becoming is determinate, and, more significantly, it is a determinacy that issues from nothing determinate at all. Consequently, the move from being to nothing to becoming that Hegel follows accounts for how there is determinacy without taking any determinacy for granted.

Although this may suggest how systematic logic can get off the ground, establishing determinacies through which self-determination constitutes itself, it leaves unclear what relation the ensuing systematic logic has to the self-justification of reason and the quest for truth.

If systematic logic presents any argument at all, it is no more in the manner of the deductive reasoning of formal logic than in that of the constitution of transcendental logic. Although systematic logic may not be predetermined by any antecedent motivation, the historical motive for taking it seriously lies in recognition that the unjustifiable premises underlying both deductive reasoning and transcendental construction prevent either from serving as paradigms of

philosophical thought. Systematic logic may make use of propositions in explicating self-determination, but what it presents cannot be guided or legitimated by any propositional calculus, rules of syllogism, or logic of discovery.

Emancipated from all appeal to the given, systematic logic can proceed neither merely analytically nor synthetically. To be systematic, logic can no more analyze what is already present in a given subject matter than judge synthetically how given concepts are connected to one another in virtue of something external to them. Instead, as Hegel suggests,¹⁰ systematic logic must proceed analytically and synthetically at once, insofar as everything it develops will be both contained in the ultimate determinacy that is determining itself and not yet given in the preceding determinacies, which are stages in the self-determination proceeding through and incorporating them.

The "argument" of systematic logic will accordingly reside in the completely self-grounded character of what it presents. In the absence of any predetermined methodology or predetermined topic, the justification of the emergent ordering and content will have to lie in nothing other than how both owe their determinacy entirely to themselves. So long as they do, their unfolding achieves the perennial aim of all philosophical investigation, the aim of accounting within itself for every aspect of its own inquiry. Since what is offered is self-determination, systematic logic will succeed in attaining self-justification by presenting the logic or determinacy of self-justification itself.

Nonetheless, systematic logic cannot claim to be a logic of thinking or a logic of reality. Systematic logic presents self-determination *per se* rather than the self-determination of a given content, be it of reality or, more specifically, of mind. Consequently, the categories of systematic logic are not categories of reality anymore than of thought. They are instead categories of determinacy without further qualification. Possessing this unprecedented formality, provided by liberation from the given, systematic logic is neither an ontology of true being nor an epistemology of true knowledge. How, then, can systematic logic contribute to reason's self-justification and the attainment of truth? Even if systematic logic uncovers in self-determination the structure of presuppositionless, unconditioned universality, and self-grounding, how does this solve philosophy's preeminent dilemma?

By itself, systematic logic provides a seemingly paradoxical answer to these questions. By developing self-determination as presuppositionless, self-grounding determinacy, systematic logic indicates that the whole project of

¹⁰ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), ed. Hans-Jürgen Gawoll (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994), p. 300; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 838.

prescriptive logic is misguided so long as it seeks the self-justification of reason's determinacy without first investigating determinacy *per se*. Failing this most basic investigation, any theory of reason or reality succumbs to the dogmatism of taking determinacy for granted. Systematic logic avoids this error by taking the problem of presuppositionlessness and self-justification to its radical extreme and providing a theory of determinacy in which no given is assumed. In so doing, systematic logic does not prescribe rules of thought or principles of reality, but instead conceives the true categories of determinacy. Their truth resides not in any correspondence to reality or thought but in the presuppositionlessness and unconditioned universality they possess as elements of self-determined determinacy. Only with them at hand is it possible to advance to a conception of reason and reality free from the hold of unexamined opinion. That conception, however, lies beyond the scope of systematic logic insofar as reality in general and thinking in particular incorporate determinacy with further qualification.¹¹ For this reason, systematic logic is only a first, yet necessary step in philosophy's quest for truth and self-justification.

¹¹ It is in light of this that Hegel does not address reason and philosophy thematically in the *Science of Logic*. He treats them instead as topics of *Realphilosophie*, properly conceivable in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. The latter presupposes both systematic logic and the *Philosophy of Nature*, insofar as mind involves determinacy in general as well as the nature of an animal organism interacting with its biosphere.

Chapter 2

Method in Systematic Logic

No problem appears more perplexing in systematic logic than that of method. Insofar as systematic logic investigates valid thinking, any methodological orientation seems self-defeating. Systematic logic can hardly presuppose how thought should be developed without begging the question, yet any employment of a determinate method seems to do just that. By conforming to any given procedure, systematic logic risks forfeiting the autonomy that reason must retain to examine itself without yielding to unquestioned dogma. Yet if systematic logic must proceed without any given, preconceived method, can its advance escape arbitrariness?

This dilemma haunts any reader of the pioneering attempt to develop systematic logic, Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Although Hegel continually intones the necessity of the passage from one category to the next, anyone seeking a methodological key is bound to be frustrated.

Hegel invites this frustration by failing to supply in advance anything that could count as a unitary doctrine of method. Instead he offers episodic reflections at different points along the way, whose compatibility, let alone justification, is far from obvious. The first of these accounts, scattered in the two introductory discussions, "General Notion of Logic" and "With What Must Science Begin?", lists general features that apply throughout the method's application.¹ A second account, surfacing in the remarks preceding the Logics of Being, of Essence and of the Concept, describes how each section has its own manner of advance, suggesting that the method operates differently in each logical sphere.² Finally, Hegel provides a third account at the very end of

¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 25, 38, 59–62; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 43, 54, 70–72.

² In these passages, Hegel intimates that whereas the categories of being pass over into one another, those of essence do not undergo transitions, but are posited, whereas those of the concept develop. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 71; Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), pp. 4–5; Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 28–30; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 81, 390–91, 596–7.

the Logic, where he first addresses the method in a self-consciously systematic fashion as a topic falling within logic under the heading of the Absolute Idea. This final analysis describes a three-stage method, unrelated to the division into logics of being, essence and the concept, that hardly seems to correspond to either of the two earlier accounts.³

The most familiar of these accounts is the introductory description of six general features of method, according to which 1) the form of logical development is in unity with its content; 2) the subject matter unfolds immanently, as a self-development; 3) logical science proceeds by means of determinate negation; 4) the movement of the categories is circular, such that the advance from the starting point is equally a regress towards the true ground on which the development rests; 5) the determination of the categories is neither merely analytic nor synthetic, but both at once; and 6) the development has its own method as its final result.

Although these characterizations are first listed without much ado, Hegel does outline a dual strategy for confirming whether they are the fundamental features of valid method. This lies in the twin discussions that introduce the systematic argument of the *Science of Logic*. In the first, entitled, "Notion of Logic in General", Hegel considers the nature of logic and examines what method must be adopted to permit logical science to achieve its aims. In the second, entitled, "With What Must the Science Being?", he analyzes how philosophy can be undertaken without being burdened by presuppositions, as in any appeal to foundations. As Hegel shows, these problems have one and the same solution, whereby satisfying the demands of logic equally allows philosophy to overcome foundationalism. This convergence not only makes intelligible why Hegel calls that with which philosophy begins a "Science of Logic", but also provides the key arguments for judging the legitimacy of his preliminary descriptions of method.

By considering each converging path in turn, we can resolve the initial perplexity of method in systematic logic, and pave the way for examining how reason unfolds.

Method As Determined From the Requirements of Logic

Logic consists in the thinking of thinking. Although logic may be called a formal science, in that it is not a thinking about particular objects of thought, as Hegel points out, logic has a subject matter all its own: the determination of

³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 287–300; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 827–38.

thought.⁴ For just this reason, the form of logic has a special relation to its content, setting logical science apart from other disciplines.

Since all other sciences conceive something other than thinking, the form in which their content is presented, namely, scientific thought, is different from their subject matter. This leaves their method something that cannot be established within their own investigations. Nonlogical sciences are therefore compelled to take their method for granted, as something that must already be at hand in order for their investigations to proceed. Because, however, the method of nonlogical sciences must be determined independently of the investigation of their particular subject matters, having the method in hand does not bring with it any content. Hence, the subject matter other sciences address must equally be given by acceptance of some concepts or other, since otherwise there would be no determinate content for their given method to address.⁵

In logic this distinction between form and content is overcome to the degree that logic consists in the thinking of thinking, or self-thinking thought. Whereas form and content fall asunder in other inquiries, the form and content of logical science are one and the same: thinking that thinks itself.

In this respect, logic proceeds upon the overcoming of the distinction of consciousness that Hegel claims is the prerequisite for systematic philosophy.⁶ This distinction, whose overcoming is purportedly achieved by the *Phenomenology of Spirit*'s immanent critique of consciousness's foundational knowing,⁷ consists in the differentiation of knowing from its object, where the standard of truth resides in the independent given comprising knowing's referent. So long as this distinction persists, knowing remains caught in the bind of representational cognition, never able to transcend its own representations and secure direct access to its object, as necessary to confirm their truth. By contrast, in logic, the object of inquiry, pure thought (that is, thought that thinks itself) is indistinguishable from the thinking cognition in which logic engages. Logical science therefore lacks the appeal to independent givens constitutive of the representational framework of consciousness. Given how the thoughts of logic refer to nothing but themselves, there can be no

⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 25; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43.

⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 25. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43.

⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 33; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 49.

⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 33; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 49.

question of logic seeking their truth in some distinct criteria. For just this reason there is nothing logical at hand to refer to until logical thinking has gotten underway. Since this eliminates any possibility of drawing a distinction between reference and referent, logical thought is nonrepresentational, lacking the constitutive distinction defining representational cognition.⁸

Hence, if the method of logic is the ordering of the content of logic, then the logical method will be at one with what it presents, in expression of the unity of form and content in logic. Because of this underlying unity, the methodological form of the thinking of thinking is only established in the determination of what thinking is by and within logical science. Consequently, the method of logic will not be conceivable apart from the content it orders. If anything like a doctrine of logical method were to be sought, it could only be obtained from the completed development of logic's subject matter. Since the logical unfolding of thought presents what is at one with its mode of presentation, only with completion of logic is the form in which thinking is thought fully at hand. Instead of being given at the start, as something distinct and independent of its topic, the method of logic can only be determinable as a result of the full exposition of the content logic presents.

This allows logical science to make an absolute beginning, avoiding the dependence upon a given method and given content characterizing other sciences. Because the unity of form and content in logic prevents logical method from being determined prior to the completed exposition of the content of logical thought, logic begins without any antecedently defined method. Similarly, since what logic is about has no independent being apart from logical thought, logic begins without any antecedently determined subject matter. By contrast, other sciences cannot make an absolute beginning. Because what they address is different from their theorizing, the form of their theorizing can no more provide the content it addresses than the subject matter examined can provide the form of its own theoretical presentation. As a result, the subject matter of other sciences must be independently given at the outset in order to be available, just as their method must be independently determined apart from thinking the subject matter of their particular science.⁹ Logic, by contrast, begins absolutely in that neither its content nor its method has any given character at the outset of logical investigation. Not before and outside but

⁸ This does not mean that logical thought is devoid of meaning. It is still about something, and, in that sense, intentional, even if what it is about is itself and not an independent given.

⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 25. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 43.

only in and through its thinking of thinking do logic's unitary topic and procedure get determined.

As a consequence, logic must proceed immanently, as a self-development. Since it has no given form or content, logic must generate its own subject matter and ordering, unless external interventions supply it with either along the way. The latter option, however, is ruled out by the unity of form and content defining logic's thinking of thinking. If any terms were externally introduced or externally ordered, the thought under examination would no longer be undertaking its own investigation. Instead, the train of logical thought would be broken and destroyed by a thinking that determines the content and/or order of the science yet stands outside its purview. To escape this outcome, logic must have an immanent development, where both what is thought and how it is thought are determined by nothing but the course of logical thinking itself. Insofar as logic develops a thinking that thinks itself, its development cannot fail to be immanent, for it is nothing but a self-development, where what is presented provides its own exposition.

It follows that logic is circular in that each advance represents a regress towards the ground on which the whole development rests. As a self-development uniting form and content, logical thinking only arrives at the completed determination of both what is under way developing itself and the order of its exposition at the conclusion of its working. Only then is the subject matter of the development determined, just as only then is the ordering principle or method of the advance at hand. As we have seen, both are what they are only as results of the development leading to and constituting them. Since the preceding development is nothing more than the succession of stages by which logical thought both constitutes and orders itself, each advance is a move towards the ground that determines and contains the prior stages as what they are: elements in the self-constitution of logical thought. This ground is the totality of logic, which only arises as a result of the completed development.

Hence, logic is not caught in a holism of coherence, where the truth of each category is defined in terms of the given totality within which it resides. Nor is logical thought involved in rebuilding the ship in which it is already afloat. In either case, the content of logic would be determined by a framework encompassing and lying beyond it, leaving categories always determined by something falling outside them all. The unity of form and content would again be disrupted. The determining of logic would not reside in its own exposition, but in an external context that could never become subject to logical investigation, since it would always be presupposed by any logical thought.

Logical thought escapes the dilemmas of holism because the whole to which the categories belong is not something given at the outset of the development, providing an omnipresent determining context, but rather a result that only

contains and orders them at the end of its self-development. On the one hand, the totality that proves itself to be the ground of the preceding development can be completely transparent to logical thought, for it is precisely what that development has consisted of thinking through. On the other hand, this totality is not some irreducible given that thought must accept as its unquestionable foundation. Because logical thought arrives at the conception of this totality without submitting its labors to any external guide, this resultant whole is not an ungrounded assumption. On the contrary, it owes every aspect of itself to the development leading to it. Because this development is the self-constitution of self-thinking thought in its entirety, neither resting on anything else nor following any foreign principle, the totality of logical thought is self-grounding, mediated by nothing but its own unfolding.

Hence, the pure thought of logic is just as much unmediated as mediated. It is unmediated to the extent that, as a whole, nothing else determines it. On the other hand, it is equally mediated, since, instead of being given, in the manner of a static form that requires an independent thinker to posit it and relate it to others, self-thinking thought is what it is only through the mediation of the categorial development of logic.

Similarly, logical thought is at once analytic and synthetic. The self-thinking of thought is analytic insofar as every logical category is contained in the resultant totality comprising both the ordering principle and subject of logical science. At the same time, self-thinking thought is synthetic in that each new category is not contained in those that precede it. If it were, the order and content of the ensuing development would already be given in the first category, rendering the method and topic of logic matters that logical science must take for granted rather than establish. Self-thinking thought is able to avoid presupposing both, and thereby retain a synthetic dimension, precisely because its pure thinking arrives at a complete determination of its method and subject matter only as the result of its labors. This equally allows self-thinking thought to retain an analytic dimension because, in arriving at its method and content, it incorporates the entire preceding development.

Finally, in following an advance no less analytic than synthetic, self-thinking thought can be said to proceed by means of determinate negation. Insofar as each successive category supplants its predecessor with a nonderivative content, it negates what precedes it, yielding something other. Yet, to the degree that it equally incorporates its predecessors as constitutive elements of its nonderivative determination, its negation of its predecessor is determinate, in that the otherness it opposes to the former is equally determined in reference to it. Since each successive category leading to the final totality of self-thinking thought undergoes this dual negation and incorporation of what

follows it, logical development can thus be described as being ordered by determinate negation.

This might suggest that logic is subject to a formal ordering principle distinct from its content of self-thinking thought. The prior analysis of how determinate negation rests on the equally analytic and synthetic character of the advance should, however, indicate that the unity of form and content is the very precondition for determinate negation playing any role. Because determinate negation ties how categories succeed one another to what they are, it is an ordering principle that cannot be detached from a development where form and content are thoroughly intertwined.¹⁰

The Reflexivity of Prescriptive Logic

All these ramifications of the demands of logic very neatly correspond to the six features cited in Hegel's first account of the method of his Science of Logic. But do they really follow from the concept of logic itself? After all, many different types of logic have been pursued. Some are merely descriptive, restricted to describing how thought in general has factually operated, whereas others are prescriptive, seeking to prescribe how valid thought should proceed. And within this broad division, logics have been developed that are formal, transcendental, or systematic. Although in every case logic involves a thinking about thinking, it is far from true that the thinking each logic engages in is identical to the thinking it is describing or prescribing.

In fact, formal logic and transcendental logic, to take the most widely practiced types, cannot possibly achieve a unity of form and content. The rules of inference that formal logic provides as the canon of thought cannot be described or prescribed by their own laws of entailment. Formal logic cannot practice what it preaches because all entailment ultimately proceeds from some indemonstrable given premise, which can only be known by some nondemonstrative knowing, whereas establishing rules of inference by means of themselves would beg the question. Similarly, transcendental logic cannot transcendently constitute its own transcendental arguments. Because transcendental logic seeks to determine some privileged structure of cognition comprising the prior conditions by which objectivity is known, transcendental logic must always define those structure directly rather than conceive them as

¹⁰ This is largely what Hegel's analysis of the method in the absolute Idea demonstrates when it shows how the determinate negation by which logic advances expands into the whole system of logical determination. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 300; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 838.

determined by themselves like all other objects of knowledge. If it tried the latter route, it would either have to take what they are for granted or transform them into self-determined structures, eliminating the distinction between knowing and its object that first allows for the conditions of knowledge to be examined prior to an examination of particular objects of knowledge.¹¹

If an identity of form and content is not and cannot be achieved by formal and transcendental logics, this does not mean that it is not entailed by the concept of logic, understood as a prescriptive science of valid thought. Insofar as logic concerns not describing how individuals think but prescribing how they should think, logic will be valid only if what it establishes as the logic of valid thought is equally the logic ordering its own investigation. If instead the thinking logic employs is not one with the logic of valid thought it presents, the exposition of thought by logic will not be valid. Logical science therefore cannot be valid unless it achieves a unity of form and content. Since such a unity escapes every effort of formal and transcendental logics, they can never successfully prescribe how we should think.

A true science of logic must exhibit all the ramifications of this unity so far discussed. First, since a properly prescriptive logic aims at establishing what valid thinking is, its own method cannot be taken for granted at the start. Instead, logical method falls within logical investigation, comprising none other than its ultimate subject matter. Since the method of logic is therefore at once the form and content of its investigation, logical science must begin with no antecedently given method or subject matter. If either just its method or just its content were given, the offered candidate of valid thought would differ from its exposition, undermining the legitimacy of each. If, on the other hand, both its method and subject matter were antecedently determined, the science of logic would accomplish nothing in its own right, leaving the putative form and content of valid thinking arbitrary assumptions, postulated outside of logical investigation. To be worthy of the name, logical science must rather arrive at both its method and subject matter as a result of its own labors. Hence, the very concept of prescriptive logic does entail that it begin absolutely, without any preconception of its form or content. Its own method and subject matter must instead be established at the very end of its investigation, at which point it completes what comprises its self-exposition of valid thinking.

It seems paradoxical that the idea of prescriptive logic would entail a development of thought whose topic and ordering are totally undetermined by any antecedent, independently given principle. How can a logic whose form and content have no prior determination be entailed by anything at all? The

¹¹ As we have seen in Chapter 1, this predicament leaves transcendental logic unable to escape the dogmatic appeal to the given that it seeks to overcome.

paradox disappears once it is recognized that the concept of prescriptive logic has no further positive filling apart from the preconception-free conceptual development that alone can bring it to realization, or, properly speaking, self-realization. This recognition need not be at hand to legitimate the science of logic. Rather, it is something the science itself establishes at its end by fully determining the idea of prescriptive logic and demonstrating that it is an idea that determines itself.

These considerations of the requirements inherent in logic thus give support to Hegel's claims that the form of logical development is in unity with its content, that the science of logic consists in an immanent self-development, that it exhibits determinate negation and is equally analytic and synthetic, and that its movement of categories takes the form of a circle, where every advance is a retreat to the ultimate ground having the determination of method as its final result.

Let us grant that these strictures of method are all necessary fulfillments of the demands of logical science. Are they, however, methodological features not just of logic, but of philosophical thought in general? As Hegel makes clear in his other introductory discussion, "With What Must the Science Begin?", the Science of Logic is concerned not just with bringing logic to completion but with allowing philosophy to achieve its constitutive aims. Do philosophy's requirements entail the very same methodological prescriptions inherent in logical science?

The Method of Philosophy as the Method of Logic

In asking, with what must the science of philosophy begin?, Hegel ponders how philosophy can overcome foundationalism, that is, begin without presuppositions and achieve the complete theoretical self-responsibility that philosophical thought needs to rise above doxology. The challenge is twofold. Negatively speaking, philosophy must liberate itself from reliance upon dogmatic givens, be they contents or procedures that have not already been established within and by philosophical investigation. Positively speaking, philosophy must ground itself, legitimating its subject matter and method by its own means alone. These demands are two sides of the same coin. To proceed without foundations, philosophy must independently establish all its own terms and method, just as to be self-grounding and self-justifying, philosophy must be thoroughly free of foundations.

If we examine these dual requirements in light of Hegel's analysis of the starting point of philosophical discourse, we find two coordinate features. On the one hand, philosophy must start with no givens, since to start with any

determinate content or method involves presuppositions whose legitimacy has not been established within philosophy. To proceed without foundations, philosophy can thus only begin with indeterminacy or being, signifying the exclusion of any assumptions concerning either the subject matter or procedure of philosophy.

On the other hand, if philosophy is to proceed from indeterminacy and ground itself, its conceptual development must be self-determining. Since the content philosophy presents cannot derive from any source other than what philosophical thinking sanctions and since the method by which its content is ordered must equally be established by philosophy, both what and how philosophy thinks must be determined in and through philosophical thought. Hence, philosophical reason must be genuinely autonomous, achieving not just the negative freedom of liberty from external ordering but also the positive freedom of self-determination.

Taking these coordinate features together, whereby philosophy starts with indeterminacy and then exhibits self-determination, it follows that philosophy will commence by presenting nothing but self-determination *per se*, which, it should already be clear, amounts to the logic of self-grounding. Because philosophy must begin with indeterminacy, its ensuing self-determination cannot be the self-determination of some further substrate, such as any independently given notions of reality or thought. If it were, philosophy would rest upon prephilosophical assumptions and fail to achieve either its negative freedom of presuppositionlessness or its positive freedom of self-grounding. Hence, the very autonomy of reason requires that it proceed from indeterminacy rather than from any determinate foundation. Little else could be expected, given how what is genuinely self-determined has no determination prior to what it determines itself to be.

Granted that the answer to how philosophy must begin is that philosophical reason starts with indeterminacy and presents self-determination *per se*, it remains to be shown how this dual prescription entails the six features of Hegel's introductory account of method.

To begin with, does it entail a unity of form and content? Is foundation-free discourse, proceeding from indeterminacy and presenting the logic of self-determination or self-grounding, a conceptual development whose content and ordering coincide? Hegel suggests as much in observing how philosophers had first considered the principle of philosophy as if it merely concerned what content should be conceived, but had now recognized that the act of knowing was essential to truth. The method of philosophy must accordingly be united with its content and its form united with its principle, so that what is first for

thinking also be first in the path of thinking.¹² If philosophy begins with indeterminacy to be free of foundations and to provide the only admissible commencement for a development determined by nothing but itself, then no determinate method can already be operative. The indeterminate content with which philosophy begins is therefore equally indeterminate in form. Contra Kierkegaard,¹³ the beginning not only begins with immediacy but begins immediately.¹⁴

Moreover, since what proceeds from indeterminacy can only be self-determination *per se*, its ordering is a self-ordering, where the succession of categories is equally rooted in what they present. The content of the ensuing development just as much determines the form of its own presentation as its ordering is inseparable from its content. Because what is being determined is self-determination *per se*, how it is being determined is identical to what it is. If instead the form of exposition were distinct from its content, the content would be ordered by something else, undermining its self-determined character, just as the determining principle of the content would no longer coincide with the identity of "self" of the latter, as self-determination requires.

If this suggests how the demands of philosophy entail the same unity of form and content required by logic, it equally entails that the method emerge as the final term of philosophy's initial undertaking. The ordering principle or method of self-determination *per se* consists in nothing less than the "self" or subject matter that is under way determining itself. Consequently, the ordering of what philosophy first presents is not at hand until self-determination has completed its own development, at once establishing what it is and how it is determined. As the unity of form and content already implies, only when the content of self-determination has constituted itself is its form or method equally established.

This means that philosophical discourse, like logic, will proceed immanently as a self-development whose every advance is equally a retreat towards its ground. Insofar as philosophy must begin with indeterminacy and offer self-determination *per se*, it consists in a self-development whereby the

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 56; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 68.

¹³ Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 101–2.

¹⁴ For a discussion of why this immediacy is not disrupted by the mediation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, see Richard Dien Winfield, "The Route to Foundation-Free Systematic Philosophy", *Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring 1984), pp. 337 ff; also in Richard Dien Winfield, *Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) p. 19 ff.

subject matter provides for its own exposition, generating its own content and ordering. For this to occur, each new determination must be incorporated into the self-constitution of the subject matter whose self-determination is under way. Otherwise, the connection between terms would depend upon something outside their development. Since what each new determination is a determination of is only established at the end of the development, every advance beyond the indeterminate beginning represents a closing in on the whole that will end up containing every preceding determination as an element in its own constitution. Although the resulting whole is not a given foundation, antecedently underlying the development, it turns out to be the ground supporting each category, providing the sole basis for determining of what they are part.

This enables the ensuing movement to be analytic and synthetic at once. As in logic's self-thinking of thought, here each advance is synthetic by presenting something not already contained in what precedes it, yet analytic insofar as it provides nothing that is not contained within the whole that is in the process of determining itself.

Similarly, the development no less proceeds by determinate negation. Each new term does represent a negation of what precedes it because it has an irreducible otherness. If it lacked that element and were merely contained in its predecessor, the movement would not be self-determining but would instead be determined by contents given prior to the ensuing development. Because, however, each term ends up integrated within the whole of self-determined determinacy, the otherness differentiating the terms from their predecessors equally incorporates the former terms as constitutive elements of the determination under way. Consequently, each term arises through a determinate negation, negating the preceding term by comprising something other to it yet incorporating this predecessor as an element of its own determination.

In sum, then, the requirements of philosophy in general entail the same methodological prescriptions that are required by logic. If logic is to achieve its constitutive goals, it must achieve precisely what philosophy turns out to demand. In fact, the self-thinking thought that logic should comprise is identical to the presuppositionless self-determined discourse to which philosophy must aspire. This is why Hegel has good reason to call the discourse with which philosophy must begin a science of logic and to introduce it with parallel discussions of the methodological problems of logic and of philosophy in general. Their convergence gives us good reason to leave the perplexity of method behind and address concretely how something can be conceived without foundations.

Chapter 3

Determinacy Without Appeal to the Given

The Self-Evidence of the Category of Something

What it is to be determinate, to have quality, to be something hardly appears to be a problem worthy of thought. How could anything be more self-evident or familiar or resistant to questioning? It seems virtually impossible to be unacquainted with the category of something, whether in reality or in thought or speech. To encounter anything real at all is to encounter something, whereas to think or speak any intelligible content is already to refer to something thought or spoken. Indeed, it is unimaginable how one could fail to understand something, since if one did lack all notion of something, there would be nothing determinate to understand or encounter.

Yet despite the ubiquitous self-evidence of categories of determinate being, of quality, of something, philosophers have unremittingly asked, "What is something?" and offered manifold discordant answers. To some extent, the divergence of response has been due to the varied way in which the question has been formulated. Some have posed the problem in a narrowly ontological form, where what is at issue is how something can be in reality. Others have treated the question in a narrowly epistemological manner, focusing their concern upon what something is as an object of knowledge. Still others have limited their inquiry to the semantic or psychological problems of how something can be meant in speech or represented in thought. Each of these formulations comprises a different question calling for a different answer, to the extent that meaning, representation, knowledge and reality can be distinguished. For just this reason, no such formulation inquires into what something is *per se*, as a category. All these formulations instead consider the category of something as further qualified by being meant, represented, realized or known. Since these further qualifications involve an application of the category of something, the controversies specific to their formulations can hardly be addressed without accounting for the category itself. It is here, in this account, which all ontological, epistemological, psychological, and semantic

considerations take for granted when they apply the category, that the philosophical controversy surrounding something is rooted.

Admittedly, much if not most philosophical debate concerning what something is has committed the category mistake of confusing ontological, epistemological, psychological, or semantic explanations with the account of something *per se*. This has occurred even though all such efforts automatically neglect and presuppose the categorial exposition by addressing something from the outset with added qualifications. Eliminating this confusion, however, does not augur any easy resolution to the philosophical problem that something presents. The moment something is itself called into question rather than treated as an unproblematic given, analyzable straight away in its relation to reality, knowing, or meaning, the possibility of a categorial account seems as paradoxical as it is indispensable.

Since things, representations, meanings, reasons, and knowledge are all something to the extent that they are determinate, a philosophical account of something finds itself in the peculiar position of being unable to employ any of these other terms as categorial elements of its exposition. If any were employed not just as means of expression but as components of the category of something, terms incorporating something would be used to determine it, causing the whole enterprise to collapse in a vicious circularity. As soon as the category of something is specified by means of elements that are already something themselves, the question is begged.

This does not mean that an account of something must be precluded simply because all inquiry involves living individuals inhabiting a historical world using a given language to express their thoughts. None of these determinate conditions need interfere so long as no claim is made that any one of them enters in determining what is and what is not entailed in the category of something. Provided they are treated not as transcendental principles juridically determining what counts as knowledge but as conditions of all inquiry, which, as such, permit right as well as wrong theories to be thought and expressed, their contribution is a matter of indifference to the truth of what they allow to be expressed.

The real problem concerns instead how the category of something can be accounted for without being taken for granted. To explicate something without begging the question, what it is must somehow be determined without employing anything that is already determinate. In regard to qualitative determinacy in general, this signifies that an account of quality must avoid using any antecedently given qualitative terms in specifying its subject. Yet how can something be explicated if its account cannot rely upon any determinate givens?

Calling the category of something into question seems to present an

insoluble dilemma. To provide a noncircular answer would appear to require accounting for determinacy with no other resource than indeterminacy. That, however, seems *prima facie* impossible. After all, how can the category of something be explicated in terms of nothing? Yet, if that cannot be done, all inquiry will be left resting on a dogmatic foundation consisting in the assumption of something, an assumption that is always present the moment a determinate subject matter is considered, but that can never be fully warranted if the very category of something defies analysis.

The Lure of the Irreducibility of Determinacy

If this impasse does not reinstate the self-evidence of something, it provides ample incentive to evade questioning what it is to be determinate by acknowledging the irreducibility of something. Instead of attempting to construct something from nothing, why not take the opposite route, admit that something underlies all account of what is determinate, and attempt to conceive how every determinacy is founded on a determinate given?

Logically speaking, there are two ways of pursuing this endeavor. One is to show how anything determinate is irreducibly explicable in terms of some privileged given. Alternately, one can argue that something has its determinacy in virtue of being determined by some privileged determiner.

These parallel strategies have frequently been pursued in narrowly ontological and epistemological or semantic terms, respectively. The appeal to an irreducible given has often taken the form of an identification of some real substrate as the foundation of all other determinate content, whereas the appeal to a privileged determiner has ever more commonly taken the form of a turn to the structure of consciousness, language, or culture as the ultimate arbiter of all definite meaning and knowledge. Nevertheless, both strategies involve an approach that applies as much to something as such as to how something is meant, thought, known, or realized. Only when these options are examined in their full generality can the root of their problems be exposed and remedied.

Dilemmas of the Theory of Substance

The approach that acknowledges the irreducibility of something by conceiving a given foundation for all determinacy has classically been pursued as a theory of substance. Its argumentative strategy has consisted in showing that no account can be made of any determinacy that is meant, known, or real without appeal to a given substrate on which all determinate qualities and relations are

based and which all determinate things exemplify. Although the advocates of the theory of substance have disputed whether there are one or many substances, whether all or any of the qualities and relations rooted in substance are necessary or contingent, and which can be objects of different sorts of knowledge, their disputes have all rested on the acceptance of this common argumentation on behalf of substance itself.

The Justifications of Substance

Classically formulated by Aristotle, but recast and reenacted by countless others, this argument has an undeniable force in all three of its aspects.

The justification of substance in regard to meaning comes first, for if substance is a precondition for meaning anything determinate, all discourse depends upon its semantic foundation. Naturally, the problem of determinacy is crucial to speech, for if words lack specific meaning, they become meaningless, annihilating all conversation whether in the inner dialogue of thought or in discourse among individuals.¹ Yet for meaning to be determinate, what is meant must have definite attributes, and these must not all be accidental. They cannot be only accidental, both because the accidental attributes of something would be infinite and hence beyond enumeration,² and because there would be no fixed point of reference to which the accidents could be predicated.³ For there to be attributes, accidental or not, there must be something to which they are attributed – the given subject of their predication. Although this subject must have attributes to be something definite, it must still have its own determinate character in order to be a subject of predication, distinct from its attributes. Hence, meaning requires not only that what is meant have necessary attributes but that what is meant involve an already determinate subject of which these are predicates. For anything determinate to be meant there must be given substance – a determinate substrate providing a subject of predication.

If this is the case for meaning, it must also hold true for knowledge. Knowledge is empty unless it is determinate. For anything determinate to be known, the minimal requirements of meaning must be met. If knowledge is justified opinion and an opinion is meaningless unless it expresses something determinate, there can be no determinate knowledge unless there is a given subject of predication to provide determinacy for knowledge's warranted belief. Determinate knowledge therefore rests on substance to the extent that meaning does.

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Gamma, ch. 4, 1006b9–10.

² Ibid., Book Gamma, ch. 4, 1007a13–15.

³ Ibid., Book Gamma, ch. 4, 1007a33–35.

Further, if anything determinate is to be known, it cannot consist entirely in accidental attributes. This would deprive all knowledge claims of any specific relation to their object, as well as render what is known utterly meaningless. Knowledge of anything determinate must thus be knowledge of something that involves a given substrate with a necessary, determinate relation to some specific qualities inhering in it. This will be true just as much of knowledge of determinate concepts as of knowledge of determinate things. In each case, substance seems to enter in as an irreducible factor of knowledge.

In regard to reality, the arguments for the irreducibility of substance are fully analogous. For anything to have a determinate existence, must there not be some underlying given substrate, bearing certain attributes rather than others? Although attributes may already have determinate meaning by being subjects of a predication defining their specific quality, they cannot exist by themselves without contradicting their character as commonly attributable qualities, as "third man" arguments can testify. The existence of something determinate requires a real substrate in which quality can actually inhere, a substrate that must already have its own character in distinction from its qualities simply in order to be their bearer. Further, since something becomes indistinguishable from everything else if all its qualities are accidental, the given substance can underlie a determinate being only insofar as it has a determinate relation to its attributes, where at least some are essentially its own. In these respects, the reality of something determinate depends upon presence of substance, comprising a given substrate, determined in some essential way through its attributes but without being reducible to them.

The Fatal Enigma of Substance

All of these arguments stand or fall upon the resolution of a problem vital to the irreducibility of substance. The moment one grants that something meant, known, or real has its determinacy in virtue of a given substrate in which all quality inheres and to which all relation refers, the question naturally arises as to how that given substrate can have its own determinate character independently of all the meanings, knowledge, and things that owe their determinacy to it. If everything is either substance or a quality or relation of substance, substance itself would have to be intelligible without reference to any particular substances or to any qualities or relations. Yet how can the given substrate of all qualities and relations have any definite character of its own without them?

An easy answer seems to be that substance has its own specific nature by virtue of being a composite of distinct elements – form and matter, or some such contrast of essentially inhering attributes and the substrate that becomes

further determined by bearing them. After all, although a given substrate of determinacy might have no specific character without some quality, it cannot just be quality. To be the determinate basis of quality and relation, substance must add to qualities something else that allows them to inhere in a determinate fashion and comprise an identifiable something. But if substance is to be accounted for as the unity of such components, while maintaining its primacy as the basis of all determinacy, how can these components be something determinate in their own right prior to the formation of substance that arises from their combination?

Attributes cannot have any meaning nor be known or realized without referring to some given substance that is itself distinguished by qualities of its own. Similarly, the substrate awaiting attribution is utterly indeterminate and hence meaningless, unknowable, and nothing at all, unless it already has determinacy as something given – that is, according to the theory of substance, as a composite bearer of some quality. In either regard, the components of substance cannot provide an account of its character without taking it for granted or repudiating its constitutive role as the basis of each and every determinate something.

If substance cannot be determined in virtue of given definite components without falling into vicious circularity, substance will have to be determinate in virtue of what it is itself. Yet, if substance is to be determined by itself, it must lose its constitutive character as the irreducibly given something on which all determinacy rests. For if it has any irreducibly given character, it has qualities that it does not give itself, but simply bears from the outset.

The appeal to substance not only begs the question, but undermines itself through the vitiating circularity of allowing what makes something determinate to be already determinate.

The Dilemma of Rooting Determinacy in a Privileged Determiner

The collapse of the theory of substance shows that the account of something cannot lie in any given substrate – that is, in any prior something. In face of the inscrutable difficulty of conjuring something from nothing, this lesson has led more and more philosophers to refrain from claiming irreducible immediacy for any given content and to consider the category of something and all other determinations to be constituted in terms of epistemological or semantic conditions. Instead of advancing some meant or known term as the basis of all determinate being, these thinkers have taken the structures of knowing and meaning as irreducible foundations underlying the specification of each and every category, opinion, knowledge claim, and thing.

The argument on behalf of the irreducibility of such determining conditions has the same ring whether the conditions be characterized as the opposition of consciousness, the structure of language, the historical practices of culture, or a given conceptual scheme. In each case, some undeniable feature of the reality of discourse is picked out and given the privileged role of being the prior condition of all other terms.

For thinkers such as Kant and Husserl, the opposition of consciousness is unavoidably fundamental, due to the fact that all categories, meanings, knowledge, and objects of knowledge can be considered by us only as they are given in our conscious awareness. According to them, this signifies that all determinacy is mediated and determined by the structure of consciousness. Hence, as Kant suggests, the notion of an object of consciousness in general precedes the concepts of something and nothing,⁴ just as the notion of a representation is indefinable and ultimately unanalyzable insofar as all terms that could be employed to account for it would already be representations themselves. By the same token, Kant admits, the pure categories are equally irreducible and indefinable, since definition is itself a judgment and hence already contains these categories insofar as they are logical functions of judgment.⁵

Similarly, thinkers such as Wittgenstein argue that insofar as all discourse operates in terms of linguistic practice, every meaning, be it qualified as a category, an opinion, a knowledge claim, or an object, is irreducibly constituted by the structure of language that is operative in its expression. What it is to mean, know, or be something can thus only be accounted for by pointing to the way language allows these terms to be signified and communicated.

Alternately, those who follow Heidegger and Gadamer in emphasizing how consciousness and language are imbedded in historical, practical engagements argue that all discourse rests on these cultural practices, not just intentionality or grammar. Hence, no matter what terms might be employed to account for the category of something, each and every one will already be determined by the practices underlying the formation of frames of reference.

In each case, all inquiry is irreducibly situated within some encompassing conceptual scheme, which plays the same foundational role whether it be rooted in the pure categories of the understanding, ideal or ordinary language, or, most concretely, in the historical practices of a given culture.

Although the appeal of these arguments cannot be denied, they all rest upon

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, John Ladd, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 18, n. 11.

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A245, p. 344.

a critical maneuver, basic to transcendental logic, whose justification is far from self-evident. In each case, conditions of discourse are identified and then elevated to determining structures that not only make possible the thought and expression of subjects of inquiry but juridically constitute what they allow to be presented. It may be true that any account of the category of something will be undertaken by conscious individuals employing the language of a particular culture in accord with a certain conceptual scheme, but this does not mean that any of these enabling conditions can determine which account of something has validity. Indeed, the very fact that all of these conditions are operative in true as well as false discourse shows that it makes little sense to appeal to them in resolving questions of knowledge.

Although each version of this approach confidently presumes that it offers an encompassing account for every topic imaginable, what sets in relief their common dilemma are the difficulties that arise when the category of determinacy is itself at stake. If it is argued that what accounts for something being determinate is its constitution by some irreducible epistemic or semantic condition of discourse, the question naturally arises as to how that condition can have its own determinate character. It must not be what it is by virtue of other terms that it itself constitutes, since that would involve the circularity of taking its own specific character for granted. Yet, if the condition has a definite nature allowing it to be identified as intentionality, language games, some conceptual scheme, or whatever, how can it have this identity without involving given terms with their own qualities? If the epistemic or semantic condition in question is still to maintain its privileged position as the determining ground of all contents of discourse, how can these constitutive terms have their own character without already being mediated by the condition they determine?

If the privileged condition be identified, for instance, as the structure of consciousness, its own determination will already involve a whole slew of categories (subject, object, unity, relation, self-relation, and so on), whose own meanings should derive from intentionality. The same difficulty applies to every other case. If language games be given primacy, everything making linguistic practice what it is must be at hand, just as, if conceptual schemes or cultural contexts be made privileged conditions, what gives them their characteristic identity must already be determinate. Yet none of these constitutive factors can have any prior determinacy if the conditions they characterize are to be irreducible foundations of all discourse.

To escape this question-begging, the privileged determiner of all content must account for its own determinacy – that is, constitute itself as the constitutive condition of all discourse without relying upon any independently given terms. If all categories are to depend upon a conceptual scheme for their

character, that scheme must be the source of its own specifications. If that is the case, the categorial scheme by which all terms are specified will determine the categories that give it its own identity. Then the basis of determinacy will be self-determined.

Although the appeal to the irreducibility of conceptual schemes requires such a denouement, the conditions of discourse can no more be self-determining than can be substance. To play its defining role as the irreducible condition of discourse, an epistemic and/or semantic structure must have its privileged givenness prior to every term it grounds. Otherwise, it loses its irreducible primacy. To be self-determined, however, a conceptual scheme could not have any given character, for if it did, it would already be something prior to its act of constitution.

For this reason, the category of something cannot be accounted for by appealing to any privileged conditions of discourse and the transcendental logic they entail. The moment this strategy is adopted, the whole question is begged simply because something, be it a determinate category or a determinate thing, cannot owe its character as something to an independently given something. That is, alas, what any determinate condition of discourse already represents.

Conceiving Something Without Privileged Givens or Conceptual Schemes

Despite its seeming self-evidence, the irreducibility of something cannot be maintained, neither in terms of some privileged given underlying all quality and relation nor in terms of some privileged determiner of contents of discourse. This signifies that any philosophy that bases its argument upon something determinate condemns itself to self-vitiating circularity and dogmatism. It also means that philosophy must account for the category of something if it is to free its argument from a dependence upon factors it cannot make intelligible. Since every definite term or principle involves determinacy, only when philosophy establishes what determinacy is can it possibly achieve a thoroughgoing self-responsibility free of unexamined and inexplicable assumptions. Yet how can the category of something be explicated?

Clearly, its exposition cannot rely upon any given terms that are already determinate in their own right. Quality cannot be accounted for by appealing to anything qualitative, nor can something be determined in reference to factors that are independently something. Yet, if all question-begging is to be avoided, are there any viable options left?

Only two routes seem available, routes that may ultimately be no more distinct than feasible. One consists in determining determinacy by means of indeterminacy. This approach would escape the problem of circularity by

appealing to the one and only resource that is not already determinate. But is indeterminacy any resource at all, let alone one from which something determinate can be categorized?

Another possibility consists in conceiving something in terms of contrastive relations among factors such that neither the relations nor the factors involved have any determinate character prior to the constitution of something in which they figure. If such a conception is possible, it would also avoid question-begging by accounting for something without employing any terms that have an independently given character. Yet can there be any such development of a contrast with no predetermination?

Perhaps the only thinker to have pursued either of these options is Hegel, who does so in his *Science of Logic* by combining both in one and the same developmental argument. This argument, which inaugurates systematic logic and philosophy without foundations, must now be drawn upon to show how something can be conceived without any conceptual schemes – that is, without appeal to independently determinate categories, which would lead into a viciously circular impasse.

From Indeterminacy to Determinate Being

As we have seen, an exposition of the categories of determinacy cannot begin with any conceptual resources that already have quality and determinate being. Hence, if there is to be any categorial starting point from which something can be determined, it will have to be the category of indeterminacy, from which all quality, relation, and any other determinacy is excluded. It makes no difference whether this category be being or nothing. If indeterminacy be being that has no relation to anything else nor any distinctions within itself nor any undivided quality, it is nothing, the utter absence of all determinacy.⁶

Indeterminacy provides no resource for categorizing anything other than itself. It cannot be the reason or determiner of any additional category, for then it would have the very determinate character of being a cause or principle. Furthermore, it cannot be the means for determining anything whose own character rests on a contrastive relation to something determinate. If determinacy has definite character only in distinction from the quality of another determinacy, nothing determinate can possibly follow from indeterminacy. Quite literally nothing can proceed from indeterminacy, which is to say that only another indistinguishable indeterminacy can follow upon the indeterminacy with which we must begin. Whether we call the former “being”

⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 71–2; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 82–3.

and the latter “nothing” or the former “nothing” and the latter “being” makes no difference since to be indeterminate, each lacks all distinguishing marks. The key point is that once an account of determinacy begins as it must with indeterminacy, it has nowhere to go but to another category as indeterminate as the first.

This peculiar predicament immediately raises two questions. First, why should there be any such development from one indeterminacy to another? Second, how can such a move comprise any development at all?

The first question asks for reasons where there cannot be any. Any move from indeterminacy to another category cannot have a cause, a ground, or any explanatory principle at all. The moment any reason is offered either indeterminacy gets treated as a determiner of some sort, which violates its constitutive lack of all qualification, or some extraneous third term is surreptitiously introduced. Indeterminacy can stand as a starting point of further development only insofar as what follows, follows immediately, without any ground or reason at all. To ask for any explanation is tantamount to asking for indeterminacy to be replaced by a definite determinate principle, which necessarily subverts any attempt at conceiving determinacy *per se*.

Even if no reason be sought for why indeterminacy be followed by another indeterminacy, it is difficult to see how such a groundless succession involves any development. If the only successor to the category of indeterminacy can be an equally indeterminate category, which follows without any mediating principle or connection, is there any basis for claiming that an advance has been made? The moment the second category is offered, it ceases to be an advance insofar as its own indeterminacy leaves it without any mark by which it can be distinguished from the first category. If the first determinacy be called “being” and the second “nothing”, then nothing is being, which seems to signify that a move from being to nothing is no move at all, since it just reiterates the point of departure. By the same token, the first indeterminacy, being, is immediately what the second one is, nothing. Either way, the would-be succession of categories vanishes by itself into the selfsame indeterminacy, which neither becomes something else nor ever ceases to be at hand. If this is so, no categorial development can possibly emerge from indeterminacy, and, by extension, no account can be given of determinacy.⁷

Yet does the groundless succession of one indeterminacy by another offer no more than an undivided exposition of the same category of indeterminacy, empty and immobile? Admittedly, since the two categories are

⁷ Hegel discusses these objections in remarks 3 and 4 to chapter 1 of the *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 85–99, *Science of Logic*, pp. 93–105.

indistinguishable and their succession involves no mediating terms, being and nothing do not stand in any determinate relation by which an advance has been made from one category to another. Nevertheless, the immediate collapse of the differentiation of one indeterminacy from another, where being is nothing and nothing is being, where the second term is no sooner advanced than it is indistinguishable from the first, presents a movement that only operates insofar as there are two indeterminacies, at once different and indistinguishable. What contains them in their difference and identity is this movement itself, whose sequence of being and nothing is just as much a ceasing to be, where being is followed immediately by nothing, as a coming to be, where nothing is being.⁸

Although Hegel names this movement “becoming”, he admits that it does not involve the coming to be of anything determinate nor the transformation of some given something into something other.⁹ Since its constitutive terms are equally indeterminate, there are no specific givens at hand to either cease to be or become something else. What is at hand, however, is the movement of this becoming itself, which, although its terms are merely being and nothing, is distinguishable from both. Minimal as it may be, the differentiation of two indeterminacies that immediately collapses, in which being has passed over into nothing and nothing has passed over into being without any intermediate term or reason, is a category distinct from the dual categories of indeterminacy it contains. Nevertheless, it obtains its irreducibility without relying on any other means than them.

Does this category of becoming then provide something determinate in contrast to the indeterminacies of which it is composed, something determinate whose development from the categories of being and nothing could offer an account of determinacy that involves no determinate givens?

Hegel himself refrains from identifying the category of becoming with the category of determinate being. He does suggest, however, that the category of becoming provides all the resources necessary for conceiving what it is to be determinate. According to his argument, becoming provides this service insofar as its own ingredients, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be – that is, the successions of being and nothing and of nothing and being – collapse of themselves, leaving a unity in which being and nothing are contained not sequentially but in an abiding relation to one another. The movement of becoming comes to a halt because the being that follows from nothing is indistinguishable from the latter just as the nothing that follows from being is

⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 85; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 93.

⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), pp. 73–4, 78; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 83, 84, 87.

indistinguishable from it. Hence, not only are coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be indistinguishable, but each immediately cancels itself as a sequence, leaving being and nothing as the only abiding elements of the whole that becoming comprises. Having lost its dual sequential movements, this whole now simply consists in a unity of being and nothing that contains them as components mediated by their identity. According to Hegel, this provides the minimal specification of determinate being, by which something can begin to be categorized.¹⁰

How this is so is far from transparent, even if one grants that becoming involves more than a reiteration of indeterminacy and that the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of becoming collapses, leaving behind no more than a unity of being and nothing. For how could any resulting unity of being and nothing constitute a threshold of determinate being? With both components utterly indeterminate and no third term available, where are the resources for specifying something rather than nothing?

Given what must be precluded, Hegel's recourse to such a unity of being and nothing has a certain inevitability. After all, what it is to be determinate cannot already involve any factor with determinacy, without taking itself for granted and begging the question. With everything determinate excluded, all that is left are being and nothing, which are no sooner given than they pass over into one another, eliminating the becoming in which they figure as distinguishable yet identical terms. But how can determinate being be specified from being and nothing?

Being, Nonbeing, and Being Determinate

Despite the paucity of the material, the option at hand has an immediate plausibility. Since being determinate cannot be categorized through qualities, definite relations, or definite entities without question-begging, what else can suffice than a unity of being and nonbeing,¹¹ where the contrast of the two provides the minimal definiteness underlying all quality and relation? Without referring to any other properties, determinacy is defined simply by what it is and what it is not, just as the indeterminacy common to being and nothing is overcome when being is joined with nonbeing so that each delimits the other.

¹⁰ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 100; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 106.

¹¹ "Nothing" and "nonbeing" do not designate different categories, for negation of being is the same indeterminacy that nothing and being each comprise. Nonetheless, "nonbeing" is useful in analyzing determinate being since it connotes how in the unity of being and nothing, nothing is immediately different from being.

Admittedly, any constitution of determinacy from being and nonbeing is difficult to imagine without referring to the presence or absence of definite qualities, relations, and entities, which all have their definite character by possessing certain features and not others. When determinacy itself is at stake, however, the contrast of being and nonbeing is not a contrast between the presence and absence of any independently given factors. Being determinate without further qualification must instead involve no more than a coterminous being and nonbeing, where being and nothing no longer figure as alternating unrelated categories but as the sole coeval elements of what obtains definition as sheer definiteness by being their unity.

Indeed, if all definite qualities, relations, and entities are what they are only by being something and not being something else, this only testifies to how the unity of being and nonbeing underlies all further determinacies as a prior category they inevitably incorporate. If they all depend upon the presence and absence of different features for their own character and these features themselves similarly depend upon being and nonbeing for their respective definition, an infinite regress will be escaped only if being and nonbeing provide determinacy in general.

What does remain perplexing is how a unity of being and nonbeing can provide for categorizing quality or something. How can the combination of being and nonbeing supplant their indistinguishable indeterminacy with what it is to be determinate? In what sense can nonbeing make being determinate when nonbeing itself has no specific character independent of its contrastive unity with being? How can nonbeing render being determinate when nonbeing is not already the absence of something definite? Or, if being and nonbeing have no determinate character apart from their contrast with one another, in what does their own difference consist?

Quality, Otherness, and Relation

If the unity of being and nonbeing first comprises determinacy, the contrast terms of being and nonbeing could only be determinate themselves if each contains the same component structure. The nonbeing incorporated in determinacy would then, however, no longer be nonbeing without further qualification. Not only would it comprise a determinate being in its own right, but it would involve more than just its own being and nonbeing. Since it would also be distinct from that of which it is the nonbeing, it would additionally stand in contrast to that determinate being, which, for its part, would contain being and nonbeing while figuring in the same contrastive relation to its correlatively determinate nonbeing.

This indicates not just why being and nonbeing cannot be determinate

themselves when they first unite to form determinate being. It also sheds light on how determinate being provides a means for characterizing something determinate whose own component contrast terms are determinate themselves. What makes this utilization especially pertinent is that it is entailed in determinate being itself. Seeing how this is so makes comprehensible in what way being and nonbeing can render determinate their own unity.

Let it be granted that what it is to be determinate minimally consists in being a unity of being and nonbeing. Being and nonbeing here can have no further character than being the aspects of what determinate being is and is not, since otherwise determinacy is taken for granted. Consequently, their unity has a character distinct from each of them, the character of being determinate. It is appropriate to call this category "quality", as Hegel does,¹² since quality cannot be explicated by means of any qualitative features. There is little alternative to categorizing quality as what the unity of being and nonbeing is *per se*. Quality is not a particular property differentiated from others in terms of certain features. Nor can quality be something inhering in a given determinate substrate. As the unity of being and nonbeing in contrast to each of these terms, quality does not have a determinate basis. Rather, it itself is what being determinate minimally comprises, relying not on determinate givens for its own character but solely on the indeterminate contrast terms of being and nonbeing. As a result, nothing more can be said about quality, except to refer to these components or to its being as their unity.¹³

Nevertheless, because the unity of being and nonbeing is qualitative, determinate, what it is, its being, is itself determinate, just as is what it is not, its nonbeing. Although quality is a unity of being and nonbeing, wherein each is without quality, quality itself has a being and nonbeing that are determinate by being quality's presence and absence, as opposed to being and nonbeing *per se*. To avoid confusion, it is worth following Hegel, as well as prior philosophical tradition, by giving distinct names to the being and nonbeing of quality, identifying them as reality and negation, respectively.¹⁴

Calling the coordinate being and nonbeing of what is determinate "reality" and "negation" might suggest a narrowly ontological interpretation of these categories. As Hegel himself makes clear, however, in his remark on quality and negation, reality is applicable as much to definite feelings, imaginings,

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 105; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 111.

¹³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 105; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 111.

¹⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 105; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 111.

thoughts, numbers and falsehoods as to determinate things.¹⁵ What “reality” here designates is not “real” being in contrast to fiction, the nonempirical, or whatever, but simply the affirmative being of quality in contrast to the coordinate nonbeing that joins in rendering it determinate. What it is for quality in general to be is reality, whereas what quality in general is not is negation.

As determinate, quality is both reality and negation in that qualitative determinacy both is and is not in determinate fashion. By the same token, negation is as much a determinate being as is reality.¹⁶ Whereas reality is quality insofar as it is, negation is the nonbeing of quality. Hence, negation is not just nonbeing without further qualification, but nonbeing in relation to qualitative determinacy, or what can be categorized as otherness.¹⁷ Since negation is determinate in virtue of not being determinate being, the otherness it comprises is not something extrinsic to quality. Rather, quality is otherness itself, for the reality and negation of quality are inextricable aspects in its specification.

This leaves a dual relation. On the one hand, otherness, in contrast to which quality has its own reality, is immediately distinct from quality as its negation. Their distinction is immediate in that there is no additional third term in which their difference resides. Otherness is simply what quality is not. On the other hand, otherness is equivalent to quality, for even though it comprises the nonbeing of determinacy, it is a determinate being in its own right, with its own reality and negation. Hence, otherness has the same structure as quality and yet has quality as its otherness.

Something and Other

This contrast of quality and otherness, where each is immediately different yet identical, provides the conceptual resources for categorizing something. With quality constitutively standing in relation to otherness and otherness constitutively opposing quality as its negation while being just what quality is, it becomes possible and necessary to speak of a qualitative being distinct from another qualitative being. Thus, whereas the unity of being and nonbeing provides for quality in general, the identity and difference of quality and otherness establishes the framework for conceiving something. It does so by

¹⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 106; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 112.

¹⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 109; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 115.

¹⁷ G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: I. Band, I. Buch; Erstausgabe von 1812* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), p. 49.

yielding a determinate being that is distinguishable through its contrast to another determinate being, whose own integral character rests on its involvement in the same contrastive relation. In this way, no independently given qualitative entity enters in to make something what it is. That could not possibly be the case, since it would take for granted precisely what must be categorized.

Since each of the contrasted terms has no character beyond being a determinate being distinct from another, these terms present something without further qualification. Accordingly, they comprise components of anything bearing additional qualities or relations.

What allows this categorization of something to avoid the pitfall of circularly relying upon prior specific qualities or given determinate beings, be they substrates or privileged determiners, is simply that all it involves are quality and otherness per se in their relation to one another. Something without further qualification is a qualitative being whose otherness is another qualitative being standing in the same relation. Because the determinate reality of something depends on its contrast to its determinate negation, something constitutively has an other.¹⁸ Something is what it is, bearing its own quality, by being in relation to another qualitative being. This is all that is available to define something, since no further specific features, principles, or connections can be introduced without taking the category of something for granted.

For this reason, the other, in contrast to which something has its determinate being, cannot be distinguished through any possession of certain characteristics that the latter lacks. It can only have its own contrasting character as something different simply by being in relation to the former as its other – that is, as what the former is not without further qualification. This means that the other of something has the latter as its other. Hence, what is other is something in just the same way as is the something it opposes.¹⁹ Each maintains its own distinct character by standing in relation to the other as the latter's other, even though, in so doing, each is both something and other in precisely the same fashion. As a result, just as quality and otherness are at one and the same time identical and different, so something is and is not identical to what is its other.

These concomitant relations of something and other cast in doubt Kant's argument that the most abstract concept is that which has nothing in common with what is different from it and that this is the concept of something, from

¹⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 111; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 116.

¹⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 113; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 118.

which only nothing is distinct.²⁰ What the preceding argument suggests is that, contrary to Kant, the category of something already involves the categorial succession of being, nothing, becoming, quality, and otherness, whereas being and nothing involve no prior terms. If this is the case, then what is most abstract are being and nothing, which are each identical to what is minimally differentiated from them – namely, being versus nothing and nothing versus being. As for something, it is distinct not just from nothing but from other as well.

Nevertheless, the identity accompanying the difference between something and other appears to destroy the determinate being of something very much as the indistinguishability of being and nothing seemed to call into question any development of categories from indeterminacy. If something and other are identical, does this not eliminate all distinction between them and with it, the contrast by which one qualitative determinacy as distinct from another can first be categorized? Does it not collapse the distinction of something and other into an empty reiteration of quality *per se*? The identity of something and other would entail these results if it were the sole relation at stake. This identity, however, itself involves the immediate difference of something and other. Only insofar as what is other has something as its immediately different nonbeing is something also an other and what is other also a something. Hence, the equivalence of something and other does not eliminate the contrast by which each has its own character. Rather, their own respective identities consist in their identity and difference.

In this respect, something has a dual character consisting, on the one hand, in its relation to other, wherein both are immediately different and identical, and, on the other hand, in what something is apart in relation to itself. These two aspects, which Hegel calls being-for-other and being-in-itself,²¹ are intertwined with one another. Something is in relation to other only insofar as it has being-in-itself, a character of its own allowing it to be something different from its other and so stand in relation to it. By the same token, what something is in itself is not independent of its relation to other insofar as the only resource available to give something its own character is its contrast to something other.²²

Although this leaves something with a most minimal characterization,

²⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Logik*, in *Werke VI* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), A147, pp. 525–26.

²¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 114; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 119.

²² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Sein* (1832), p. 115; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 120.

nothing could be more fitting given the poverty of material with which its categorization must proceed. Indeed, if there is any test for judging this account of something, it can only lie in certifying its utter abstraction. To the extent the account passes muster, it provides a platform for further concretizations free of reliance upon inexplicable substrates and determining conditions. In that case, the categorization of something in its relation to other can testify to how something determinate can be accounted for, as it must be, without appeal to any conceptual scheme with its irreducibly determinate givens. What must not be forgotten is that no matter how much the account of something may employ a language rich in conceptual terms to achieve expression, what counts in regard to logical development are which terms enter in as component elements of the category at issue. It is in this respect and this respect alone that the account of something warrants critical examination.

The Logic of Determinacy and the Logic of the Concept

The categorization of something signals an achievement that only systematic logic can possibly attain: accounting for determinacy without taking any determinacy for granted. This achievement provides the basic positive fulfillment of the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness and the appeal to the given constitutive of every variety of foundationalism. The development of something from being has been shown to be the immediate result of making the absolute beginning required by logic's unity of method and subject matter. Nonetheless, how determinacy and conceptual determination are connected is still not established. To understand why the presuppositionless development of systematic logic has anything to do with the universality of conceptualization, it is necessary to consider how the determination of the concept itself becomes a logical theme. The third part of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, the so-called Subjective Logic, tackles this problem, and it is to this problem we must turn, taking advantage of Hegel's pioneering effort, where possible.



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Chapter 4

Concept, Individuality, and Self-Determination

The Concept in Philosophy

Philosophers may disagree with unmatched zeal, but no philosophical controversy can free them from their common dependence upon the concept as a privileged vehicle of truth. Even when embracing the most radical empiricism or the most unyielding skepticism, philosophers cannot help but make conceptual arguments. All their efforts may aim at curing themselves of addiction to the concept, but so long as they reason in behalf of experience or the suspension of judgment, thinking remains the element in which their claims live and die.

Philosophers' perennial use of conceptual argument might seem a double curse, subverting all of philosophy's equally perennial aspirations to seize the truth. To begin with, if philosophical investigation constitutively employs concepts, how can it possibly establish the validity of conceptual determination? If philosophy cannot fail to use concepts to legitimate reason as a midwife of truth, will philosophical investigation not fall into the vicious circularity of relying upon an instrument that can never be certified without taking its reliability for granted? Secondly, if philosophy must always utilize concepts to arrive at truth, must philosophers not presuppose that the object of truth is what is conceptually determinate? Besides being beyond philosophical justification, will this assumption not limit objectivity to a mortuary of changeless universals from which all becoming, all particulars, and indeed, all actual existence are excluded as some inconceivable illusions? Will the only objectivity that philosophy can conceive be a phantom realm of ideas that can never correspond to genuine reality?¹

These parallel problems would be fatal to philosophy if the concept were what all too many philosophers have taken it to be: an abstraction whose

¹ Nietzsche raises both of these objections to philosophy in his *Twilight of The Idols*.

universality is given independently of the particulars to which it pertains. This view has crippling ramifications: First, it renders thinking a formal enterprise that must look elsewhere for the content to which it applies. If the concept is a universal that leaves undetermined the distinguishing features of the many it otherwise unites, everything pertaining to individuation lies beyond the grasp of thought. The problem of the differentia becomes an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of philosophical truth, for if the concept is a formal universal that cannot lay hold of what individuates its particulars, conceptual determination can never correspond to its objects. The concept may find itself in some property that individuals share, but the individual will always fall outside conceptual grasp. This predicament leaves two equally unsatisfactory options: that parody of Plato, mocked by his own *Parmenides*, where universals are held to be a separate realm of their own against which all individuals are but illusory appearance, or the opposite extreme of nominalism, where individuals devoid of universality are taken to be real and universals devoid of individuality are regarded as subjective illusions.

Either move entails a further consequence of the rigid divide between universal and particular: the freezing of concepts into immobile, isolated abstractions that neither give themselves new determinations nor connect themselves with one another or any other objects. So long as the concept is taken to be a universal that has no inherent relation to its individuation, it does not become something other than the abstraction it immediately comprises. Instead, it relates only to itself and any relation to something else must be externally imposed. Consequently any thinking that connects such concepts to one another or to individuals will have no basis in the concepts themselves. And if all concepts are of this ilk, any such connections will automatically be bereft of conceptual, which is to say, philosophical justification.

Under these received dogmas the content of concepts becomes just as problematic as their interconnection and objectivity. If concepts neither alter themselves nor relate themselves to what is different from them, their own content has an inescapable givenness. Frozen thus in solitary immediacy, concepts can only be encountered in a series of atomistic receptions, devoid of any intrinsic order or standard of completeness. To the degree that each concept has an isolated givenness, no other conceptual term can possibly certify that a putative concept has a valid content. Every candidate for recollected idea, for example, has no more and no less authority than any other abstraction that is immediately offered. Instead of providing truth, concepts get reduced to vessels of meaning and thinking gets condemned to the doxography of analysis.

If philosophy is to go beyond blindly collecting given meanings and instead attain new knowledge through concepts, conceptual determination cannot be

limited to abstract universals. This requirement has often been recognized. Plato, for example, identified philosophical thinking with a dialectic in which thought moves from one idea to another without leaving the domain of concepts.² Nevertheless, Plato never succeeded in providing an account of concepts that avoided appeal to immediately given contents,³ nor avoided reducing concepts to forms whose embodiments were incidental to the universal in which they participated. Hence, it can be no surprise that Plato could not provide the self-contained conceptual odyssey promised under the banner of dialectic. Kant, for his part, acknowledged the need for overcoming formal universality both by identifying philosophical wisdom with synthetic *a priori* knowledge and by making necessary conceptual determination a requirement for the objectivity of representations. As Kant recognized, philosophy could obtain new knowledge of what was necessarily and universally the case only insofar as concepts could be set in binding relation to what was not their immediate identity. Yet, by conceiving such relations as a synthesis, Kant treated the related terms as separate, immobile categories whose necessary relation had to depend upon some third connecting factor – in this case, sensible intuitions as independently given in experience.⁴ Far from determining anything individual, concepts remained empty without the external addition of intuitions. Similarly, although Kant allowed the necessary conceptual relation of representations to overcome subjective association and provide for reference to objects, he still left the resulting objectivity relative to appearances. Hence, instead of enabling concepts to lay hold independently of something other, Kant left concepts incapable of determining things in themselves, depriving synthetic *a priori* knowledge of any unconditioned truth.⁵

The Concept in Systematic Logic

Not until Hegel, and perhaps not since Hegel, has any concerted effort been

² Plato sketches dialectic in his famous account of the Divided Line in the *Republic*, Book VI, 511c.

³ In particular, Plato roots all ideas in the Good, whose given content is immediately intuited, but never shows how specific ideas arise from this foundation, whose own determinacy remains problematic.

⁴ Hegel makes this point in the *Science of Logic*. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 22; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 591.

⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 19; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 589.

made to conceive how universality is intrinsically connected to individuality, thereby enabling the concept to surmount the limitations that would condemn philosophy to futility. Despite the growing mountain of discussion of Hegel's work, his contribution on this score has largely been ignored. This is partly due to a lack of appreciation of the systematic program of the Logic and partly due to a failure to get beyond the Logics of Being and of Essence and attend to the crowning arguments of the Logic of the Concept.

The connection between these two areas of neglect is far from clear. As we have seen, the systematic program of Logic addresses at one and the same time the challenge of fulfilling the intrinsic demands of logical investigation and the challenge of beginning philosophy without subverting the philosophical enterprise. The answers to these two challenges are one and the same, yet how the resulting solution involves something culminating in a logic of the concept poses questions that have rarely been raised or resolved.

A rehearsal of the basic considerations underlying systematic logic brings these questions to the fore. Although logic has continued to be taught and studied as a formal discipline, aiming to uncover forms of thought that underlie the thinking of any content, logic is a thinking of thinking, where form and content, subject and object, method and topic are one and the same. If consciousness be a knowing that constitutively relates to an object it takes to be given independently of its relation to it, then logic can properly proceed only if the defining opposition of consciousness is overcome, that is, if knowing and what is known become indistinguishable. Logic cannot succeed unless its cognition achieves identity with its object because logic will not establish what valid thinking is unless its thinking of valid thinking is itself valid thinking. Accordingly, logic provides the very form of truth, for logical thinking must correspond to its subject matter and do so with a thoroughness that is impossible if knowing relates to something independent of cognition. A discipline that addresses a subject matter distinct from its own thinking cannot help but presuppose its method. Since such a discipline investigates what its topic is, which is something different from the procedure by which it is uncovered, the method is not established by the investigation but must be employed by it as something independently furnished. Moreover, in order to have a specific topic to address with its given method, such a science must presuppose some minimal identity for its subject matter. Otherwise, it has nothing determinate to consider. By contrast, logic can presuppose neither method nor subject matter. Because what logic thinks is indistinguishable from its thinking of it, if logic were to begin with any preconception of its method or topic the identity of valid thinking would be taken for granted instead of being established as the outcome of logical investigation. To avoid begging the question, logic must therefore begin without any determinate method or

content. Yet, if logic must proceed without any given method or any given content, whatever content it succeeds in developing will have to be as free of external determination as the form it takes. In positive terms, this signifies that the content must order itself, just as its ordering must be self-determined. Unlike formal universals, whose rigidity requires an external hand to relate them to any further contents, the determinacies of logic must transform themselves and thereby establish the succession of terms that end up comprising the autonomous development of logical thought. Since this free development of self-determined content begins without any presupposed method or subject matter, the self-thinking thought of logic cannot help but be a development of self-determination *per se*, that is, a development of self-determined determinacy. The indeterminacy of the starting point and the self-determination of the ensuing development are inseparable, for if logic began with any determinate beginning, it would have a determinacy it had not determined for itself. Far from predetermining the course of logical thought, the very project of logic sets logic free of any foundations.

As we have seen in Chapter 2, all these implications, which Hegel anticipates in the Introduction to the *Science of Logic*, follow equally from the consideration of with what philosophy must begin. If philosophy were to start with any determinate method it would dogmatically presuppose the form of philosophical investigation instead of considering this as a problem that must be resolved within philosophy itself. By the same token, if philosophy were to begin with any predetermined content, it would take its subject matter for granted, relegating all its subsequent conclusions to claims resting upon an arbitrarily assumed foundation. To begin non-dogmatically, philosophy must therefore start with a complete absence of determinacy, with indeterminacy or being, which can only be thought without mediating qualifications by an equally indeterminate, immediate thinking. If anything is to arise from such indeterminacy, it will have to emerge determined by nothing but itself, for nothing is already at hand to give it a content or an order of presentation. Yet since no foundation can be present as the given substrate of self-determination, what follows from indeterminacy must once more be nothing but self-determination without qualification. Accordingly, philosophy will escape the hold of foundations only by beginning with indeterminacy and proceeding with a self-development of self-determination.

It is not hard to see how the bare outline of Hegel's Logic could fulfill the program these considerations anticipate. The tripartite division into successive logics of being, of essence and of the concept can readily be seen to comprise the self-constitution of self-determination. The Logic of Being presents the development of determinacy from indeterminacy. It offers an account of determinacy without further qualification. Of course, if that account began

from some given determinacy instead of from an indeterminate starting point, it would beg the question by presupposing determinacy, which is precisely what is to be established. By contrast, the Logic of Essence can and must begin with determinacy, namely the determinacy provided without any presuppositions by the Logic of Being. Without that resource of determinacy in general, the Logic of Essence can hardly unfold the determination of determined determinacy, where determinacy is mediated by some factor that relates to it with a prior immediacy. Only if determinacy is available, can determinacy figure as the determiner of something else whose being it posits. This comprises a two-tiered logic of essence and appearance, ground and grounded, cause and effect and all the further relations involving what rests upon some foundation. Essence's foundational determination sets the stage for the Logic of the Concept to the degree that the latter is a logic of freedom. Freedom's self-determined determinacy presupposes both determinacy in general and determined determinacy since self-determination has determinacy and determines its own determinacy. While incorporating what the Logic of Being and the Logic of Essence provide, the Logic of the Concept transforms both by achieving an identity between what is determined and what does the determining. In this fashion self-determined determinacy emerges as the result of categories that thereby get revealed as way stations incorporated into the process by which self-determination constitutes itself.

This itinerary seems to stand in stark contrast to another division of logic in which the concept looms large. Although Hegel may describe the contents of the three subdivisions of logic in terms that fit the schema of determinacy, determined determinacy, and self-determined determinacy, he also divides logic into an Objective Logic and a Subjective Logic, describing the former as a stage in which the concept is given in its immediacy, prior to coming into its own as a self-mediated totality. Although Hegel qualifies this two-fold division by inserting the Logic of Essence as a connecting bridge, the contrast of Subjective and Objective Logics raises the question of why the concept should map onto the logic of self-determination.

Hegel tells us that he has chosen the term concept with care because the logical determinacies that come under its heading fit the usage that the "concept" has come to have as a privileged vehicle of philosophical cognition.⁶ Significantly, when Hegel first introduces the concept as a theme, he initially

⁶ See Hegel, G.W.F., *Werke 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse (1830) – erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), Zusatz to ¶160, p. 308; Hegel, G.W.F., *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), addition to ¶160, p. 224.

defines it in terms of two parallel considerations: first, freedom, and then the interconnection of universality, particularity, and individuality. The link between these correlative characterizations must be comprehended if the role of the concept in logic is to be unveiled.

Freedom, Individuality, and the Requirements of Conceptual Truth

Hegel introduces freedom as the truth of necessity, describing how the governing relationship of the Logic of Essence resolves itself into self-determination.⁷ The basic moves are starkly simple, yet seldom heeded, especially by those who extol the hegemony of efficient causality. The necessitation of determination by some external dominating factor is the pervasive motif of the two-tiered relations in the sphere of essence. With essence, being is always mediated by some foundation. Yet since the foundation has its own determining character only by determining what it finds, what is grounded effectively grounds its own foundation, resulting in a reciprocal interaction where cause and effect simultaneously exchange their roles. Since the erstwhile foundation turns out to have the same determining/determined identity as its erstwhile derivative, the external necessity of foundational determination is supplanted by an internal determination, where the indiscernibility of determiner and determined factor transforms their relation into one of self-determination. Although differentiation still occurs, it proceeds within the unity of the self. Since differentiation is now a matter of the self giving itself new determinacy, differentiation takes the form of a development of the self and determination becomes self-development.⁸

That the emergent process of self-determination could have anything to do with universality, particularity, and individuality depends upon the conceptual breakthrough that Hegel pioneers in conceiving the relation of these three categories. All the dilemmas plaguing formal universality and the philosophies that rely upon it are supplanted by a simple insight: the universal cannot possess its encompassing unity as a one over many unless the plurality of its particulars can be sustained. Particularity, however, only determines something

⁷ See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 12, 14–15; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 583, 584–5.

⁸ This is why, as Hegel duly observes, the categories of the concept develop, whereas those of essence are posited. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Wesen* (1813), pp. 4–5, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 28–30; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 390–391, 596–7.

as an undifferentiated embodiment of the universal. *Qua* instance, particulars stand in identical relation to the universal in which they participate. Identifying a factor as an embodiment of a universal in no way distinguishes it from any other embodiment. Yet, unless instances can be distinguished from one another, their plurality collapses into one and the universal loses its own constitutive character as a one over many. Consequently, the encompassing unity of the universal depends upon the differentiation of particulars, which is what individuality provides for each. Individuality, as the differentiated particular, is therefore ingredient in universality. And, conversely, because the individual is the differentiated particular, it is equally tied up with universality, without which it loses the particularity that allows it to be more than a classless something or appearance.

The Logic of Self-Determination as the Logic of the Concept

These interconnections between universality, particularity, and individuality provide the necessary categorial resources for determining self-determination. Because self-determination must give itself new determinacy to be what it is, freedom minimally involves a successive plurality of determinacies. Since, however, these differentiations remain elements of the self that determines itself in and through them, their plurality comprises a development of the self by which it achieves its self-determined identity. Accordingly, these differentiations are each instances of the self that thereby is their one in many, comprising the universal subject that constitutes itself in these its own particulars. Since the self can only determine itself by giving itself a plurality of differentiations, the particular developments of the self must further be individuated. Otherwise their plurality will collapse, eliminating the differences that the self requires if it is to give itself new determinacy. Without the categories of universality, particularity, and individuality, determinacy can only be characterized through either contrast with a coeval other or derivation from some antecedent foundation. With a one in many that remains self-identical in the differentiation of individuated instances, the limits of being and essence are overcome and subjectivity, self-development, or freedom becomes determinable.

Granted the traditional association of the concept with universality and with knowledge of what is universal, it now becomes plausible for the logic of the concept to be properly the logic of self-determined determinacy. Because universality is indeterminable without particularity and individuality, and because universality, particularity, and individuality are the elementary constituents of freedom, the concept and, by way of anticipation, conceptual

knowledge are as autonomous as they are universal. Moreover, because universality is inseparable from individuality, the concept need not be skewed upon the problem of the differentia, where formal universality remains incongruent with what it determines. To be trapped within a logic of essence, where determiner and determined never achieve the reciprocity with which self-determination proceeds, may be the fate of the formal thinking of the understanding, whose fixed and rigid representations need external help to connect them with further content. By contrast, if we are to take seriously the concept's baptism in the logic of self-determination, the concept can develop itself, establishing new connections unconditioned by any other factor, laying claim to the title of the synthetic *a priori* itself.

The Concept, Objectivity, and the Logic of Truth

Establishing how the concept is self-determining and self-individuating may set the stage for overcoming the problem of the differentia, but doing so only partially secures the truth of conceptual determination. It enables the concept to acquire a content that is not arbitrary and externally dependent, but it still does not establish how the concept can provide a true determination of something other than itself. So long as the content that the concept gives itself remains purely conceptual in form, it remains subjective in the sense of remaining part of a self whose self-determination does not stand in relation to something else.

In order for the concept to have objectivity, three things must be secured. First, objectivity must itself be established both in distinction from and independence of the concept. This presupposes the development of the concept in its own subjectivity, since objectivity must be other to it. Secondly, objectivity must have a character that is still conceptually determinable. Otherwise, objectivity will remain something forever beyond conceptual grasp. Finally, the congruity between objectivity and the concept must be certified without appeal to some third factor, be it a criterion or a standpoint. If a criterion were employed to assure correspondence, the old sceptical trope of third man argumentation would reintroduce itself, incurring an infinite regress where every application of the privileged criterion requires another criterion to assure its correctness. If a standpoint were required to judge the fit of concept and objectivity an analogous difficulty would be encountered. The above dilemma would, of course, reoccur if the standpoint laid claim to authority by appeal to any criterion. But if the standpoint avoided such an appeal, how could it retain authority against any competing perspective? Since the distinguishing identity of each standpoint would be different from both concept and objectivity in order to comprise a distinct vantage point, nothing in concept

or objectivity could unequivocally sanction one standpoint's primacy over another. To avoid this problem, the agreement of concept and objectivity would have to be established from these factors themselves, although the resulting accord would comprise a further irreducible determinacy incorporating them in their correspondence.

These are precisely the central challenges that Hegel's *Logic* addresses in moving from the account of the concept to that of objectivity and that of the Idea. These problems are properly handled as logical issues, without appeal to the epistemological frameworks of consciousness or language and the opposition of real selves to the world. If the account of either concept or objectivity were encumbered with any such aspects of nature and mind, the whole enterprise would be sabotaged by the introduction of non-logical determinations whose own difference and conceivability would have to be taken for granted. To escape arbitrariness, the determination of objectivity and its relation to the concept must incorporate nothing but the categories that arise in the self-determination of thought without yet involving objectivity itself.

Objectivity is and cannot be reducible to reality or existence. As we have seen in Chapter 3, reality, as contrasted to negation, is simply the being of determinate being in general. Reality cannot help but be contained in the concept insofar as the concept has determinacy. Admittedly, the concept has determinacy in a manner rather different from how determinacy is contained in the *Logic of Being*. Whereas the given determinacies of the *Logic of Being* have determinate being by standing in contrast to other coeval entities, the concept has determinacy that it has imposed upon itself, the determinacy of its self-determination. Unlike given determinacy or determined determinacy, the determinacy of the concept is what it has determined itself to be. Consequently, what is to stand as something other to the subjectivity of the concept must have more than reality. Of course, objectivity will possess reality simply by standing in contrast to subjectivity as something other. But the basis of that contrast must lie in something that is not simply contained within subjectivity; if not, the would-be contrast term gets absorbed without remain.

For just this reason, objectivity cannot simply be existence. Existence has reality, as something determinate, but existence adds the element of determined determinacy common to everything in the logic of essence, where being has lost its immediacy and become founded by some foundation. Existence is determinacy that has a ground and exhibits the relativity of all factors that are determined by something prior to them. The concept incorporates existence to the degree that self-determined determinacy contains determinacy that is determined. Conceptual determination, of course, adds the proviso, issuing from reciprocal interaction, that what gets determined and what does the determining are one and the same. This proviso issues from the reciprocal

interaction with which the logic of essence brings itself to an end and introduces conceptual determination. As we have seen, although the two-tiered relations of essence always distinguish between what is founded and what founds, each factor only possesses its defining role thanks to the polar role of its counterpart. Because what founds has its founding character determined by what it founds, a reciprocal determination results where each term is both cause and effect of the other. Since they are indistinguishable, leaving what determines and is determined one and the same, reciprocal interaction itself reverts into self-determination, leaving behind the two-tiered structure of foundational determining and introducing the free self-development constitutive of subjectivity. Although the resulting self-determined determinacy of the concept is irreducible to the determinacy of being and the determined determinacy of essence, the concept incorporates both. What is other to the subjectivity of the concept must therefore be irreducible to each and every category of being and essence.

Instead of being contained within the self of the concept's self-determination, objectivity must be radically independent. Since objectivity can owe its determinacy neither to standing in contrast to other coeval factors nor by issuing from any ground, it must be a self-sufficient totality minimally external to the self-determination of the concept.

Knowledge of objectivity would accordingly escape the limitations of "knowledge" of reality or "knowledge" of existence. Because reality is the determinacy something has in virtue of its contrast to something else, knowledge of reality is always dependent upon knowledge of this other. Yet, if the other only has reality, knowledge of it is dependent upon the same reference to other, introducing the endless dissemination of meaning that Derrideans absolutize as if reality were the ultimate object of knowing.

Knowledge of existence, by comparison, is plagued by the problem of knowing something that is always just the appearance of some determining factor. The latter foundation cannot completely disclose itself in what it determines at pain of collapsing the distinction between ground and grounded by which it is defined. Moreover, if knowing is always only knowledge of what is grounded, no ground can be known as such, since, by definition, the foundation must lack the underlying sufficient reason on which cognition of existence always depends. But then what cognition needs in order to know existence always eludes capture.

To the degree that objectivity is a totality determined in and through itself, objective knowledge cannot reside in contrastive reflections upon what is non-objective nor in attempts to uncover foundations for objectivity. Instead, objectivity can only be known in terms of its own self-constitution, which will give what it is necessarily and with no unencompassed remain. Objectivity is

therefore the very entity that could be known without qualification and, in particular, without the quandaries afflicting cognition of reality or existence.

Such a possibility beckons provided knowing can capture objectivity's process of self-constitution. What kind of knowing can lay hold of the internal self-development of objectivity, that is, can grasp what Hegel routinely calls the *Sache selbst*? Neither contrastive or foundational tropes will do. Only a knowing that exhibits the self-determination of the concept can possibly hope to correspond to objectivity's own self-constitution. Precisely because the content of conceptual determination develops itself, genuinely conceptual thought alone can seize objectivity without the distortions of rendering it something relative or foundationally determined by cognition.

Several problems still remain. Objectivity's special suitability for conceptualization might seem to shut philosophy off once more from any grasp of reality or existence. Yet the inability to adequately conceive either reality or existence independently need not signify that knowledge of objectivity leaves reality and existence beyond philosophical treatment. To the degree that reality and existence are and revert through their own determinacies into components of objectivity, conceptual determination of objectivity will still consider reality and existence. It will do so, however, in light of how neither reality nor existence can subsist by themselves, nor be known with the same necessity and completeness by which objectivity can be unveiled.

More vexing, however, is the abiding question of just how the concept can achieve correspondence with objectivity. Even if objectivity is determined in and through itself just as the concept is self-determined, objectivity is still other to the concept. If the concept is to be a vehicle for subjectively appropriating objectivity, conceptual determination must have room for both the concept and its other, just as objectivity must retain its difference from the concept and yet be transparent to conceptual determination. Moreover, the accordance of concept and objectivity cannot just fall within our observation; if it is to be inherent in concept and objectivity themselves, their determinacies must generate the conceptual structure that contains their correspondence.

Hegel's account of the Idea aims to provide just that logic of truth in which concept and objectivity achieve correspondence without appeal to any third factor, be it an immediate reference to reality, as in pre-critical metaphysics, or, recourse to some epistemological structure, as in Kant's transcendental logic, where conditions of sensible experience must be enlisted to determine objects by concepts. Such truth might seem to be of questionable value insofar as the Idea contains concept and objectivity as purely logical terms, which lack any resources for distinguishing one or the other from self-thinking thought as something natural or spiritual. Yet this formality is crucial, for if the Idea incorporated reference to non-logical terms, their difference and identity would

be taken for granted, instead of exhibiting a non-arbitrary agreement of their alleged concept and objectivity. Hence, although the Idea incorporates nothing of nature or mind, it supplies the determinacy of truth that anything further qualified as non-logical would have to possess to be known to have an objectivity in accord with conceptual determination.

Significantly, the move to the Idea is presented as something resulting simply from the inner workings of objectivity. Instead of depending upon some *deus ex machina* to set it in agreement with the concept, objectivity progressively transforms itself from mechanism through chemism to teleology whereby it arrives at making itself objectify the form of subjectivity as the outcome of teleological process.⁹ Although only a complete determination of the categories involved can certify this pathway, if it does so unfold, it would suggest that the separation of concept and objectivity eliminates itself, that their opposition resolves itself into a unity into which both are absorbed. Any claim that concept and objectivity are incongruent would thereby be shown to rest upon a falsification of their very own identities.

The resultant unity of the Idea thereby possesses an origin that would put the lie to such retreats to the opposition of consciousness, for which concept and objectivity are held apart as independently given correlates whose accord depends upon an ever illusive bridge. The Idea, by contrast, can be duly identified as the pure form of truth to the degree that it contains concept and objectivity in their own immanent correspondence.¹⁰ What makes this correspondence both objective and conceptually transparent is that, at least on Hegel's self-understanding, each side of the relation has determined itself to be equivalent to its counterpart: through syllogism the concept has given itself determinacy with the self-subsistent totality of objectivity¹¹ whereas through teleology objectivity has made itself subjective.¹²

The immediate unity of the Idea can not, however, be the end of the story. The truth of the Idea is first presented as the structure of life, of organic unity. The organism unifies its organs into a conceptual whole, whose universality is the soul animating the particular organs whose own working reproduces their union. What is lacking, however, is a separate conceptualization of the

⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 204; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 754.

¹⁰ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 208–210; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 757–9.

¹¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 31; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 599.

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 156, 204; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 710, 753.

concurrence of soul and body, of the one in many and the totality that exhibits its structure. Without a distinct concept of their correspondence the truth of the Idea will not be an object of conceptual determination. If the Idea cannot encompass this added feature, then the accord of concept and objectivity within the Idea will not itself be in the form of the concept, but will only be conceivable by an independent standpoint of dubious license.

The difficulty is overcome, however, if the Idea transforms itself so that the unity of concept and objectivity is contained within it as a conceptual determination corresponding to that unity. Hegel's account of how life develops into theoretical and practical cognition offers a metamorphosis of this sort, arriving at a so-called Absolute Idea allegedly achieving correspondence between the concept of the Idea and the Idea's unity of concept and objectivity. The resulting correspondence between the concept of the Idea and the Idea itself ends up identified as the method of the whole process by which this outcome has arisen.¹³

This notoriously elusive characterization becomes less indecipherable once one considers how the correspondence between the concept of the Idea and the Idea could not be formulated. Like the correspondence between concept and objectivity, that between concept and Idea cannot reside in some third term. To escape the plague of third man argument and other foundational appeals, each side of the accord must posit its counterpart through its own determinacy. If method were an external form applied to an independently given content, method could hardly comprise the process whereby the accord of terms is determined through themselves. The method would instead operate in the traditional manner as an instrument for connecting terms that lack any intrinsic connections. If method is instead the form of a self-developing content, that form will contain the entire content within itself. For if the content is self-ordering, the order of its self-presentation is wedded to the content. Further, since the content of logic, of presuppositionless philosophy, determines itself and since the concept is self-determined determinacy, the form or method of logic will unfold the content in terms of the concept. Indeed, only the self-determined factors of the concept could possibly organize the content, for any terms that are not conceptual, i.e. self-determined, would cancel the content's autonomy by making it fit a heteronomous scheme. Accordingly, when Hegel identifies the conceptualization of the Idea as the logical method, he proceeds to briefly recapitulate the opening moves of the logic with the added twist of describing how they can be reconsidered in terms of universality, particularity,

¹³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 287 ff.; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 827 ff.

and individuality, the minimal components of the concept.¹⁴ This does not involve mapping onto logic some independently given schema; it instead comprises a self-organization of the content by terms that emerge within it as it draws to its own close.

Although the details demand investigation like so much before, these concluding moves add a final testimony to why autonomous determinacy and the concept can be one. As all addicts of the concept must admit, the method of philosophy inveterately revolves around conceptualization. The method of logic, of presuppositionless science, is the ordering of the self-ordering of self-thinking thought, an ordering that is defined by the categories of freedom. The concept can be the privileged vehicle of philosophical method because the autonomy of conceptual determination is the anatomy of truth.

¹⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 287 ff.; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 827 ff.



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Chapter 5

From Concept to Judgment

Concept, judgment, and syllogism have perennially occupied a preeminent position in the annals of logic. Usually, they have reigned as the privileged elements of a formal logic, where, allegedly, they provide the anatomy of thinking no matter what content thought conceives. If logic is to fulfill its generic task of conceiving valid thinking, however, it cannot be a formal science. Far from engaging a thinking indifferent to all content, logic must validly conceive a very specific content, namely, valid thinking itself. Logic will thereby differ from all other disciplines by possessing a content that cannot diverge from the form by which it is thought. Since non-logical sciences address a subject matter different from valid thinking, the method by which their topic is properly ordered cannot be what they investigate. These other sciences must therefore presuppose their method as either a dogmatic assumption or as the result of some separate investigation of method proper.

This discrepancy between form and content or method and subject matter equally applies to the “philosophy of science”, even if the latter’s meta-theory of science purports to be an empirical knowing like its subject matter. Although the reduction of the philosophy of science to a positive science seems to render it a positive science of positive science, whose knowing and object become equivalent, so long as the positive sciences under its scrutiny have particular contents distinguishing them from that defining the philosophy of science, the topic of the philosophy of science diverges from its subject matter. This divergence is generic to any “meta-theory”, for if the difference between the science and its object is eliminated, the meta-level collapses, together with any preconception of either method or topic. Neither can then retain a given character, for if the investigation and its subject matter become identical, their predetermination leaves nothing left to investigate.

By contrast, logic can no more presuppose its method than it can assume the content of valid thinking. As we have seen, since logic can properly determine its content only by employing the same valid thinking that is its subject matter, logic’s form and content, method and topic, or knowing and object known, must be one and the same. Accordingly, if logic is not to beg its own question, what and how it thinks must be concurrently established within logical

investigation.

This required unity of knowing and object in logic, which constitutively defines logic's self-thinking thought, might seem to preclude any role for concept, judgment, or syllogism, given how all three have usually been construed as forms of a cognition that stands distinct from its object. Ordinarily, the concept is imagined to conceive a subject matter given apart from its conceptualization, just as judgment is presumed to relate terms subsisting independently of its connection and syllogism is taken to connect judgments present outside the inference that concludes one from the others.

Yet, in each of these external roles, concept, judgment, and syllogism have been accorded a privileged epistemic function. Traditional metaphysics has recognized the concept to be the term by which the true nature or essence of things is grasped, enabling judgments to expound the conceptual relations by which true natures can be defined and allowing syllogism to delineate the necessary connections by which genus and its species are differentiated. By contrast, Kantian critical philosophy has retained the concept, not as the vehicle for knowing *a priori* kinds or natures, but as the connecting term in judgments that specify the temporal and spatio-temporal relations that any object of knowledge must exhibit to be distinguished from a merely subjective representation. Here even if concepts cannot determine any necessary types of objects, objectivity cannot be known apart from necessary conceptual connections between sensible representations. Similarly, the transcendental turn redefines, rather than eliminates, the preeminent function of syllogism. The absence of necessary natures may prevent syllogism from generating new *a priori* universal knowledge, since necessary inferences can no longer be drawn from what kind of thing an object may be. Yet syllogism still remains what distinguishes reason from understanding by being the form that reason must take to think, if not objectively know, the unconditioned characteristically sought as the underlying ground of all objective judgments.²

¹ For a further exploration of these issues, see William Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 106–114.

² The tendency of contemporary formal logics to ignore syllogism in favor of a more abstract propositional calculus reflects an abandonment of the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding.

The Challenge of A Non-Formal Determination of Concept, Judgment, and Syllogism

If concept, judgment, and syllogism are to make any, let alone any preeminent contribution to truth, their respective forms cannot be construed in the terms of reflection, where each is imbedded in a structure of cognition, be it psychologically or linguistically described, that stands opposed to its object. If a concept is to correspond with any object, each side of the relation must exhibit the same determinacy. That is, there must be a determination of the concept given apart from the additional clothing worn by the concept as a factor in consciousness or language on the one hand and as a factor in objectivity on the other. Similarly, if judgment and syllogism are to have truth, they must be determinable independently of what gets added to enable them to be actualized as forms of consciousness and discourse as well as in corresponding objective embodiments. Unless concept, judgment, and syllogism can be determined in their own right, apart from cognitive frameworks or objective substrates, their purely logical determinacy will never be obtained and the non-logical structures of mind and nature that incorporate them will never have their logical components accounted for.

Yet how can concept, judgment, and syllogism be determined in a purely logical manner without already presupposing them as the forms of thought that must be employed in their own explication? How can logic meet its requirement of uniting form and content without using the concept to think the concept, without employing judgment to determine the forms of judgment, without using syllogism to determine inference, without thereby having ready at hand the very forms of thought which it is logic's business to determine in the first place?

What provides a solution to the looming circularity is the strategy pursued in Hegel's account of concept, judgment, and syllogism in the "Subjective Logic" of his *Science of Logic*. Owing to the contents, this is the section of Hegel's logic that most closely intersects with traditional logic. Yet, the manner of the treatment and, to no small degree, the resulting categories, are radically distinct from their customary incarnations.

To begin with, concept, judgment, and syllogism are all presented in their own right. Although multifarious examples parade by for purposes of illustration, the argument proper determines concept, judgment, and syllogism without reference to any epistemological, psychological, or linguistic frameworks in which they might figure or to any independently given objects to which they relate.

Secondly, the order of their consideration is intimately connected to their content. The absence of any defining reference to external factors leaves little

other option. The development must make do exclusively with what already lies at hand within it. At each point, the category at issue, at least putatively, gives rise to its successor in virtue of its own determination. Of course, to engender such development, the terms under consideration cannot have a fixed content, but must transform themselves, so as to generate a different term that leads to other categories beyond itself due to its own dynamic. Consequently, the order of treatment comprises an order of constitution, where a topic arises only once all its prerequisites lie at hand. No gaps nor any additions are possible, for the immanence of the development guarantees that the determination in which concept, and then judgment, and finally syllogism emerge is exhaustive and self-sufficient. Because order and content are wedded together, any alternate route would have to involve entirely different categories.³

These features, which all conform to the constitutive unity of method and subject matter in logic's self-thinking thought, provide negative guidelines for evaluating the success of Hegel's reconstruction of the traditional topics of logic. Namely, the determination of concept, judgment, and syllogism must never appeal to externally given materials, be they epistemological or ontological factors, and the specification of terms must never rely upon any more than what the preceding development has brought forward. If these provisos can be satisfied, Hegel can accomplish what prior logicians hardly even sought: a complete *a priori* account of the forms of concept, judgment, and syllogism, detailed with a thoroughgoing necessity. Only then will it be possible to assess just how central to thinking these perennially hallowed terms can be.

Principal Guiding Theses in Hegel's Subjective Logic

The overarching structure of Hegel's account has an immediate plausibility, that seems to share the direction of many past treatments. The concept is analyzed first, followed by judgment and then by syllogism, an order that

³ The fact that the successive editions of Hegel's *Encyclopedia Logic* and *Science of Logic* present somewhat variant orderings of categories does not of itself impugn either the necessity of immanent development or the systematicity of Hegel's own pioneering efforts. Not only may much of the variation involve terminological as opposed to conceptual discrepancies, but the variation may reflect the uncovered deficiency of early versions, rather than an equal validity for each alternate route. Of course, that none of Hegel's versions may be adequate in all respects still leaves unchallenged the unique trajectory of categorial self-development.

makes evident sense, given how judgment connects concepts and how syllogism infers judgments from one another. If the concept were not accounted for prior to judgment and syllogism, these latter factors would depend upon a component of unjustified character, whereas if judgment were not developed before syllogism, syllogism would connect terms whose identity remains uncertain.

What might seem less plausible is the deduction of the concept itself, without which judgment and syllogism are left hanging. Hegel indicates that this deduction consists in the development that has immediately preceded the emergence of the concept, a development in which the two-tiered determinations of the logic of essence reach the point at which the reciprocity of causal interaction renders determiner and determined identical in structure, eliminating the divide separating essence and appearance, ground and grounded, and substance and accident. In virtue of this collapse of any distinction between base and superstructure, what is independently determined is no less posited and positedness is equally determined in and through itself.

The result is most clearly identifiable as the basic logic of self-determination, for when cause and effect, determiner and determined, become indistinguishable, what does the determining is what gets determined, achieving the reflexivity of agent and patient enabling something to be what it has determined itself to be,

Hegel identifies this new threshold as the logic of subjectivity,⁴ which fits the bill given how self-determination is internal to a subject that retains each emergent differentiation as a development of its own self. Substance is not subject so long as its differentiations are mere accidents, contents adding nothing to the identity of substance, which, for its part, can provide no determinate principle for its own modifications. When, however, the determinations are constitutive of the self and the unity of the self is the process determining its own differentiation, a subjectivity has arisen in the dual sense that all specification remains internal to an encompassing unity that must engage in that specific determination to be at one with itself.

Less explicable, perhaps, is the next addition brought into play to categorize the outcome of the logic of essence: the introduction of universality, particularity, and individuality as the specific terms by which self-determination, i.e. subjectivity, is minimally defined. The linkage might appear questionable, in that universality, particularity, and individuality are customarily presumed to apply without restriction beyond what is self-determined. From Aristotle on, the ubiquitous refrain has been that everything

⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 31; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 59.

that is individual, be it rational agent, sub-rational organism, or inanimate thing, and that universal and particular apply equally indiscriminately. Yet, a strong case can be made that universality, particularity, and individuality provide the indispensable categories for determining freedom in thought or reality. As Hegel illustrates with the example of the will in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*,⁵ the self that determines itself is universal insofar as it remains self-identical in all its differentiations, yet can abstract from each in virtue of not being limited to any one of the contents it gives itself. Because, further, the self that determines itself must give itself content in which it remains at one with itself as self-determining, it is equally characterized by particularity, that difference which is the otherness of the universal that remains the vehicle of its encompassing unity. Finally, because what is self-determined remains self-identical in its particular determinations, freedom has individuality, understood as the determinate that is determined in and through itself, instead of having its character depend upon contrast to an independent other or reflection in some appearance.

Although these connections might be thought to exhibit the dependence of self-determination upon universality, particularity, and individuality, the reverse can equally be maintained. For if what is not self-determined is determinate either through contrast to an other, as in the given determinacy of the logic of being, or through reflection in what it posits, as in the posited determinacy of the logic of essence, universality will be wanting. Something and other may be distinct, but so long as they owe their difference to their qualitative contrast, each has a *different* quality. Accordingly, the qualitative determinacy of the logic of being cannot figure as a universal, equally at hand in each of its particulars. Similarly, essence may have determinacy in virtue of its appearance, but it does not stand to its manifestation as a universal relates to its particularization. For whereas the universal enjoys its characteristic unity as a one over many, bridging any gulf between itself and the particulars in which it communes with itself, essence maintains its defining primacy over its appearance not by relating a plurality of appearances to one another, but by preceding them all as their positor.

These connections may seal the intimate linkage between self-determination and the categories of universality, particularity, and individuality, but neither that tie nor the related one to subjectivity immediately bring to mind the concept. The concept may commonly count as the privileged vehicle of reason

⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *Werke 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), ¶5–7, pp. 49–54; G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ¶5–7, pp. 37–42.

with which philosophy seeks to capture the truth, but why should that connotation have any special relation to self-determination or universality, particularity, and individuality?

The room for questioning partly derives from the common conflation of the concept with representation that Hegel so often bewails. If thought be identified with consciousness, and the concept be made an all-purpose idea encompassing all representations, it may well serve the function of correct understanding, that is, of providing a mental content that can match given appearances in all their variegation. Since this involves representations of a given content, which may appropriately be received in the form of impressions via the passivity of sensibility, self-determination seems to be the last requirement that concepts could have. Indeed, if the standpoint of consciousness is identified with cognition in general, then all thought is representational, conditioned by independent givens and governed by the demand for correct representation of what appears. Yet representational cognition is precisely what must be left behind to achieve the autonomy of reason that the self-thinking thought of logic must involve, for the unity of topic and method in logic precludes the difference between knowing and its object on which the representational cognition of consciousness depends.⁶ Accordingly, the concept can no longer serve as a vehicle of philosophy unless it exhibits the self-determined structure that reason thinks when it thinks autonomously. Only then can the concept realize the unity of form and content that logic must achieve to think validly valid thinking; only then will the concept be what Hegel aptly calls an infinite form,⁷ a self-realizing, creative process that does not need a given material to realize itself, as does any finite form, limited by standing in relation to some external content. Then, if universality, particularity, and individuality are the constitutive categories for thinking and being what is self-determined, the concept will be plausibly

⁶ For this reason, logic presupposes overcoming the opposition of consciousness, something that Hegel seeks to achieve in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, which observes how the structure of consciousness eliminates itself as the hegemonic principle of knowing by subjecting its own truth claims to self-examination and discovering that when consciousness' relation to its object becomes identical to the object as it is purportedly in itself, an identity required for true knowing, the distinction between knowing and its object collapses, removing consciousness as the foundation of knowledge. For a more sustained analysis of how and why logic presupposes the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness, see Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations*, pp. 47–98.

⁷ Hegel, *Werke* 8, addition 2 to ¶163, p. 313; Hegel, *Logic*, addition 2 to ¶163, p. 228.

characterized in their terms.

By being self-determined in character, the concept could no longer provide the measure of correctness with antecedent givens, with all the insurmountable difficulties that poses for certifying correspondence. Nor would the concept be amenable to grasping some construct of a reflecting understanding, better determinable by categories of essence. Instead, the autonomy, that is, the subjectivity of the concept would make conceptual determinacy precisely what is needed to capture a self-developing subject matter, such as the truth could be in its own right, once liberated from the veil of a determining reflection.

These considerations depend upon applications of the concept to a conceptually determinate objectivity and then to the unity of both in the "Idea" of truth. These further applications permit the subjectivity of the concept to manifest the negative character of lacking objectivity, by which the concept equally gets branded as being neither objectivity nor Idea, but just the "mere" concept, determined immediately in its own right, independently of any relation to objectivity or to the Idea's unity of concept and objectivity.

Long before these topics become thematic, Hegel presents evidence confirming the tie between the concept and the terms of self-determination by showing how judgment arises from the completed specification of universality, particularity, and individuality. If judgment is their progeny and judgment has its element in the concept, the logic of self-determination can prove a deserving bearer of the title, "the logic of the concept". Not only will self-determination afford the concept the means to capture what is determined in its own right, but the individuality of freedom will show itself to be the key prerequisite engendering judgment, so critical for conceptually determining the relation between concepts. In this way, the purportedly constitutive components of the concept will secure the connection to judgment and, by extension, to syllogism, enabling the concept to recover a familiar guise for its newly unveiled character.

Universality, Particularity, and Individuality in Anticipated Connection

Hegel presents universality, particularity, and individuality in succession as the constitutive elements of self-determination, subjectivity, and the concept. The implications of these connections are far-ranging, but of equal and inseparable importance is the way in which universality, particularity, and individuality are determined and how their contents wed themselves together. On the one hand, universality is presented as the point of departure, which then engenders particularity, which, for its part, develops into individuality. On the other hand, each term has its determination in relation to the other two and through this

relation ends up taking on the character of each, thereby proving itself to be a totality of all three terms. These relationships are correlative. Because the serial unfolding of universality, particularity, and individuality takes the form of a putatively immanent development, each successive term is generated by its predecessor. Hence, universality ends up resolving itself into particularity and, by way of particularity, into individuality, whereas particularity figures as a self-transformation of universality and, in virtue of that connection, as individuality, just as individuality comes to stand as the term that the universal has become through the mediation of its self-transformation into particularity.

This fluid prospectus stands in radical contrast to the all too commonplace separation of universal and particular that has led so many past philosophers to ignore the distinction between particularity and individuality and to treat them indiscriminately. Whether one follows the "Platonic" route and conceives the universal to exist apart as an intelligible reality, detached from the phenomenal realm of particulars, or follows the nominalist rejoinder of conceiving particulars to be an objective reality completely divorced from the subjective thinking in which universals are confined, a fixed, exclusive opposition is presumed that Hegel's account obliterates.

The ignored inseparability of universality, particularity, and individuality is easiest to grasp in considering abstract quality, class, and genus, the most familiar types of universality.⁸ These determinate, particular universalities arise within the development of the first three forms of judgment, the qualitative judgment, the judgment of reflection, and the judgment of necessity. Although the relationship of universality, particularity, and individuality within these forms cannot fail to illustrate what is generic to the concept, the concept of the concept will have to provide an account of universal, particular, and individual that is intelligible without reference to the more concrete content distinguishing particular types of concepts. On the other hand, the additional determinacy that permits forms of concepts to be differentiated will have to result from the concept of the concept, since any other origin would destroy the systematic immanence of the argument by injecting extraneous assumptions for which no account has been given.

⁸ Class and genus might both be disqualified as forms of universality if one identifies universals with inhering qualities and observes that class and genus cannot be predicated of individuals. Yet that class and genus have individuality, distinguishing each class and genus from every other, is something class and genus share with inhering properties, for even inhering property as such has a determinacy differentiating it from every other instance of what inheres. For further discussion of how universality ineluctably entails individuality, see Winfield, *Freedom and Modernity*, pp. 51–58.

Nonetheless, if we consider these three forms of universality in the order of their development in the logic of judgment, we encounter the relationship of universal, particular, and individual in three variations that provide an accessible point of contrast for distinguishing the elementary unity that underlies them all.

The universal of abstract quality displays its intensional relation of attribution, or inherence, in the subject-predicate relation of qualitative judgment. Although it provides the most common exemplar of a universal allegedly existing apart from its particulars, it is easy to see how a quality that inheres in particular instances cannot be common to them unless it stands in relation to particularity and individuality. As particular, each instance of the shared quality comprises an undifferentiated example, standing in an identical relation to the quality they hold in common. *Qua* instance, each particular relates to the quality they share in the same way: they exemplify it and in that respect they are completely alike. The quality that inheres in each particular, must, however, be applicable to a plurality of cases if it is to retain its constitutive generality. Consequently, something must provide for an individuation of particulars. Unless they can be differentiated, they collapse into one, eliminating the inherence in a plurality characterizing universal quality. For this reason, each particular case of the universal quality must equally be a differentiated example, that is, an individual, distinct from every other. Far from having a separate existence, whereby it can exist apart from particulars, the abstract universal cannot have its own identity unless it stands in relation to both particularity and individuality.

The universality of class, whose extensional relation of set membership, of subsumption, is realized in the quantitative judgments of reflection, exhibits a completely analogous linkage of universality, particularity, and individuality. Even though a class of one or a null class may be entertained, class forfeits its significance as a form of universality unless it can contain the extensional relationship of plural class membership, from within whose horizon quantitative judgments can be made about all, some, or one member. As a class member, each particular belongs to the class in the same way, falling under its extension without further qualification. Yet, if the plurality of class membership is to sustain itself, members cannot just be particular, undifferentiated members; like the instances of the inherence of universal quality, class members must also be distinguished, and this requires an individuation supervening upon their common subsumption under the class. Consequently, class cannot retain its universal extension unless its members are both particular and individual.

The case of genus points even more decidedly to the inseparability of universal, particular, and individual, for whereas both universal quality and

class leave completely undetermined what other features their particulars may possess alongside the universal they share, in genus, the universal determines defining features by which its particulars are distinguished. In this manner, the genus differentiates itself into definite species, whose distinguishing character follows from the unity of the genus, as even and odd follows from number. This enables the genus to provide the field for necessary judgments about what must hold true of its particulars. Although the determining relation between genus and species binds universal and particular together, it does so with such concreteness that the particular seems already individuated through the universal in virtue of being a particular species. Classical philosophy, which privileges the universality of genus in its metaphysics of substance, is thereby led to conflate the particular and the individual. Yet classical philosophy is compelled to acknowledge that as much as species may be distinguished from one another, the species is not itself the individual, which belongs to the species much as the individuated member belongs to its class. Just as subsumption under class leaves undetermined every other feature individuating its members, so inclusion in a species leaves undetermined what distinguishes one species member from another. Consequently, whereas the differentia of species may be the object of necessary judgments, the individuating qualities of their members are objects of the same contingent, ultimately empirical judgments as those pertaining to the inherence of abstract universals.⁹ The addition of a distinct relation to individuality therefore becomes mandatory, for unless the genus has not only species whose differentia it defines, but a further individuation of species members, species cannot have their own constitutive identity as subordinate groups, standing like a class to their own members as well as like a necessarily determined particularization of their genus.

In each of these three types of universality, the universal depends for its constitutive identity upon both particularity and individuality, where particularity comprises an undifferentiated instance and individuality comprises a differentiated particularization. Indeed, in each case, the three categories appear to be coeval, for without the universal and particular, the individual cannot have an instance to differentiate from others, just as without the universal and individual, the particular cannot be one exemplification among others of a common unity.

Because these comparisons depend upon our reflection upon the stipulated content culled from the course of the three forms of judgment in which universality, particularity, and individuality all take on specific forms, the universal determination of the concept must be certified by turning to the

⁹ Michael B. Foster develops these points in his article, "The Concrete Universal: Cook Wilson and Bosanquet" (*Mind*, Vol. XL, No. 157, January 1931), 4, 9–10.

account of the concept *per se*, which precedes and provides the elements from and through which judgment allegedly arises.

The Concept of the Concept

Hegel presents this account as the concept of the concept, which would seem to provide that unity of form and content that is the element of logic's self-thinking thought. Significantly, Hegel also maintains that every preceding category equally involves the concept of its respective determinacy.¹⁰ The reason for this general extension of the concept to the form of each and every other logical category is that they all, *qua* logical, should emerge within an immanent development. With appeal to the given and employment of any external methodological principle both excluded, each category must be independently determined in its own right and thereby no less transform itself, giving rise to a further category that equally engenders what is other to itself by virtue of its own determination. This movement of determinate negation can be considered the concept of each category insofar as each term develops itself, exhibiting the self-determination that amounts to its conceptual determinacy.¹¹ The concept of the concept brings this autonomous conceptuality to itself to the degree that the development of the concept *per se* moves itself along through its own immanence.

When Hegel opens the account of the concept with the category of universality, several questions pose themselves that demand a united response. First, why is universality what is immediately at hand once determiner and determined lose their distinction, eliminating the logic of essence's defining two-tiered structure of determined determinacy? Secondly, how can universality come first, if universality is inseparably linked to particularity and individuality? Is the serial order of universality, particularity, and individuality simply an expository convenience, successively describing what are really coeval elements of the same totality? Adding further ambiguity to the opening and its two successor developments is the dual characterization given each stage. Namely, the starting point is described both as universality and as the

¹⁰ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 40; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 607.

¹¹ In this connection, Hegel maintains that the categories are grasped as determinate concepts insofar as each is known as being in unity with its other. That unity is, of course, precisely what determinate negation involves, where a category engenders something different from itself as its own truth. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 40; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 607.

universal concept, just as the next step is characterized both as particularity and the particular concept, and the concluding moment is determined both as individuality and the individual concept.¹²

The answer to all these perplexities must be found together, for all that can provide clarity is what lies at hand in the outcome of reciprocal determination. The collapse of the distinction between determiner and determiner has led to the threshold of self-determination, where what is determined in its own right, being-in-and-for-itself, is posited determinacy or positedness, where what determines and what is determined are indistinguishable.

If conceptual determinacy be self-determined determinacy, then the starting point of the concept is plausibly the universal concept provided this signifies the concept in general, without any further qualification. The particular concept minimally requires, as the subsequent account of particularity will show, a contrast to the universal concept, a contrast by which the concept has two contrasting instances or particular determinations: universality and particularity, the universal and the particular concepts. At the outset, only one can be at hand, a determination of the concept that is yet to stand in relation to what it determines itself to be. In other words, the concept, to begin with, is only the universal concept, for a multiplicity of concept determinations, particularizing it, has not emerged.

To identify the concept in its immediacy as the universal concept would seem to presuppose the category of universality. Yet universality is allegedly just what the concept immediately offers. How can the universal concept and universality be coeval?

The minimal reciprocity of self-determination supplies the answer. Even if to start with the concept cannot have given itself new determinacy, the identity of determiner and determined, of being-in-and-for-itself and positedness, entails that every determinacy in the concept's constitutive self-determination is equally the concept as a whole. The concept does not determine an other, as something provides the defining boundary for what it is not, nor does the concept determine a reflection through which it appears as determining. As self-determined, the concept determines itself and each and every differentiation it generates is itself as so-determined. Hence, if, at the outset, the concept is universal, universality is what the concept is immediately in its entirety. Universality is then the universal concept, for the determinacy of the concept is a self-determined determinacy, identical with the self that gives itself this content. Accordingly, when the concept engenders particularity, this is its own particularity, rendering particularity the particular concept. Analogously,

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 33, 38, 55; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 601, 605, 620.

when the concept generates individuality, this individuality is both a differentiation of the concept and the individual concept itself.

Granted that the concept cannot already be particular at its debut, yet has some determinacy that is both a stage in its development and the concept as a whole, the question still remains as to why the starting point comprises universality and how it can do so without already bringing in particularity and individuality. The inseparability of universal, particular, and individual in inhering attribute, class, and genus would seem to belie any beginning with just universality, but perhaps this belying rests on too rigid of view of these categories. For if universality, not to mention particularity and individuality, is not a fixed term, whose rigidity requires an external connector to link it to any other factor, but instead a dynamic category that transforms itself and thereby relates itself to additional content that it encompasses, their inseparability may not be incompatible with an initial priority for the universal. Although the universal may be the concept in its immediacy, the universal may just as immediately relate itself to the particular as its own difference and, through the mediation of this relation, engender individuality as the third element in its own identity of identity and difference, i.e. in the encompassing universality that unites universality and particularity in individuality. In this way, the universal can start its career as a first term, yet just as soon establish its unity with the particular by which it closes into individuality.

If illicit introduction of extraneous content is to be avoided, the dynamic character of universality, as the universal concept, must follow from nothing but the immediate unity of positedness and being-in-and-for-itself, i.e. of determined determinacy and its determiner. This unity has resulted from the negation, the self-elimination of their difference, an outcome of the irrepressible reversal of roles by which the determiner figures as a determiner only in virtue of something it determines, which thereby determines the determiner, reducing the latter to a determined factor as well. Although the resulting unity is mediated by that role reversal, that process equally removes itself as a conditioning factor, leaving an immediacy because what determines itself no longer rests upon any antecedent ground. This resulting, but immediate unity is equivalent to the immediate determinacy of freedom, or subjectivity, or that which is what it has determined itself to be.

But what is self-determination at the outset? It cannot already have determined itself. As the immediacy of self-determined determinacy, it must instead be poised to give itself determinacy, not by standing in contrast to some other, nor by shining forth in some subsidiary appearance, but by being identical with the difference it posits in virtue of being what it is. That prospective unity, which is by canceling its indeterminacy and differentiating itself exclusively by its own means, is the identity that universality has as the

initial stage of self-determination. Because this identity, issuing from the collapse of determined determinacy, is, at this juncture, all that self-determination comprises, it is the concept in its minimal entirety, the universal concept, the determinacy that is about to differentiate itself without ever going beyond itself.

If this seems too impoverished a description to qualify as the universal, or, for that matter, as the concept or subjectivity, this can only be because of a misguided expectation to have more given content at the start and to have a fixed term that is immediately everything that it turns out to be. Yet, if the universal is a constitutive term of self-determination, it cannot have further quality than being that which will remain in unity with itself in its self-differentiation. After all, if universality had additional filling it would not only already be particular, but have a character that it had not given itself through its self-determination. Moreover, if the universal were fully manifest immediately, it could not be self-determining. Although the universal cannot have given determinacy, it is not just an indeterminate immediacy, like being. The universal does have character, but the character in question is nothing but the poised self-differentiating unity that is the minimal threshold of freedom.

Given just what it is, the universal presents neither any obstacle nor any intermediary transition between it, as the universal concept, and the difference it gives itself to determine itself and thereby develop into the particular concept. To be universality and not just being or essence, the indeterminacy of the universal concept must immediately generate determinacy and determinacy of a specifically self-determined kind. To determine itself as the unity of determiner and determined, the universal concept must give itself a content that is different from the universal, yet characterized in terms of no other contrast or positing. This non-universal, this negation of the universal, must remain in continuity with the universal concept because the emergent difference is no less a determination of the self-same subject that inhabits the universal as well. Because the differentiation of self-determined determinacy, of the universal concept, derives exclusively from the determinacy underway determining itself, the difference cannot stand distinguished from other independently given differences, as one particular opposing others. Instead, the differentiation that universality immediately generates is particularity as such, not *a* particular, already contrasted with others, but the particular concept as a whole.

Unlike the specifications of particularity in the judgments of quality, reflection and necessity, where the respective universals entail a plurality of particulars distinguished by individuality, the concept of particularity per se cannot already involve a multiplicity of particulars, individuated by factors given independently of the universal. All that lies at hand as legitimate conceptual resources are universality and the determinacy it distinguishes from

itself.¹³ Although this leaves universality and particularity as the only determinations so far constitutive of self-determination, their contrast with one another immediately alters their respective character in a manner that becomes characteristic of every development in conceptual determination. The moment particularity emerges over and against universality, each of these terms figures both as a stage and as a coeval differentiation of the unitary subject determining itself through their development. Instead of having just one self-same particularity, the differentiation of the concept now has two contrastable, qualitatively distinct terms, namely the particular and the universal. Particularity has thereby acquired two species: the particular and the universal, through each of which the universal runs unencumbered in its encompassing self-identity.¹⁴

Whereas the plurality of particulars in the judgments of quality, reflection, and necessity, depended upon individuality, the distinction of particularity and universality as elements of the concept does not already depend upon individuality. Instead, particularity and universality provide sufficient resources for the initial differentiation of self-determination, as they must if individuality is to follow from them, instead of being their coeval partner.

Yet, by the same token, particularity and universality directly provide all that is required to generate individuality as the third differentiation of the concept. By determining itself, as it must immediately do to prove itself to be universal, the universal concept gave itself the difference of particularity, which just as immediately applied to universality as it stood distinguished from particularity. Hence, not only is the universal the particular in its contrast to particularity, but the particular is universal, insofar as it encompasses the particular and the universal as its own two exemplifications. Although the unity of the particular and the universal is determined in and through the universal and the particular themselves, it is no less something different from either, taken separately.

Hegel, of course, identifies this resulting unity as the individual, but its defining character seems distinctly different from that of individuality as it figures in the judgments of quality, reflection, and necessity in relation to the universals of inhering attribute, class, and genus and their respective particulars. In each of these cases, individuality functions as the differentiated particular, sustaining the plurality of particulars upon which universality depends. Here individuality as such emerges as the particularized universal, the

¹³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 39; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 606.

¹⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 40; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 607.

determinate subject, the determinacy determined in and through itself.¹⁵

Admittedly, both descriptions fit ordinary notions of individuality. On the one hand, the individual is not just an instance or class member in general, but a unique instance and member. On the other hand, to be unique, the individual must be determined in virtue of itself. Contrast with another is inadequate, since that mode of contrastive determination, defining the categories of the logic of being, leaves something and its other each with the same dual character (*qua* something and as the other of something else), resulting in at best an endless dissemination of meaning, where negation supplies determinacy, but never individuation. Determination by an external ground is insufficient as well, since the foundational determinacy characterizing the categories of the logic of essence refers each term back to the same foundation, without providing resources for distinguishing them further. Finally, recourse to universality and particularity alone will not suffice, as the Russellian theory of definite description would like to believe, because any collection of general properties could always be duplicated unless they or their assortment be tied to something that is already individuated.

Although both characterizations of individuality are thus plausible, it is easy to see that they are not mutually exclusive. First of all, the individual as the differentiated particular is derivative of the individual as the particularized universal, as should be the case, if judgment presupposes the concept. Secondly, the particularized universal determines itself as a differentiated particular, as also should be expected, if the determinacy of judgment is to issue from the concept.

The dependency of the differentiation of particulars upon the particularized universal is evident once attention is focused upon *how* a plurality of particulars are to be differentiated. As the above survey suggests, the only sufficient resource for enabling a particular to be unique is the determinacy whereby a subject is determinate in and through itself. Neither negation (i.e. the contrast to an other), nor positing (i.e. the appeal to a ground), nor appeal to mere universals can do what the particularized universal of individuality accomplishes. Consequently, the individuality of instances and of class and species members must incorporate the more basic specification with which individuality gets baptized in the concept of the concept.

On the other hand, individuality cannot help but be a differentiated particular because it, like universality and particularity, takes on the determinacy of each of the other elements of the concept. Once individuality arises from the unity of universal and particular, the self-determined subject of

¹⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 53; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 618.

the concept has three differentiations: the universal, the particular, and the individual. Thus, particularity applies to not only the particular and the universal, but the individual as well. Moreover, because the universal, particular, and individual are qualitatively distinct, the individual is a differentiated particular, like its two counterparts in the concept.

These role reversals are not, however, the end of the story. Because each of the three particulars of the concept, the universal, the particular, and the individual, are determinations of the self-identical subject underway determining itself, each is the particularized universality defining individuality. Not only is the individual individual, but so therefore are the universal and the particular. Then, of course, individuality is itself universal, for it pervades all three of the components of the concept. Taken together with the preceding developments wherein the universal and individual became particular and the particular became universal, the emergent universality of individuality signifies that each and every determination of the concept exhibits the totality of conceptual determinacy as it has so far established itself. The universal is particular and individual, the particular is universal and individual, and the individual is particular and universal. In this manner, each term has come to incorporate the entire process of the concept, i.e. of self-determination *per se*.

As a consequence, the concept has issued in a relation between concepts, whereby not just universality and individuality exhibit particularity, but the totality of conceptual determinacy becomes determinate, as one totality standing in contrast to another.

From Concept to Judgment

Hegel identifies this result as the emergence of judgment from the concept. The identification seems apt once linguistic, psychological, and epistemological considerations are left aside and judgment is considered exclusively logically as a determinacy immediately relating concepts to one another.

Although Hegel proceeds to describe judgment in terms of a relation of subject and predicate, he is adamant in distinguishing the logical determinacy of judgment from ordinary notions that conflate judgment with propositions that link representations in general, thanks to an external "judge" who connects terms that are antecedently given apart from their relation in the ensuing proposition.¹⁶

¹⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 61, 62; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 626, 627; Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶167, p. 319; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶167, pp. 232–3.

The outcome of individuality allows for none of this because the terms that stand in relation are concepts, rather than representations in general, and if these concepts are determinate, they are so not through any reference to objects within a supervening structure of reference, but solely in virtue of their contrast with one another as particular. The only terms legitimately available are, on the one hand, those by which the concept is structured, namely, universality, particularity, and individuality, and, on the other hand, the category capturing the relation by which the determinate concepts are connected. Since the emergence of determinate concepts is the immediate result of each conceptual element figuring as the totality of the concept, the independent conceptual terms oppose one another immediately. The appropriate connector is therefore “is”, expressing how their relation has the form of being, completely unmediated and otherwise indeterminate.

This fits judgment to the degree that judgment unites conceptual terms by a copula in the form of being, a copula that simply asserts that one term *is* the other. Less obvious is the role the copula plays as the connector of subject and predicate, the two terms traditionally associated with the basic form of judgment. These terms are adopted for use by Hegel with the fundamental qualification that subject and predicate are not representations in general, to which any content can be ascribed, but particular concepts, which is to say, particular determinations of the concept: universality, particularity, or individuality. Limiting subject and predicate to conceptual determinations instead of treating them as free or, for that matter, bound variables, is in accord with the systematic demands of logic, for which no content is admissible that does not arise immanently from what has already been established. This constitutive connection between the form of judgment and specific conceptual content marks the fundamental divide between the doctrine of judgment in the *Science of Logic* and the treatment of judgment in formal logic.

Given the immediacy in the relation of judgment and the conceptual specificity of its content, one might expect particular types of judgment to be distinguished according to which conceptual terms occupy the respective positions of subject and predicate, producing a taxonomy of “the universal is the individual”, “the universal is the particular”, “the particular is the individual”, “the particular is the universal”, “the individual is the universal”, “the individual is the particular”, and the three tautologies of “the universal is the universal”, “the particular is the particular”, and “the individual is the individual”. Although Hegel makes mention of “the individual is the individual” and “the universal is the universal” in regard to the infinite judgment of determinate being,¹⁷ he excludes the latter three pairings because

¹⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 78, 79–80;

they remove the qualitative difference of terms on which judgment's connecting depends. Moreover, although Hegel does allow different conceptual terms to occupy alternately the positions of subject and predicate, the relation between the terms ends up varying together with the type of universal, particular, and individual that each respective judgment connects.

On the one hand, Hegel prospectively limits the paired terms of judgment to three basic options: "the individual is the universal", "the particular is the universal", and "the individual is the particular".¹⁸ The rationale for this limitation is that judgment opposes subject and predicate as the more determinate and the more universal respectively, and that individual, particular and universal stand in an order of decreasing determinacy and increasing generality.¹⁹

On the other hand, Hegel groups the forms of judgment into three broad divisions, such that the concept is determined by the particular concept first in terms of the categories of being, then in terms of the categories of essence, and then in terms of the categories of the concept.²⁰ If, as the preceding development purports to establish, the contrastive determinacy of being, the determined determinacy of essence, and the self-determined determinacy of the concept exhaust the basic forms of determinacy, one should expect that judgment's specification of the concept by its particular components will complete itself in proceeding through these fundamental options.

Before any of these promissory claims can be evaluated, a basic problem must be resolved on which depends the entire transition from concept to judgment. The problem is twofold. To begin with, why should the relation of independent conceptual terms be an immediate connection of just two terms? If each category of the concept ends up determined as an individuality exhibiting the totality of their moments, why is there not a threesome at hand? On the other hand, even if judgment relates only two terms, why should the independent conceptual factors resulting from individuality be specifically related as subject and predicate? The subject-predicate relation seems to be not just bipolar, but non-transitive. If the connection of particular concepts is immediate, should it not be a matter of indifference whether a term occupies one side of the copula or the other?

Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 641, 642–3.

¹⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 59; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 624.

¹⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 59; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 624.

²⁰ Hegel, *Werke* 8, addition to ¶171, p. 322; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶171, p. 236.

Compounding these perplexities is Hegel's additional claim that the judgment issuing from the self-determination of individuality not only involves subject and predicate, but a subject determined as individual and a predicate determined as universal.²¹ Why should the totalization of the moments of the concept issue in an immediate relation of just these two terms in just this arrangement?

At the end of his account of individuality, Hegel describes how individuality exhibits the character of being a qualitative one, repelling itself from itself, in a generation of a plurality of many other ones.²² Since each of the three components of the concept has taken on individuality, as totalities joining universality and particularity, Hegel's claim is supported, with the caveat that the many in question would seem to be a threesome. This triplicity of the related totalities seems indicated by the fact that, as Hegel observes in paragraph 165 of the *Encyclopedia Logic*, individuality has both independently differentiated the concept components, while just as much positing their identity.²³ Although this underscores the accompanying claim that the judgment is the posited particularity of the concept,²⁴ it still leaves unexplained how judgment will connect only two conceptual terms.

The needed explanation, however, is near a hand. As Hegel elsewhere points out, because these totalities are still moments of the concept, they are united by universality.²⁵ Since, however, each moment has become an independent totality, determined in and through itself as a determinate subject, the universal relates to each as merely an indifferent one, standing in the same relation to the universal as any of its counterparts. As a consequence, universality is merely their commonality, an abstract universal that they all share, without otherwise determining them.²⁶ Hence, even if the individual excludes other individuals, the relationship between them, the universality linking them together, is the bipolar connection where an immediate individual is determined by an abstract universal such as held in common by an indefinite number of other immediate individuals. The individual in question is

²¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 66; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 630.

²² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 56; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 621.

²³ Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶165, p. 315; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶165, pp.229–30.

²⁴ Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶165, p. 315; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶165, pp.229–30.

²⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 56; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 621.

²⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 56; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 621.

immediate because it is a self-determined totality, determined in and through itself rather than through the mediation of other terms. At the same time, judgment equally relates it to a universal that can have the same external link to other such individuals.

These ramifications lend support to the bipolar relation of judgment and the identification of the connected terms as, on the one hand, an immediate individual and, on the other, an abstract universal, inhering in the individual as an instance of itself without otherwise determining it. Even though the individual is an individual among others, the only relation by which they stand related is the connection each has to the universal they share in common, a universal which cannot further determine their respective characters since these are determined in and through themselves.

Moreover, because the two terms are now qualitatively distinct, judgment can have, as it minimally emerges from the concept, a non-transitive connection aptly identifiable as the relation of subject and predicate. Subject and predicate are appropriate qualifiers insofar as they capture the salient features that the immediate individual and the abstract universal possess in the relationship by which the copula joins them. Although the immediate connection expressed by the copula does not itself privilege one direction over the other, the qualitatively distinct conceptual character of each term gives them different roles in the relationship. Because the immediate individual is an independent totality, it has a determinacy extending beyond the universal attribute that the judgment ascribes to it. Accordingly, this universal *inheres* in it, as one attribute among manifold others. The immediate individual thus figures as the *subject* of the judgment, enjoying a prior determinacy of its own to which the abstract universal is now joined. By contrast, because this universal is abstract in the sense of being one among other determinations possessed by the individual, it figures as a *predicate*, predicated upon the individual that provides the underlying substrate for its attribution. Just as the individual is now a determinate individual, rather than individuality *per se*, so the universal is a determinate universal, the universal of inhering attribute, rather than universality in general. So, too, judgment, as it immediately arises from individuality, has a minimal determinacy that will prove to be a particular form of judgment, the judgment of quality or determinate being, once further forms have arisen to contrast to it.

Of course, if any such forms are to emerge, they must do so through the dynamic internal to the qualitative judgment in which individuality has issued. Following out that prospective development is the task awaiting the theory of judgment that can prepare the way for a theory of inference worthy of logical science. Whether Hegel's pioneering efforts have met the challenge must now be addressed.

Chapter 6

The Forms of Judgment and the Types of Universals

The forms of judgment are widely recognized to be central to thinking and to knowing objectivity. Seldom, however, have the necessity, interrelation, and completeness of these forms been investigated. Although Kant can be credited for having brought them to center stage, he is notorious for failing to account for their diversity or for that of the categories he finds rooted in each form. As he himself would have to admit, assurances that judgment is found in certain shapes relating terms through certain concepts can never validate any claims holding universally for either thinking or objective knowledge. At best, what is culled from tradition or psychological observation can support corrigible descriptive claims of contingent local application.

To be conceived as such, independently of any conditional empirical content, judgment must not be considered in relation to any specific concepts that happen to be predicated of a subject. Instead, judgment must be examined in respect to the concept in general. Moreover, judgment per se must not predicate the concept in regard to any specific, contingently given subject. Rather, judgment, considered as such, must predicate the concept to the subject as such. To be logically rather than empirically determined, the subject can have no further content than the particular or the individual. These contents are themselves intrinsic to the concept. This is because the concept, logically speaking, is the universal and the universal constitutively involves both the particular and the individual. Without differentiating itself through the particular, the universal cannot have its encompassing identity, whereas by being at one with itself in the particular, the universal engenders the individual, that which owes its differentiation to itself, enabling the particular to be distinguishable from other particulars and the universal to be a one over many. Accordingly, judgment will constitutively relate these necessary elements of the concept, of universality, to one another. In determining the subject by the predicate to which it gets connected, judgment will accordingly determine the concept by its own elements, as related externally to one another through the immediate connection of the copula. This connection is immediate insofar as

judgment relates subject and predicate by nothing but “is”, a connector providing no ground for its connection. By contrast, syllogism connects its extremes through the mediation of a middle term, which, logically speaking, must again be one of the elements of the concept.

If judgment necessarily takes particular shapes, these will be distinguished by which elements of the concept they connect, as well as by any generic type of universal, particular, and individual that distinguishes each type of connection. No other differentiating factors are available without appealing to contingently given contents that have no legitimate place in logical investigation.

Consequently, if any categories are to emerge from the logical treatment of judgment, they will comprise the generic types of universality, particularity, and individuality, types whose necessity will reside in how they are ingredient in the different forms of judgment. To have any necessity of their own, these forms of judgment must themselves emerge from judgment *per se*. Otherwise, their differentiation will be rooted not in the nature of judgment, but in extraneous, accidental features.

For this reason, the logical investigation of judgment must begin with the universal determination of judgment, which comprises the minimal specification presupposed by any further forms that may be logically entailed. Although any such forms must emerge from this universal determination, once they do, it becomes differentiated as the initial shape of judgment, distinct from those that follow from it. Then, the universality, particularity, and individuality within this initial shape become distinguished as specific types of universals, particulars, and individuals, externally related to one another by the type of copula with which judgment logically begins.¹

Significantly, these types of universals, particulars, and individuals, can be embodied in different types of reality and thought. Accordingly, any theory that privileges one type to the exclusion of the others will truncate thinking and

¹ In section 19 of the B edition “Transcendental Deduction of the Categories”, Kant questions the received view that judgment is a relation between two concepts, noting that this characterization applies to categorical judgments only, since hypothetical and disjunctive judgments contain relations of judgments to one another. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B141–2, p. 251. That all forms of judgment exhibit an immediate relation of concept determinations, rather than the conceptually mediated relation of syllogism, becomes evident once it is duly recognized that 1) judgment logically relates the constitutive determinations of the concept (e.g. universality and particularity or individuality), and 2) that their relations in judgment take different forms in function of the generic types of universality, particularity, and individuality.

conceptual knowledge. Such privileging will not only limit reason to a form of universality that is not exhaustive, but limit the application of thought to particular forms of reality, leaving others erroneously beyond rational conception. The forms of judgment thus need to be developed in their totality to liberate reason from the shortsighted truncations that have plagued all too much philosophy, past and present.

Among historical figures, Hegel stands out for attempting to account exhaustively and systematically for the forms of judgment. He purports to develop judgment from no further resource than the concept itself, following out how the universal, particular, and individual entail the external unification of universal and individual constitutive of the subject-predicate relation of judgment. He then proceeds to differentiate the forms of judgment by thinking through how the minimal form of judgment transforms itself into a further form, which entails more successive transformations. These metamorphoses continue until a form is reached that brings closure to the complete series of particular forms of judgment by engendering syllogism, where the unity of terms is mediated by another concept component, rather than being joined through the "is" of the copula. Hegel seeks to escape arbitrariness and incompleteness by presenting the differentiation of judgment as a self-development that ends up transcending judgment's immediate connection of subject and predicate. All intervention by an external theorist is thereby purportedly avoided. Whether Hegel has succeeded depends, of course, on whether the series he presents does comprise successive self-transformations that lead beyond judgment.

To test Hegel's achievement and, more importantly, explore the forms of universality in their exhaustive diversity, one must examine each form in succession, employing Hegel's account as a guide, wherever possible.

Preliminary Overview of the Forms of Judgment and the Types of Universality

Complicating the evaluation of Hegel's treatment are the two somewhat incongruous ways in which he divides the territory. On the one hand, he claims that the itinerary of the forms of judgment reflects successive applications of categories of being, essence, and the concept to the connection of universal and individual. On the other hand, he offers a fourfold division of judgments into those of quality, reflection, necessity, and the concept. These two listings do map onto one another insofar as judgments of quality involve categories of being, judgments of reflection and necessity both apply categories of essence, and judgments of the concept apply categories from the logic of the concept.

Nevertheless, some explanation is required not only for why being, essence, and the concept reappear, but for why the intermediate phase breaks into two successive sets of judgment.

Admittedly, the resulting taxonomy is not far removed from other traditional divisions of judgment. Under judgments of quality Hegel offers the positive, negative, and infinite judgments, each pertaining to determinate being and involving inherence. Under judgments of reflection, the so-called “quantitative” judgments, Hegel presents the singular, particular, and universal judgments, each involving subsumption, rather than inherence. Under judgments of necessity, Hegel develops the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments, each containing relations of genus and species. Finally, under judgments of the concept, Hegel gives the assertoric, problematic, and apodeictic judgments, each presenting modal relations in which evaluations enter. Kant gives very much the same assortment, albeit in a different order, in his Table of Judgments, placing first, under quantity, the universal, particular, and singular judgments, second, under quality, the affirmative, negative, and infinite judgments, third, under relation, the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments, and fourth, under modality, the problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic judgments.² Of itself, this convergence may well testify to mutual confusion as much as mutual enlightenment.

More indicative of the conceptual comprehensiveness of the proposed division is the typology of universals that it contains. The judgments of quality, reflection, necessity, and the concept contain, respectively, the abstract universal, the universal of class membership, the genus, and the universal of normativity, the “concrete universal”. Each of these types of universal entails a correlative type of individual and particular.

The abstract universal is “abstract” in that its quality inheres in individuals whose other determinations are entirely indifferent to the universal they share. The individual that possesses the abstract universal is immediate in the sense that nothing else about it is mediated by its universality. For this reason, knowledge of the abstract universal inhering in an immediate individual indicates nothing more about the latter. All other knowledge of the individual must be obtained from other means, such as observation. The abstract universal is privileged by early modern philosophers, who, not surprisingly, appeal to experience to know individuals in recognition of reason’s alleged inability to grasp more than abstractions, and conceive reality in atomistic terms, where objects are immediate individuals, otherwise indifferent to how they are connected.

² See Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allan Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 206 (A70/B95).

By contrast, the universal of class membership relates its members to one another through ascription of some quality to one, some, or all members of a class. Here, individuals' properties are mediated by relation to a group, but group membership still leaves undetermined what other features distinguish members from one another. Consequently, although the individual as class member is not simply immediate, the mediation of class membership leaves unspecified what subgroups may fall within the class, as well as what individuates members. The universal of class membership is privileged by those who restrict general knowledge to "natural kinds", which, given the contingency of subgroups and individuation within classes, stand in no *a priori* hierarchy and can only be delimited empirically.

The genus, for its part, does determine the particularity of the individual, mandating specific differentia by which the genus inherently differentiates itself into species. Hence, knowledge of the genus entails knowledge of its species, making possible *a priori* judgments about the differentia of its members, as well as what sub-groupings of a genus they fall under. Nevertheless, although the individuals of the genus have a particularity necessary to the genus, namely, some necessary species being, what individuates them as members of their species is left just as undetermined as the individuality of the immediate individual or class member.³ The ancients, most notably Plato and Aristotle, privilege this type of universality, which is why they conceive reality in terms of a hierarchy of forms, whose genus/species relation enables reason to make necessary judgments about the nature of things, independently of observation. Because, however, the genus does not individuate its members when it determines their species, the ancients must leave individuality beyond the grasp of reason, together with those realities in which individuality is penetrated by universality, realities such as beauty and freedom.⁴

By contrast, the universal of normativity, or the concrete universal, determines the individual in its entirety through the particular and universal. The individual that is so determined is not the immediate individual, nor merely a member of a class or a genus and species. Normativity requires an exemplary existence in which what is individual is no less universal. This complete union of individuality and universality is basic to self-determination, where the self, qua self-determined, is what it has determined itself to be,

³ Michael B. Foster discusses these features of the genus, in contrast to the abstract and concrete universals, in "The Concrete Universal: Cook Wilson and Bosanquet", *Mind*, Vol. XL, No. 157, January, 1931, pp. 1-22.

⁴ Michael B. Foster exposes this limitation at length in his *The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

giving itself an individual identity that it owes to itself, a self that contains that individuality in its all pervading unity. Although the concrete universal, and its associate freedom, may underlie truth, right, and beauty, no other type of universality is more neglected. That it brings closure to the typology of universals is suggested by how it exhausts the conceptual gradations in predication – the universal determines either just the universal (quality or class), or itself and the particular (genus and species), or itself, the particular and the individual (concrete universal).

Qualitative Judgment and Abstract Universality

The minimal determination of judgment, the subject-predicate relation, comprises the starting point for systematically investigating the forms of judgment and the types of universality, particularity, and individuality. Nothing more can enter into the necessary differentiation of judgments and a critical investigation of Hegel's account must begin by examining how the subject-predicate relation can be both basic to all forms of judgment and immediately comprise one such form, qualitative judgment.

Although a proposition may grammatically connect a subject with a predicate in which contingent contents define each term, the logical determination of judgment must be restricted to the immediate identification of the subject *per se* with the predicate *per se*. In this connection, the subject must have a given character in order to be ascribed a predicate. Else, there is nothing determinate to which anything can be predicated. As such, the subject is simply a given individual, without further qualification. Although judgment connects it to a predicate, the subject figures within judgment as something whose individuality is antecedent to the predication the judgment effects. Consequently, the subject is an individual with an immediate character that has, as yet, no relation to the predicate that judgment will assign to it. Whatever predicate judgment connects to the subject will inhere in the subject as a given substrate of predication, different from, and thereby possessing determination additional to whatever content the predicate possesses. The subject can be conceived to have nothing more specific than this immediate individuality in which the predicate will inhere. Otherwise, content extraneous to the subject-predicate relation will be illicitly introduced.

On the other hand, the predicate must, to start with, have a given character of its own, independent of the subject to which it gets ascribed. If not, the relation of judgment has nothing determinate to predicate of the subject. Yet to inhere in the subject, rather than be merely its other or determining ground, the predicate must be a universal, whose given character remains self-identical in

the individual without being reducible to what the individual contains. Not only does the universal of the predicate have a determination independent of the subject, but that universal must be susceptible of inhering in other given individuals. In this way, the immediate individual is equally an instance of the immediate universal that inheres in it.

This gives the individual a particularity that is immediate in that being an instance of the immediate universal neither determines or is determined by the individual character of any other instance, nor defines the range of predication the universal enjoys.

Because all these features are inherent in the subject-predicate relation basic to judgment, all forms of judgment must exhibit them, albeit with different further qualifications. Nevertheless, these features equally define a particular type of universal – the abstract universal, as well as the immediate individual and immediate particular to which it applies.

By its very nature, the abstract universal relates to the immediate individual in terms of what Hegel, and others, call the positive judgment, the judgment where the predicate is immediately ascribed to the subject at the same time that both terms have given determinations that are indifferent to the identity affirmed by the copula of the judgment. What is immediately individual falls outside the abstract universal just as the abstract universal falls outside what is immediately individual. Because the abstract universal inheres in a given individual that is its instance, the individual has a determinate being that is other to the universal with which it is identified, just as the universal cannot be confined to this its instance.

Consequently, the abstract universal is just as much in a negative relation, that of being an other to the immediate individual, rendering the subject-predicate connection of the positive judgment a negative judgment in which the subject is determined to *not* be the predicate.

Hegel maintains that the negative judgment can be positively expressed as a predication of particularity to the subject.⁵ By being posited as not the abstract universal that inheres in it, the subject is determined to be particular. This becomes evident once one notes that the inherence of the abstract universal in the immediate individual renders that individual an instance of its predicate. To be an instance is to be a particular, whereas to be a differentiated instance, distinguished from others, is to be an individual. Of course, to be *a* particular, the subject must also be an individual, and the positive reformulation of the negative judgment gives the individual in both capacities, for the judgment, “the individual is the particular”, presents both the individual as individual and

⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 73; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 637.

the individual posited as particular.

These features are obscured if the judgments involving the abstract universal are viewed as literally qualitative, involving determinate being. Given the pervasive reduction of universality to the abstract universal, it is not uncommon to find quality and universality equated, an equation that appears fulfilled when positive and negative judgments are identified as judgments of quality in which categories of determinate being predominate. Quality, however, must be distinguished from the universal. Quality is simply the unity of being and non-being that is in the form of being, and determinate being always involves qualitative relations where something and other are contrastively determined.⁶ Universality is the unity of self-determined determinacy, where otherness is always reintegrated within a subject that differentiates itself. Something does not inhere in an other, but stands separated from it by some limit. The universal instead continues into the particular that is distinguished from it. Nonetheless, the abstract universal has a qualitative dimension insofar as the individual in which it inheres has a determination that is irrevocably other to the universal, just as the universal has something about it that remains ever beyond its instance. In these respects, categories of determinate being enter in, but only as qualifications of relationships involving universality, particularity, and individuality.

Judgments of abstract universality manifest their own inability to be ultimate in the result to which they lead: the determination of the subject as particular, as an instance of a universal. This predication opens the door to judgments of class, in which the relations of instances of the same universal get determined. These relations are posited in the quantitative judgments, where predication applies to one, some, or all members of a class.

Quantitative Judgment and Class Membership

Qualitative judgment resolves itself into quantitative judgment, and more specifically, into the singular judgment in virtue of how abstract universality determines the individual to be an instance. Since an instance is not an immediate individual, but an individual set in relation to other individuals of the same universal, its individuality is expressly mediated by its particularity. That is, the individual is a member of the class of individuals all subsumed under the same universal.

Because the universal contains this and other instances under its unity, the subsuming universal is not merely abstract. The universal no longer simply

⁶ See Chapter 3.

inheres in an immediate individual, unrelated to anything else in virtue of that inherence. Instead the universal subsumes individuals, which are set in relation in virtue of that subsumption. That relation, however, lays hold of only the particularity of each individual. Each is determined to be an instance, a particular, but how they otherwise are individuated from one another is left unspecified by their subsumption under the same universal. Consequently, although the subsumption of an individual under the universal entails that other individuals are similarly subsumed, their identity is not further determined. Hence, the judgment, "the single individual is a member of the class" entails that *some* individuals are members of the class, leaving indefinite which ones belong. The "singular" judgment thereby transforms itself into the "particular" judgment.

Although extraneous material might be illicitly introduced to further identify which group of individuals belong to the class, particular judgment itself leaves unspecified how the group is defined. *Some* individuals, without further qualification, must belong, given that one individual is an instance of the subsuming universal of class membership. Of course, that *some*, but not *all* individuals belong entails that some individuals do not belong. The particular judgment thus negates itself. This negation cannot signify simply that certain individuals fall outside the class, for that merely upholds the original particular judgment by affirming that certain others fall within the class. Because the specification of *some* individuals does not mark it off from any other determinate group, the negation of the particular judgment precludes excluding any group from class membership. If just any particular plurality does not belong, another particular plurality does belong, reinstating the particular judgment that is to be negated. Accordingly, the negation of the particular judgment must instead signify that *not some* individuals belong to the class. Since this negation is violated if either just one or just some individuals do belong, it can only be sustained by extending class membership to *all*. Then, and then alone, does membership in the class transcend particularity, as well as singularity.⁷ When *all* individuals are subsumed under the universal, the singular and particular judgments are both negated. Admittedly, the single individual and some individuals are still contained within the extension of the class, but they there belong only without excluding any others. In this way, the particular judgment results in the universal judgment, that all individuals are subsumed under the universal of class membership.

If reason were limited to the reflected universality of class membership, no

⁷ These relations exhibit how singularity is a particular type of individuality. Singularity must thus be consistently terminologically distinguished from individuality to indicate the type of individuality specific to class membership.

judgment, not the singular nor the particular nor the universal, could provide grounds for what individuates class members or for what distinguishes one group of individuals from any other within the class. Because class membership does not individuate members or their subgroupings, knowing their desiderata cannot be obtained by thinking the class, but only through empirical investigation. Similarly, since the particular identity of a class depends on what individuals and particulars belong to it, and these are left undetermined by class membership, there can be no *a priori* differentiation of classes. What defines each class is itself an empirical matter, to be decided by the corrigible labors of collection and comparison that uncover the family resemblances distinguishing natural, that is, empirically given, kinds.

Any attempt to make this the final word on reason is subverted by how quantitative judgment transforms itself into the judgment of necessity, in which class gets superseded by genus. As Hegel points out, once all individuals are subsumed under the universal, the individual cannot fail to be determined by that universal. In other words, once class membership extends to all individuals, the individual as such is the universal. The relation to other class members falls by the wayside, since if the individual must be determined by the universal, what individuates the individual is no longer indifferent to its universality, as is the case with class membership. Under the reflected universality of class, what makes the individual belong is that it is grouped with others to whom it has no other determinate relation beyond that inclusion. Through the universal judgment the individual becomes immediately determined as universal in virtue of its individual identity. This determination, however, is immediate, which is to say that the necessity of the connection with the universal is not mediated through any other factor. The universal does not inhere in the individual, besides other features it leaves untouched, nor does the individual figure as an instance of the universal, related to others through a bond that leaves out of account their respective individuation. Instead, the individual here has its own encompassing nature in the universal, with no residue distinguished from its universality.

Judgments of Necessity and Genus and Species

Judgments of necessity might appear to have little to do with genus and species, given how categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments are commonly associated with substance, cause and effect, and reciprocity. Hegel himself endorses this connection, emphasized by Kant, but still affirms that all of these relationships figure in necessary judgment thanks to the determination

of universal and individual in terms of genus and species.⁸

What distinguishes genus from class and abstract quality is that genus comprises the substance of the individuals that belong to it. Whereas class delimits membership while leaving everything particular and individual undetermined, genus pervades its individuals by dictating the particular features that distinguish their species-being. Individual accidents still remain, insofar as what differentiates members of the lowest species is not defined by their species being.

Categorical Judgment

The quantitative judgment of “allness” gives rise to the categorical judgment, that the individual, in virtue of its nature, is the universal. This is because the common subsumption of all members of a class renders each necessarily and immediately connected to their predicate. Although the categorical judgment identifies the individual with a nature to which the universal is immediately conjoined, their simultaneous distinction as subject and predicate is sustained to the extent that the individual figures in its species being in relation to the universal comprising the genus to which the species necessarily belongs. Fittingly, this species-genus connection is exhibited in every example Hegel gives (“gold is a metal”, etc.).⁹

The species being of the subject exhibits substantiality to the extent that it pervades all features of the individual. Yet, more than a relation of substance and accident is present, for the individual is immediately tied to a universal of necessity, a necessity grounded in the individual’s own identity. Or, the individual as such is connected to this universal. To be a specific individual is equivalent to being an individual of a kind whose pervading communality immediately ties it to a distinguishable universal in which it is included. This relation is that of species and genus, where the individual kind has a nature necessarily contained within the genus. Although the connection of species and genus is necessary, it is no less immediate. No other term renders the species a necessary differentiation of the genus. The genus just consists of the species it has, without any further ground. The categorical judgment expresses this immediacy through its copula.

Moreover, although the subject has a species being contained in the genus,

⁸ In this respect, Hegel points out that substance, causality and reciprocity figure in the three forms of necessary judgment not simply as categories of essence, but as incorporated into the form of concept determinations. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 91; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 653.

⁹ Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶177, p. 329; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶177, p. 329.

its individuality is otherwise still contingent. What distinguishes the subject from other individuals of its species is left undetermined by species being and the necessary differentiation of the genus. Consequently, what the categorical judgment posits is not the necessity of the subject *qua* individual, but the necessity of its species-genus connection.¹⁰

In positing the subject's species to be of the genus, the categorical judgment thus contains an asymmetry. Whereas the species being of the individual entails the genus, the genus can be in different individuals of its other species, as well as in other individuals of the same species.¹¹ Consequently, the categorical affirmation of the necessary connection of species and genus leaves the individual existence of the species unnecessary.

This asymmetry is expressed in the hypothetical judgment, that if an individual of a certain species is, then so is an individual of a certain other species. On the one hand, this judgment posits the necessary connection of different species, which is the unity of the genus. On the other hand, the judgment leaves the being of each individual contingent.

Hypothetical Judgment

Ordinarily, the hypothetical judgment is linked to causality and causality is construed as a cause and effect relation governed by a law neutral to the kind of entities cause and effect may be. The hypothetical judgment is thus associated with efficient causality, which is indifferent to "formal" causality and relations of genus and species. Yet hypothetical judgment arises from categorical judgment involving genus and species and in particular from the way in which the necessary connection between genus and species still leaves undetermined whether the genus will be realized by one species or another. Accordingly, are the cause and effect associated in hypothetical judgment individuals, whose kind is of no consequence, or rather particular species, whose connection rests on the genus? After all, causal relations are commonly acknowledged to relate entities of a certain kind, where the cause will be a type of state of affairs producing as its effect some other type of state of affairs. Although this presence of kind is usually treated as if cause and effect were linked by a law,

¹⁰ Accordingly, Hegel remarks that the necessity of the relation of subject and predicate is still inner and not yet posited, as it will be in the hypothetical judgment. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 90; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 651.

¹¹ Hegel claims that the advance from the categorical to the hypothetical judgment lies in this indifference of the individual being of the genus to its particular species. See Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶177, p. 329; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶177, p. 242.

law is properly indifferent to kind, subjecting all legal subjects to the same rule, whatever they may be. Hence, that cause and effect involve types suggests a relation of species rooted in the genus they share, or alternately, a relation of individuals that have a genus and species and are dependent upon one another.

What the hypothetical judgment posits is not the existence of the extremes, but only the existence of their connection.¹² The causal relation holds whether or not there is an individual of that species, whose existence would entail that of an individual of some other type.

Disjunctive Judgment

The hypothetical judgment entails disjunctive judgment to the degree that the conditional relation of individuals with a species being gives the universal of the genus in its particularization, where the individual being of the genus is identical to the conditional, rather than necessary existence of each of its species.¹³ The genus has a disjunctive realization because, as the hypothetical judgment makes explicit, although the genus exists in the individuals of its different species, none of them has a necessary existence. That is, the genus will exist in one *or* another of these individuals which represent one or another of its species. What allows the disjunctive judgment to have necessity is that the universal is the genus and that its disjunctive reality is the exhausted particularization of its species. Because class does not determine the particularity of its members, no disjunction of them or of any subgroupings can ever necessarily exhaust class membership (e.g. the class of bachelors is always open to addition and further subdivision).¹⁴ By contrast, the disjunction of species is necessarily exhaustive because the unity of the genus differentiates its particulars, the different species, albeit without individuating the members of each species.

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 91; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 652.

¹³ Hegel accordingly claims that what engenders the disjunctive judgment is that the hypothetical judgment yields the universal in its expressly realized particularization. See Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶177, p. 329; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶177, p. 242.

¹⁴ Hegel makes an analogous contrast between the instantiation of abstract universals and the disjunction of the genus: the former allows for an empirical disjunctive judgment devoid of necessity, where the completeness is purely subjective, signifying that A is either B or C or D, etc. because B, C and D happen to have been found. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 93; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 654.

For this reason, the universal of the genus cannot consist of some mark abstracted from individuals. If that were the case, the genus would not immanently determine its disjunction, since what exists in each individual besides any such mark would be indifferent to it, leaving the differentiation of both individuals and species external to the universal of the would-be genus.¹⁵

Although the disjunctive judgment connects the genus with its differentiation into species, that connection is present neither in the subject nor in the predicate. What disjunctive judgment does is posit their immediate connection. Because the connection is immediate, it remains necessary, rather than free, in that subject and predicate do not themselves posit their connection, but have it made externally by the judgment.

Nonetheless, because disjunctive judgment does posit their unity, the subject thereby gets determined to be the genus united with its necessary differentiation. This posited unity comprises the immanent combination of universal and particular generic to the concept. As such, it provides the distinctive content predicated in the type of judgment warranting description as the judgment of the concept. Combining the genus with its comprehensive division into species, this totality comprises a new type of universality to which judgments of the concept connect a correspondingly new type of individual.

Judgments of the Concept and the Universal of Normativity

Judgments of the concept determine normativity insofar as what is predicated of the subject is the *correspondence* of its particularity with its universality. Truth, right, and beauty all involve the agreement of particular reality with what is universal in nature. This agreement, however, remains incomplete if individuality falls outside the correspondence. The relations of species and genus may equate the exhaustive particularization of the genus with its own concrete unity, but individuality still remains external to their unification. If reason were limited to the universality of genus and the corresponding judgments of necessity, individuality would remain opaque to thought and individual existence would resist evaluation.

Although the outcome of disjunctive judgment is the posited unity of the differentiation of species and their genus, that this is now predicated of the subject signifies that individuality is to be equated with that unity. What lies at stake is therefore the complete conceptual determination of individuality.

Because, however, the judgment of the concept sets the subject in

¹⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 94; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 654.

immediate relation to the posited unity of particularity and universality, the individuality of the subject does not yet contain the correspondence to be attributed to it. The agreement of the individual with the correspondence of particularity and universality is still something external, depending upon the immediate linkage of subject and predicate through the copula of the judgment.

Assertoric Judgment

Accordingly, the judgment of the concept is, to begin with, merely assertoric, immediately affirming a connection between individuality and the unity of particularity and universality that is not already present in the subject. The connection is posited by the judgment, but since the connection rests only on that positing, the individual cannot be otherwise certified to fit the evaluation conferred upon it. As far as it is immediately given, the subject might or might not correspond to the evaluative predicate. The individual is a candidate for normativity, of correspondence with the concrete unity of particularity and universality, something involving more than possessing abstract qualities, belonging to a class, or having species being. Nevertheless, because the individual does not contain that concrete unity, it is contingent whether it warrants the predication affirmed in assertoric judgment.

Problematic Judgment

Consequently, assertoric judgment is problematic, ascribing a normative predicate that may just as well fit as not fit the individual. Immediate individuals are not necessarily true, right, or beautiful, but might or might not agree with such correspondence, depending upon their particularity and its connection with universality. This signifies that the individual does agree provided it possesses the proper constitution that is immanent to the universal. In other words, the problematic judgment issuing from assertoric judgment ends up positing that the individual *is* in accord with normativity insofar as its individuality contains the particular constitution wedded to universality.

Apodeictic Judgment

This yields the apodeictic judgment, that the individual, possessing a particular constitution entailed by the universal, is concretely universal, that is, a unity of particularity and universality. Because here the individual already contains what is predicated of it, what the judgment posits is “necessarily” and “objectively” the case. Unlike the categorical judgment, which connects the individual’s species being with its genus, without providing any ground for that

connection, the apodeictic judgment has a necessity that is fully grounded in the subject. This self-grounding exhibits the autonomy basic to conceptual determination, which allows truth to be obtained by yielding to the *Sache selbst*, following the internal constitution of the factor under consideration. That factor can be internally constituted and subject to apodeictic judgment only insofar as it is not externally determined by abstract universals, class membership, and species being, but self-determined through the immanent connection between its individuality, particularity, and universality. That immanent connection is the corresponding constitutive of the normative universal.¹⁶ Accordingly, the individual of judgments of the concept is the subject that is wholly conceptually determinate, what Hegel identifies as *die Sache selbst*.¹⁷ This type of individual is what can correspond to the universality of normativity and figure in judgments of the concept. Its particular constitution can not just be species being, for that type of particularity leaves undetermined what individuates members of the species. The particularity in judgments of the concept is instead inherent to the individual.

Beyond Judgment

Because of this inherence, both subject and predicate actually contain the structure of judgment within themselves. The subject unites its individuality with the particular constitution by which it is connected with the predicate. For its part, the predicate connects the particular with the universal. By connecting both sides, the apodeictic judgment posits a relation between judgments, a relation mediated not by the immediacy of the copula, but by particularity. In this way, apodeictic judgment transforms the immediate connection of judgment into the mediated connection of syllogism.

By undergoing this self-transformation, apodeictic judgment brings closure to the forms of judgment and the corresponding types of individuality, particularity, and universality. Because the systematic differentiation of judgment must proceed from nothing other than the concept, once the resultant series of shapes supercedes the immediate connection of subject and predicate

¹⁶ As Hegel points out, universality is here not what the individual ought to be, or the genus, but the corresponding that comprises the predicate of the apodeictic judgment. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 102; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 662.

¹⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 102; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 662.

constitutive of judgment, no further forms can arise without appeal to extraneous assumptions.

This closure does not, however, signify that reason finds its ultimate expression in the culminating judgment of the concept. Both that judgment and the syllogisms that follow remain plagued by a discrepancy between what relates their terms and the terms themselves. In every form of judgment, the immediate connection of subject and predicate is still different from the united terms, even if they finally come to have contents fitting their identification. Similarly, in syllogism, the mediation of judgments remains different from the judgments it connects so long as their unity must be posited through inference. Eliminating these last vestiges of externality is equivalent to overcoming the "subjectivity" of concept, judgment, and syllogism.¹⁸

¹⁸ For a further analysis of this overcoming, see Chapter 8.



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Chapter 7

The System of Syllogism

Reason and Syllogism

Ever since Aristotle, syllogism has occupied a central place in logic and cast a fateful shadow upon the power of reason. Recognized to be the great conveyor of rationality, allowing reason to reach conclusions of unparalleled universality and necessity, syllogism has equally been acknowledged to be beset by limits. These limits narrowly circumscribe the reach of reason, if rational knowledge is based upon the deductive inference by which syllogism mediates judgments by one another.

Neither Plato, nor his greatest pupil, Aristotle, sees fit to restrict reason to syllogistic inference. Given how every syllogism operates with premises, they recognize that if reason were confined to syllogizing, it could never account for the given assumptions on which its conclusions ultimately rested. Any attempt to conclude those premises would require further inferences whose own premises would always stand in need of further deduction. The unconditioned knowledge required for philosophical wisdom would instead depend upon transcending the limits of syllogism, something Aristotle and Plato sought by employing an intuitive understanding of first principles, those privileged givens that allegedly have an absolute immediacy mediating everything else that can be and be known. Such intuitive cognition would then empower syllogism to infer what would follow from the first principles.

The role of syllogism takes on a different cast once the intuitive understanding of first principles is called into question. Because the form of immediacy can be ascribed to any content and no putative immediacy can be justified by anything else without forfeiting its alleged primacy, privileged givens can never be shielded from skeptical challenge. *If* the repudiation of intuitive understanding leaves reason with no resource but syllogism, philosophical argument is condemned to an empty formality, where every inference rests upon premises never fully proven. At best, syllogism becomes a regulative imperative, leaving reason ever seeking the unconditioned condition of judgments, which always lies beyond whatever inference gets concluded.

Whether syllogism be supplemented by an intuitive intelligence or left alone

as reason's solitary device, it can no more account for its own defining nature, than provide an exhaustive treatment of its particular types. Inference cannot be inferred without taking itself for granted. Further, because inference employs premises that, as such, are given rather than generated by itself, it can no more legitimate its own concept than any other. Moreover, no empirical survey of inferential thinking can ever reliably locate its essential nature, since what all observed examples share may be contingent rather than necessary commonalities. Similarly, whatever types may be experienced can never be empirically certified to be exhaustive nor even to qualify as types. Empirical family resemblances can always be revised in face of new observations, just as no amount of observation can preclude unnoticed varieties.

To be logically accounted for, syllogism must be determined apart from any contingent content. This does not mean that syllogism *per se* is completely formal. It does have a content consisting minimally in the mediated succession of terms comprising inference. Commonly, these terms are identified as three successive judgments, which are just as commonly assumed to be determined in their own right and only externally related through the inference to which they belong. The connection of inference thereby appears to be something subjective, rather than objective, residing not in the judgments themselves, but in the arrangement imposed upon them from without by some syllogizer. Even if the conclusion is drawn from the succession of the major and minor premises, these enter into the inference as givens. Nevertheless, the immediacy they possess is just as much superceded by the inference of which they are a part. Insofar as the conclusion follows within the syllogism from them and them alone, it certifies that their connection is not just subjective, but inherent in their content. Both aspects of immediacy and posited mediation require recognition, just as do the externality of subject and predicate in judgment and the relationship posited by the copula that unites them.

Yet how are the terms that are both initially immediate and posited as mediated further determined in syllogism *per se*? To the degree that syllogism incorporates judgments, these judgments must enter in only as they are necessarily determined. To eliminate all empirical contingencies, the logical investigation of judgment must consider the subject as such and the predicate as such. Instead of predicating some particular universal, judgment *per se* predicates the universal as such and does so not of some contingent subject, but of the individual or particular as such. Similarly, if inference is to be categorized independently of all contingent content, its constituents must be as equally conceptually determined as those that comprise the terms of judgment that get further related inferentially. Moreover, if the minimal nature of syllogism involves factors that are, logically speaking, the universal, the particular, and the individual *per se*, then any differentiation of types of

syllogism will be necessary and exhaustive only if it relies upon nothing but the generic types of judgment they contain and the types of universality, particularity, and individuality that distinguish these. Further, if differentiation of forms of syllogism is to be non-arbitrary, it must emerge from what minimally characterizes syllogism. Whatever particular types of syllogism arise must do so from that starting point alone, for otherwise their differentiation will be alien to the nature of syllogism and contingent upon some extraneous factor.

Although philosophers since Aristotle have freely employed syllogism as a central fixture of philosophical investigation, a systematic account has been just as wanting for inference as it has been for judgment. The great exception to this neglect is Hegel, whose treatment of syllogism follows upon and indeed follows from his systematic account of the forms of judgment. To escape arbitrariness, Hegel attempts to think through how the differentiation of judgment achieves closure when a type emerges whose connection overcomes the defining immediacy of judgment's copula, transforming itself into the mediated connection minimally comprising syllogism. Having thereby provided an allegedly non-arbitrary account of syllogism *per se*, Hegel then proceeds to think through the differentiation of the forms of inference. He does this by following out how the minimal relationship of syllogism transforms itself, setting in motion a series of self-transforming types of inference that exhausts itself by reaching a form that eliminates the type of mediation constitutive of syllogism.

Not surprisingly, the resulting forms of syllogism arise in an order and differentiation that largely follows the order and differentiation of the forms of judgment incorporated within them. One glaring discrepancy stands out, however. Whereas judgment successively takes the form of judgments of determinate being (qualitative), of reflection (quantitative), of necessity (modal), and of the concept (normative), syllogism takes only three forms correlating with the first three of the four forms of judgment.¹ In Hegel's account the first form of syllogism is that of determinate being, relating qualitative judgments and the abstract universals, particulars, and individuals that these involve. This form of inference transforms itself into the syllogism of reflection, linking quantitative judgments tying universals of class to

¹ Kant also distinguishes only three forms of syllogism (the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive), despite identifying four forms of judgment (of quantity, quality, relation, and modality). In Kant's case, the restriction of syllogism to three forms involves basing them solely on the three species of judgments of relation. He thereby neglects those syllogisms that involve judgments of quality and quantity, a neglect that will be demonstrated to be unfounded. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A70/B95, p. 206; A304/B361, p. 390; and A323/B379, p. 400.

individuals with the particularity of class membership. Finally, the syllogism of reflection gives rise to the syllogism of necessity, containing judgments of necessity and their genus-species relationships. What is lacking is any further form of syllogism that might correlate with the judgments of the concept, whose normative relations involve the concrete universal. Instead, the syllogisms of necessity allegedly exhaust the necessary forms of inference by eliminating the difference between what is concluded and that by which it is inferred. This purportedly undermines the mediation constitutive of syllogism, removing the remaining externality of its connections, in which its abiding subjectivity resides. With the universal and particular relations of individuals now completely posited in their own individuality, the category of objectivity has emerged.

The only way to evaluate the anomaly between the series of judgments and that of syllogisms is to think through their determinations and establish whether they transform themselves as Hegel suggests. Doing so will allow us to equally determine to what degree a systematic account of inference has been achieved and what significance any closure has for the role of syllogism in the realm of reason.

In drawing upon Hegel's investigation to comprehend syllogism, the logical starting point consists in examining whether syllogism does arise from the self-engendered closure of the forms of judgment, and if so, with what character it emerges. This may allow us to lay hold of the minimal determination of syllogism, which no less becomes a particular form of syllogism once other types arise from it.

From Judgment to Syllogism

On Hegel's account, the forms of judgment achieve closure through the connection posited in the apodeictic judgment. Apodeictic judgment, like the assertoric and problematic judgments from which it arises, involves the concrete universal, which unites particularity and universality. As we have seen,² this correspondence of particularity and universality is predicated of the individual in all three of these judgments of the concept. Because the assertoric judgment makes this connection immediately, providing no ground for the individual to fit this correspondence, the individual may or may not fit, depending upon what particularity it has. The problematic judgment posits just this, which yields the apodeictic judgment insofar as the latter specifies that the individual has the unity of particularity and universality by containing the

² See Chapter 6.

appropriate particularity. As a consequence, both subject and predicate now take on the form of judgments, containing an immediate connection between individual and particular (the erstwhile subject) and particular and universal (the erstwhile predicate). Moreover, the identity posited by the apodeictic judgment resides no longer simply in the immediate connection of the copula (expressed by "is"). What connects the individual in the subject with the universal in the predicate is instead the particularity both equally contain, which is why the connection is not contingent upon some subjective association, but necessary and objective.

Although the apodeictic judgment nominally has the form of a subject-predicate relation, the connection it effects yields a relationship leaving judgment behind, or, more precisely, incorporated in a more concrete mediation of the three factors of the concept, the individual, the particular, and the universal. The apodeictic judgment has brought closure to the forms of judgment by transforming predication into a process in which an immediate relation between individual and particular is connected with an immediate relation between particular and universal, leaving individuality and universality related through particularity. What has emerged is syllogism, taking the immediate form of an inference concluding universality from individuality by means of particularity.

These transformations, which Hegel has duly followed, explain both how syllogism arises from judgment without taking anything else for granted and how syllogism immediately, that is, without any further development, comprises the determination of universality from individuality through the mediation of particularity. This determination is the minimal form of syllogism to the degree that it rests on no inferences and will be presupposed by any that follow from it. In this regard, it comprises syllogism *per se*, while awaiting the possibility of showing itself to be a particular form of syllogism once others arise from its workings.

Differentiation of the Forms of Syllogism

Any systematic differentiation of the forms of syllogism must follow from what arises from apodeictic judgment, given that this delivers the minimal determination of inference. Appeal to any other resource will introduce factors wholly extraneous to syllogism, contaminating the development with arbitrary additions. But does syllogism transform itself into a succession of different forms yielding one another, before achieving closure by turning into some category transcending inference?

The first task is to examine what syllogism immediately is. There might

appear to be a discrepancy between what Hegel presents as the minimal form of syllogism and the elements of apodeictic judgment from which it follows. Apodeictic judgment can transform subject and predicate into judgments connecting individual and universal through particularity precisely because the universality at stake is *concrete*, containing particularity, just as the individuality involved is not immediate, but inherently connected to the universal through its own particularity. Yet, when Hegel examines syllogism as it results from apodeictic judgment, he finds a syllogism of determinate being, involving *abstract* universals, particulars, and individuals, each as immediate as their counterparts in qualitative judgments of determinate being, which comprised the initial form of judgment and now build the constituent propositions of the first form of inference. What makes the universal of qualitative judgment abstract is that everything individuating the individual in which that universal inheres is given independently of that universal. Predicating the abstract universal of the individual has no bearing upon whatever other qualities it possesses. This individual therefore both is and is not that universal, just as it can be connected with many different abstract universals by way of alternate particulars.

One need only examine the outcome of apodeictic judgment to understand why it yields a syllogism whose constituent universal, particular, and individual are immediately given, with determinations indifferent to their connection. Although the subject and predicate of the apodeictic judgment involve an individual and universal inherently containing the particularity uniting them, no intermediary connects this individual with its particularity or this particularity with the universal. Through apodeictic judgment, the individual and the universal obtain a mediated identity, but one resting upon a subject involving an immediate connection between individual and particular, and a predicate involving an immediate connection between particular and universal. What results is a syllogism uniting the individual with the universal through two judgments in which, on the one hand, the individual is immediately identified with the particular and on the other hand, the particular is immediately identified with the universal. Due to the immediacy of both relations, their elements have a givenness indifferent to their connection. The universal, particular, and individual are therein abstract in that the universal and particular inhere in an individual whose other features are indifferent to them, just as the universal inheres in a particular left otherwise undetermined by it. Because the terms all involve a residual otherness not absorbed in their interconnection, the inference is qualitative, or, in other words, a syllogism of determinate being. It exhibits the same limitations that afflict the qualitative judgments comprising its major and minor premises as well as the conclusion drawn from them.

The Minimal Form of Syllogism: the Syllogism of Determinate Being

The syllogism of determinate being undergoes a development that unsurprisingly parallels the transformations undergone by qualitative judgment. Logically speaking, the qualitative syllogism consists in uniting the immediately given individual with the abstract universal through an immediately given particular. This can be represented through three successive judgments: a major premise, “the immediate individual is the immediate particular”, a minor premise, “the immediate particular is the abstract universal”, and a conclusion, “the immediate individual is the abstract universal”. Of key importance is the type of individual, particular, and universal at play, for this is what differentiates forms of syllogism as well as the forms of judgment they contain.

Just as the qualitative judgment, “the immediate individual is the abstract universal”, entails its negation, “the immediate individual is not the abstract universal”, so the qualitative syllogism immediately subverts what it concludes. The abstract universal may be predicated of the immediate individual owing to the immediate connection of abstract universal and immediate particular and of immediate particular and immediate individual. Nonetheless, the indifference of the terms to their connection signifies that a different abstract universal can be predicated of the same individual through the same particular, just as much as that another individual can have the same universal predicated of it through the same particular and that other particulars can connect the same individual and universal. All these options are possible because 1) the individual has features having nothing to do with its tie to the mediating particular, allowing it to be connected to other particulars through which it can be united with other universals, 2) the mediating particular is connected to other universals having nothing to do with the universal concluded of the individual, allowing other universals to be predicated of the individual, and 3) the universal is not exclusively tied to the particular any more than the individual, allowing other particulars to connect it with the same or different individual. As Hegel explains, the individual contains a plurality of features, any of which can serve as the particularity relating it to a universal, just as any particularity contains more than the determinacy of the abstract universal to which it connects, allowing it to be a *medius terminus* to many universals.³ Which individual is connected to which universal through which particular is therefore completely accidental to the qualitative syllogism.⁴

³ Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶184, p. 336; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶184, p. 248.

⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 115; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 674.

In light of this contingency, Hegel designates the qualitative inference a merely subjective syllogizing,⁵ whose terms may just as well be substituted by others. Given the arbitrariness of the content of its immediate individual, mediating given particular, and abstract universal, the qualitative syllogism comprises what Hegel describes as the formal syllogizing of the understanding,⁶ whose thinking always reflects upon independently given contents, whose necessity can never be rationally established.⁷ If reason were confined to qualitative syllogisms and the qualitative judgments they contain, philosophy could never prove the universal validity of any content and would always be dependent upon other sources for what it draws inferences about. Powerless to account for content, reason might certify the consistency of its conclusions, but never attest to their truth. The logic of reason would be the formal logic to which it is reduced by logical positivism.

Why reason cannot be confined to qualitative syllogizing is revealed by the transformation that inference undergoes through its very own working. Due to the disseminating connections that subject the immediate individual, given particular, and abstract universal to indefinitely multiple substitutions, the conclusion of the qualitative judgment countermands itself. The immediate individual just as much is as is not connected to the abstract universal by the given particular serving as predicate of the major premise and as subject of the minor premise.

Nonetheless, the result is not simply negative. Whatever individual is united with whatever abstract universal by whatever given particular it shares, the accomplished conclusion renders that universal connected to that particular through that individual. Once the conclusion links that universal to the individual, the given connection between the same individual and the particular ties the universal to that particular by way of the individual they share. In other words, the initial form of the qualitative judgment, which can be encapsulated in the figure: *I* (individual) - *P* (particular) - *U* (universal), results in a syllogism with the figure: *U-I-P*, connecting the universal with the particular through the individual. This remains a qualitative syllogism of determinate being in that the universal is still abstract, tied to an individual otherwise

⁵ Hegel, *Werke* 8, remark to ¶182, p. 333; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶182, p. 246.

⁶ Hegel, *Werke* 8, remark to ¶182, p. 333; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶182, p. 246.

⁷ Accordingly, Hegel further labels the syllogism of determinate being the syllogism of mere perception, whose accidental connections contrast with those of the syllogism of induction, which Hegel labels the syllogism of experience, insofar as it subjectively combines individuals into a class, which is then concluded with some universal because that universal is found in every individual. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 134; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 690.

undetermined by it, through which it is linked to a particular possessing other features equally indifferent to that universal. Consequently, the content of the related terms is just as accidental as in the first form of qualitative syllogism.⁸ The universal could equally be connected to the same particular through different individuals who share the latter, to different particulars through the same individual they share, or to different particulars through different individuals. Once more, this renders the conclusion subjective, for the abstract universal just as much is as is not connected to the given particular through the individual.

Yet, again, the inference that is made generates a new figure of qualitative syllogism. By concluding the link between the universal and the particular, while connecting the universal and the individual, the second figure ties the particular to the individual by way of the universal they have in common. What results is a third figure of qualitative syllogism, *P-U-I*, where the particular is united with the individual through the universal. At first glance, this inference is no less subjective than its two predecessors. The particular could just as well be connected through the same universal to other individuals having it in common, just as it could be tied to the same individual through other universals inhering in that individual as well as to other individuals through other universals. With this third figure, however, something has been achieved that pushes beyond the limits of the qualitative syllogism.

To begin with, all three components, the universal, the particular, and the individual, have now filled every position in the syllogism. Each has occupied not only both extremes, but also the position of *medius terminus*, connecting the others. This intermediary role is played in the first figure by the particular, in the second by the individual, and in the third by the universal. Insofar as the universal, particular, and individual can no longer be distinguished by what role they play in inference, their form distinctions as much as their contents have become a matter of indifference. Not only is each term subject to substitution by other universals, particulars, and individuals, respectively, but their very form as universal, particular, and individual has been rendered irrelevant. This irrelevance gains independent expression in the so-called quantitative or mathematical syllogism,⁹ according to which, if one term is

⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 117; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 675.

⁹ As Hegel points out, insofar as this mathematical syllogism arises from the transformations of the qualitative syllogism, it is not an unprovable axiom, as mathematics commonly presumes, but a mediated result of other logical relations. See Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶188, p. 340; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶188, p. 251.

equal to a second and that second is equal to a third, then the first is equal to that third (i.e. if $A = B$ and $B = C$, then $A = C$). Mathematical syllogism might be considered a fourth figure, whose schema is $U-U-U$,¹⁰ in that its terms express the same commonality, without anything distinguishing them besides their numerical identity. Yet, because the concluded quantitative equivalency abstracts from all qualitative differences, including those specific to the concept, namely universality, particularity, and individuality, its empty transitivity eliminates the very factors logically constitutive of syllogism.

Although the qualitative indifference of the mathematical inference reflects one aspect of the outcome of the three figures of qualitative syllogism, more has been established. Specifically, the second ($U-I-P$) and third ($P-U-I$) figures have together provided proof of the major and minor premises ("the universal is the particular" and "the individual is the particular") of the first figure ($I-P-U$), which presents as immediate what these figures posit as mediated in their respective conclusions ($U-P$ and $P-I$). This completes the mediation of each figure by one another. The process was already underway with the move from the first to the second figure. As Hegel points out, the second figure ($U-I-P$) was mediated through the first figure ($I-P-U$) in that the second figure's major premise, $U-I$, was concluded by the first, while the conclusion of the second figure, ($U-P$), mediates the first figure's minor premise ($U-P$).¹¹ For its part, the third figure ($I-U-P$) presupposes the first ($I-P-U$) and second ($U-I-P$) figures, which conclude, respectively, the relations of individual to universal ($I-U$) and universal to particular ($U-P$) comprising the premises from which the third figure concludes the relation of individual to particular.¹² Through these reciprocal mediations, each qualitative syllogism possesses givens whose mediation lies outside it in one of its counterparts.¹³

As a whole, the sequence of qualitative syllogisms has transformed the character of mediation in inference. Instead of occurring through a single factor of the concept, taken in qualitative, that is, immediate difference from the others, the mediation occurs through a concrete identity in which each term reflects its relations to the others.¹⁴ No longer immediately given, the mediating

¹⁰ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 121–2; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 679.

¹¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 116; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 675.

¹² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 120; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 678.

¹³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 120; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 678.

¹⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 124; Hegel,

term is now grounded upon mediation.¹⁵ Namely, the particular that mediates the individual and universal is just as much mediated by their relation, and so forth.¹⁶

The type of syllogism that involves such mediation is characterized by Hegel as the syllogism of reflection. Its component elements exhibit the relations of class membership that play themselves out in the quantitative judgments (judgments of reflection), in which predication applies to one, some, or all members of a class. Although the same figures that order qualitative syllogisms envelop the syllogism of reflection, its constituent universal, particular, and individual no longer are abstract and immediate, but reflect the mediation of class relationships. This mediation is not the self-mediation proper to self-determination because what mediates and what gets mediated remain distinct. It is instead the mediation occupying the logic of essence, where determinacy is determined by a determiner that it thereby reflects. Class relationships bring this reflection to the universal, particular, and individual. The individual, as class member, reflects the class to which it belongs, possessing a particularity shared by every other member of the class. Relations of one, some, or all members of a class always reflect the implications of the membership that underlies them. These implications, however, are limited in that class membership still leaves undetermined what particularities (subclasses) fall within a class, as well as what individuates members from one another. By contrast, with genus and species, the universal becomes more concrete, determining its own particularities (i.e. species), while leaving unspecified what individuates members of the same species. All these contrasts decisively distinguish the types of syllogism that infer conclusions about these different types of universals, particulars, and individuals.

As we shall see, the development underway progressively resolves the contradiction inherent in syllogism. This contradiction consists in the discrepancy between the middle term and the extremes it unites. So long as the middle term remains distinguished from the extremes, it cannot truthfully be the unity of them that is concluded through it. The difference between middle term and extremes is most pronounced in the qualitative syllogism, where each term is still indifferent to the other. This difference now becomes diminished in the syllogism of reflection insofar as the terms reflect their mediation by one another. Because, however, class membership does not determine its

The Science of Logic, p. 681.

¹⁵ Such mediation, Hegel here observes, is the mediation of reflection. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 123; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 681.

¹⁶ Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶189, p. 340; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶189, pp. 251–2.

particularities or what individuates its members, any syllogism involving it will be plagued by an abiding difference between the unity posited by the syllogism and what mediates that unity. As Hegel points out, in order for the discrepancy to be overcome, the middle term must become the same totality that it mediates.¹⁷ That, however, will remove the difference between middle term and extremes upon which the very form of inference depends. How this equalization can occur is what lies at stake in bringing the development of syllogism to closure.

The Syllogism of Reflection

To legitimate the move to the syllogism of reflection, it is necessary to show why the mediation of universal, particular, and individual emerging from the forms of qualitative syllogism involves class membership relations of quantitative judgments, rather than genus-species relations of judgments of necessity.

Hegel presents the immediate outcome of the qualitative syllogisms to be the syllogism of allness, where the mediating term between the individual and the universal is class membership. Class membership is particularity of a specific kind. Unlike the particularity of qualitative judgment, it is not an abstract quality, otherwise unrelated to either the individual or the universal it connects. Instead, class membership relates all members to one another as well as to the same universal. In so doing, however, class membership is indifferent to the further individuation of its members, as well as to its own subgroupings. For this reason, the old saw, "Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; Socrates is mortal" would be a misleading example of the syllogism of allness if being human here counted as a specification of a genus. Then, having that genus would necessarily entail further commonalities comprising the species necessary to that genus. By contrast, the universal to which class membership relates the individual leaves undetermined what other universals may also be shared by all members.

Although qualitative syllogism renders the individual, particular, and universal mediated by one another as they alternately play the role of medius terminus, they still remain subject to substitution in each figure. Despite the fact that each mediates and is mediated in turn, they do not thereby fix which individual, particular, and universal can operate in the inference in question. This abiding indifference is what distinguishes the mediation of class

¹⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 127; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 684.

membership. Class is a universal whose own identity is dependent upon the given being of its members. One cannot derive from any prior specification of the class either the individual identities of its members or into what subgroupings they fall. When qualitative syllogism results in the individual united with the universal through a particular mediated by a universal mediated by the individual, without any term exclusively defined by those mediations, syllogism has transformed itself into an inference uniting the individual with the universal through class membership.

This inference can aptly be called a syllogism of allness because the mediation it posits concludes the connection of an individual with some universal from a major premise affirming that all members of a class have that universal and a minor premise affirming that an individual is a member of that class. The syllogism of allness fits under the same figure (*I-P-U*) as the first qualitative syllogism, but what must not be forgotten is that the particularity is here that of class membership.

This makes all the difference.¹⁸ To begin with, as Hegel points out, the conclusion of the syllogism of allness is really presupposed by the major premise.¹⁹ Because allness, or class membership, unlike genus, does not dictate any further determination of the individuals falling within it, any universal tied to class is so connected by external happenstance.²⁰ That is, the relation of class membership to any universal is contingent upon what features its individual members may share. In the syllogism of allness, the conclusion (that the individual is united with a universal) is the only relation actually affirming that an individual has some other universality. Yet, without this conclusion already being true, there can be no truth to the major premise, that all members of the class have the specified universal.²¹ Hence, the individual stands in immediate, rather than a concluded relation to this predicate.²² The major premise may

¹⁸ Since, as Hegel notes, the middle term specifically defines syllogism and differentiates it from judgment [Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 103; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 663], its content must at least of all be ignored.

¹⁹ Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶190, p. 341; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶190, p. 252.

²⁰ As Hegel points out, the form of allness (class membership), encompasses the individual only externally, which means, conversely, that the individual retains an immediate givenness not reflecting the universality of class. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 131; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 687.

²¹ Hegel, *Werke* 8, remark to ¶190, p. 342; Hegel, *Logic*, remark to ¶190, p. 253; Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 132; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 688.

²² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 132; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 688.

encompass all individuals, but because it does so under a universal that fails to posit their particularities or individuation, it needs their independently given content for support.

For this reason, the syllogism of allness depends upon induction, the certification that all individuals grouped in a class happen to have the universal attributed to class membership. Since class membership does not itself entail that connection, the certification can only be obtained by observation of every individual belonging to the class. Expressed as a syllogism, this truth yields the syllogism of induction, according to which a specific shared feature is connected to class membership through the complete given array of its constituent individuals. Accordingly, the syllogism of induction falls under the second figure, *U-I-P*, with the crucial qualification that the particularity is that of class membership and the mediating individual is not singular, but the complete, immediately given array of individuals belonging to the class.²³ This expansion of the middle term can be expressed by the schema *U-I, I', I'' ...-P*, according to which the major premise ascribes a universal to an immediately given array of individuals, the minor premise affirms the class membership of these individuals, and the conclusion connects the universal to class membership.

The universality ascribed to these individuals is not concrete, but still leaves undetermined which individuals it encompasses, just as class membership leaves undetermined which individuals exhaust its grouping. Consequently, a difference persists between the given array of individuals and the complete extension of class membership. In their immediacy, these individuals may all possess the universal and may all belong to the class, but that does not preclude other individuals from belonging to that class without sharing the universal or from sharing the universal without belonging to that class. To take Hegel's example, the major premise may assert that a given array of substances are all metals, the minor premise may assert that all these substances conduct electricity, and the conclusion may affirm that all metals conduct electricity, but the two premises only establish that all metals so far observed conduct electricity.²⁴ The conclusion therefore depends upon an analogy presuming that because these class members have the universal, all class members have it as well. That is, because in respect of class membership, all members are like these that are given, they will be alike in another respect. By drawing its conclusion, the inference of induction is relying on this relationship.

Thereby the syllogism of induction has transformed itself into a syllogism of

²³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 133; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 689.

²⁴ Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶190, p. 342; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶190, p. 253.

analogy. Mediation is no longer effected by just the given array of individuals. Instead, what connects the extremes is the basis of the analogy enabling individuals of a certain kind to share a certain property. This basis is a communality that is not indifferent to other features common to the individuals it encompasses. Although syllogism now once more takes on the abstract schema *I-U-P*, the particular is here united with the individual in virtue of a universality beginning to exhibit the concrete connection of genus and species, where a kind, unlike a class, entails further groupings.²⁵ This is just a beginning, however, because the premises of the syllogism of analogy are the immediate connection between an individual, its class, and some feature (to take Hegel's example, "Earth is a heavenly body and is inhabited") and the immediate connection of another individual and that class ("the Moon is a heavenly body"), from which is concluded the connection of the latter individual and that feature ("the Moon is inhabited").²⁶ The relation between the class and the universal remains conditioned by the immediate being of the individual or individuals in which that connection is given. That immediate being may possess features not shared by all individuals of the class, which is why results can be concluded that may not be the case ("the Moon is inhabited"). If the conclusion is valid, it is because the individual to whom the universal is inferred by analogy happens to have the right property. This signifies that the conclusion is conditioned by the constitution of that individual as well, a constitution that remains immediately given and external to both the class and its other members.

Nonetheless, the syllogism of analogy just as much undermines that externality by concluding something it must presuppose.²⁷ The conclusion, that the individual has the particularity ascribed it through analogy ("the Moon, being a heavenly body, is inhabited"), is identical in form to the premise ("the Earth, a heavenly body, is inhabited") in which the individual has the particularity in analogy to which the conclusion is drawn. In both cases, the given constitution of the individual is what links it to that particularity and to the universal to which they belong. Unless the individual *is* connected to the particular and universal through its own constitution, the syllogism cannot infer what it infers. With the positing of this connection, however, the universal to which the individuals belong ceases to be a class. No longer is this universality afflicted with subjective connection, as manifest in how class membership

²⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p.136; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 692.

²⁶ Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶190, p. 343; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶190, p. 254.

²⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 138; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 694.

remains external to both individual identity and particular subgroupings. Instead, the universal figures as an objective universality,²⁸ necessarily linked to the constitution of the individuals falling under it. In the syllogisms of reflection, inference depended upon the immediate givenness of the individual, setting them generally under the schema *P-I-U*. With the objective universal now binding individual and particular together, syllogism becomes reconfigured under the schema *I-U-P*.²⁹ Inference has transformed itself into the syllogism of necessity, uniting the individual with the particular through a universal that is not indifferent to the particularity giving the individual its constitution. This universal is the genus and individuals belonging to that universal are necessarily, objectively bound to the particular inherent in the genus.

The Syllogism of Necessity

Hegel introduces the syllogism of necessity as a categorical syllogism, so defined by having the categorical judgment as one or both of its premises.³⁰ The categorical judgment immediately asserts the unity of an individual species with its genus (e.g. "Gold is a metal"). Although the syllogism of necessity links the individual and the particular through the mediation of the universal, each part of this mediated connection consists of an immediate connection, as provided by judgment. Since the mediating term is the genus, the premises from which the conclusion is drawn each involve immediate connections to the genus. The individual is immediately connected to the genus by having a nature, that is, through its species being. This is what the categorical judgment asserts. The other premise unites the genus with some particularity. Since this particularity is not indifferent to the universal, but objectively entailed by it, this particularity is a species being, necessary to the genus. Accordingly, the assertion of their connection is categorical. The inferred connection between individual and particular shares in this necessity and for this reason, Hegel can duly identify the syllogism of necessity as being, in the first instance, the categorical syllogism.

²⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 138; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 694.

²⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 139; Hegel, *Werke* 8, ¶187, p. 343; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 695; Hegel, *Logic*, ¶191, p. 254.

³⁰ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 140; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 696.

Although the categorical syllogism falls under the same schema, *I-P-U*, as the first qualitative syllogism, the type of individuality, particularity, and universality at stake precludes the accidentality allowing for multiple substitutions. Because the middle term is the genus, essentially linked to the individual through its constitution, that constitution does not lead to other mediating factors through which other conclusions can be drawn. The constitution of the individual is its species being and this is inherent in the genus. Similarly, because the other extreme figures in the inference by having a specific difference of the genus, rather than some extraneous quality, the middle term does not entail indefinitely multiple conclusions.³¹ The same concrete nature pervades all three termini, whose distinction as individual, universal, and particular merely presents it in alternate forms.³² The individual possesses a species being uniting it with the genus, the genus contains specific differences through which individuals have their nature, and the particular is specific to the genus and thereby tied to the individuals of that kind. Because each terminus contains its linkage with its counterparts, there is no need to prove the premises, generating the infinite regress of syllogisms that plagues qualitative inference. Far from resting on subjective associations in need of an account,³³ the termini of categorical syllogism involve objective connections, built into their own content.

Aristotle, who, like Plato, privileges the universality of genus and the hierarchical knowledge of genus-species it makes possible, not surprisingly points to substance as the basis for syllogism.³⁴ As Hegel observes, the categorical syllogism, like categorical judgment, encloses substance relations in the concept determinations of universal, particular, and individual.³⁵ Insofar as

³¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 141–2; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 697.

³² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 142; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 697.

³³ As Hegel points out, the subjective aspect of syllogism consists in the indifference of the extremes with respect to the middle term that mediates their unity (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), 142; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 698). This is most pronounced in qualitative syllogism, but, persists to lesser extent through the syllogisms of necessity until all remaining difference between extremes and medius terminus is eliminated. That elimination frees the factors of the concept from any abiding subjectivity and signals the passage into objectivity.

³⁴ See *Metaphysics*, Book Zeta, Chapter 9, 1034a33–35, where Aristotle writes, “as in syllogisms, the beginning of all is the *substance*. For syllogisms proceed from the whatness of things...” (Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, trans. by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1979), p. 121).

³⁵ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 141; Hegel,

Aristotle and Plato conceive substance to involve a form/matter relationship rendering each substance an individual of a kind (genus), they can regard the reality ultimately consisting of substance to be eminently knowable through syllogisms of necessity. As we have seen, this provides knowledge with an objectivity surpassing what either qualitative syllogisms containing abstract universals or syllogisms of reflection involving class membership furnish. Nevertheless, syllogisms of necessity remain tainted by a limitation that calls into question their adequacy for philosophical cognition.

The problem is that not everything about the termini of syllogisms of necessity is determined by their unification through the genus. The individual may have a nature by which its genus ties it to some specific difference, but what individuates the individual remains external to the genus-species relationship. The genus may be inherently differentiated into its species, but the nature of the genus does not provide the identity distinguishing each individual from any other of the same kind. This indifference to the individuation of individuals comprises an abiding subjective element in the categorical syllogism. Although each member of the genus is objectively connected to a species particularity, the exclusive identity of each member remains subjective, being extraneously given. For this reason, when any categorical syllogism is concluded, the identity of the individual must be supplied by the subject who formulates the syllogism, irrespective of the content of the genus and its species.

The same deficit that led categorical judgment to resolve itself into hypothetical judgment now transforms categorical syllogism into hypothetical syllogism. The subjective character of the individual in categorical judgment left the existence of the individual hypothetically conditioned, reflecting the necessity of the genus-species relation and the accidentality of the individual. With its characteristic formula (if *A* then *B*), hypothetical judgment necessarily links two individuals, while making the being of one depend upon another, whose own existence remains contingent. Similarly, the extraneous character of individuation in categorical syllogism renders the concluded connection between individual and specific difference contingent upon the being of another, while retaining the objectivity of the genus-species connection. The categorical syllogism produces this result insofar as the genus' indifference to individuation allows indeterminately many other individuals to be pervaded by its nature, leaving its subsumption of *this* individual in the syllogism something accidental and therefore contingent upon another.³⁶ That other, as individual, is

The Science of Logic, p. 696.

³⁶ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 142; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 698.

equally indifferent to the genus to which it is connected. Accordingly, this extreme is afflicted with the same contingency it extends to the subject whose generic character it mediates.

Schematically, hypothetical syllogism takes the familiar shape: if *A*, then *B*; *A* is; thus *B* is. In this way, the necessity of the terms' relation (if *A*, then *B*) is presented apart from their immediate being (*A* is, *B* is). So expressed, the inference abstracts from both the general determinacies of the concept (universal, particular, and individual) and the particular form that these factors have in genus-species relations. Nonetheless, given from where and how hypothetical syllogism arises, it still retains genus/species relations. The individuals are not simply abstract; they each instead have a generic nature and differences specific to it. The necessity of their relation depends upon these connections of the objective universality pervading them. That is, although the being of one is dependent upon the contingent being of the other, this dependency is grounded in what kind of an entity they each are.

Commonly, hypothetical syllogism is taken as an inference of cause and effect, since cause and effect are both contingent, yet linked by necessity. Causality, understood as efficient, abstracts from formal causality and thereby conforms to a law indifferent to the kind of factors subject to it. Such causality pertains to the material being of factors, in abstraction from what they are. Accordingly, causal necessity of this sort involves laws of matter. Because such law is completely indifferent to what it governs, it does not involve universality, particularity, and individuality. This is why Hegel addresses law and causality in the logic of essence. There law comprises an essential regularity whose appearance retains a phenomenal indifference categorically distinct from the relation of universal, particular, and individual, each of whose content is just as essential as that of their conceptual counterparts. For this very reason, cause posits its effect without relating to it as universal, particular, or individual.

Although hypothetical syllogism does share with causal relationship the contingency of its extremes and the necessity of their connection, the extremes are factors of a kind, connected through the objective relations of their genus. By positing this connection as hypothetical and concluding the contingent existence of certain individuals, the syllogism presents the individuals of the genus in two respects. On the one hand, because of their contingent existence, these individuals do not exhaust the extension of the genus. The syllogism posits *their* related existence and not that of other members of the genus. On the other hand, because their being is contingent, the hypothetical syllogism could just as well posit the linked existence of any other members of the genus.

Taken together, these features signify that while the genus is either this individual or any of the others comprising its exhaustive particularization,

insofar as the genus gains existence in the contingent being of certain individuals it thereby does not exist as the others. The hypothetical syllogism has thus transformed itself into the disjunctive syllogism, whose abstract formula is presented by Hegel in two alternate forms: 1) *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*; *A* is *B*; thus *A* is not *C* nor *D*; and also 2) *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*; *A* is not *C* nor *D*; thus *B* is.³⁷ Because what mediates the conclusion is the universal in the disjunctive array of its contingent particularization, Hegel places the disjunctive syllogism under the scheme *I-U-P*,³⁸ whereby it becomes reformulated as 1) *A* is *B*; *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*; *A* is not *C* nor *D*; and 2) *A* is not *C* nor *D*; *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*; thus *B* is. The different ordering is really of no consequence, for the disjunctive syllogism reaches the same conclusion whatever sequence is followed.

Given how it emerges, the disjunctive syllogism must no more be reduced to its formal scheme than any of the other syllogisms of necessity. Following the familiar sequence of Hegel's first formulation (*A* is either *B* or *C* or *D*; *A* is *B*; thus *A* is not *C* nor *D*), the first premise (*A* is *B* or *C* or *D*...) determines the genus in its exhaustive development and in so doing, contains both the universal of the genus, the species that are necessary to it, and the contingency of the individuals in which it consists. The middle term (*A* is *B*) is not just a single individual without further qualification. Rather, the middle term consists in whatever individuals happen to comprise the genus, individuals that bear the specific differences inherent in the genus. The conclusion (*A* is not *C* nor *D*) expresses the exclusive individuality of the given members of the genus, negating those individuals who happen not to exist. Considered in isolation, the three terms of the disjunctive syllogism appear to be different in content. The disjunction of the genus in the major premise appears to contain more than the array of individuals given in the middle term and those denied in the conclusion. Yet, through its own inferring, disjunctive syllogism determines the genus to consist of just those individuals contingently given in the middle term, who are just those not excluded by the conclusion. Although the disjunctive syllogism operates on the basis of a distinction between its three terms, without which no inferring can proceed, the mediation it effects renders all termini equivalent. Each consists in the same exhaustive determination of the same genus. Thereby, what mediates can no longer be distinguished from what is mediated.

³⁷ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 147; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, pp. 701–2.

³⁸ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 146; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 701.

Why There is No Syllogism of the Concept

Hegel, as we have noted, does not take this outcome to signal a transformation of the disjunctive syllogism into a syllogism of the concept paralleling the transformation of disjunctive judgment into the judgment of the concept. To understand why Hegel is correct in not introducing any more forms of syllogism, one need only compare the outcome of disjunctive judgment with that of disjunctive syllogism.

The key difference resides in the fact that judgment, unlike syllogism, *immediately* unites its terms, subject and predicate. Through the copula “is”, disjunctive judgment immediately connects the universal with its exhaustive particularization. This renders both subject and predicate identical in content, but not identical with what mediates them, the immediate connection of the copula. The subject is now determined to be a unity of the universal and its complete particularization, but it remains related to this unity immediately, by the copula of judgment. Hence, what results from the disjunctive judgment is another judgment in which the subject is affirmed to be immediately at one with the unity of the universal and its exhaustive specialization. This comprises the assertoric judgment of the concept, in which the individual is held to be a unity of the universal and the particular. Because judgments of the concept predicate of the subject the correspondence of its particularity and universality, they have a distinctly normative character.

By contrast, the disjunctive syllogism mediates the universal of the genus with its particularization through an individuality that has the same content as the genus and its particularization. In order for this outcome to generate another form of syllogism there must remain some difference between the extremes and their mediation. This difference is required in order for any inference to operate. Yet the disjunctive syllogism removes that very distinction.

This development might seem to be nothing new, for the “mathematical” syllogism already apparently removed such difference by connecting terms through their numerical equivalence. The mathematical syllogism, however, only represents one aspect of the outcome of qualitative syllogism, since the numerical equivalence it certifies entirely abstracts from the factors of the concept (universal, particular, and individual) logically constitutive of syllogism. Instead of comprising a bonafide type of syllogism, the mathematical inference serves to introduce the syllogism of reflection by exhibiting how the termini of qualitative syllogism are members of a class whose membership is indifferent to their individuation.

By contrast, disjunctive syllogism retains the elements of universal, particular, and individual, while rendering the formally distinguishable major

premise, minor premise, and conclusion identical in content. Syllogism, however, can only persevere by maintaining the formalism and subjectivity lying in the distinction between the extremes and that which mediates them. This distinction involves formalism and subjectivity because it leaves some content unaccounted for by the mediation of the inference.³⁹ Insofar as what gets unified has determinations indifferent to its unification, the concluding retains a formal subjective character. With elements undetermined by the inference, syllogism has a form external to its content. Instead of being objective to the inference, this extraneous material must be independently given, as by some subject who stipulates the content about which inference is to be made.

Through the working of disjunctive syllogism, however, the extremes and middle term are posited to be the very same unity of universal, particular, and individual. Because the positing of that identity of content is not present at the outset, but is effected through the inference, disjunctive syllogism does begin as a bonafide syllogism. Through disjunctive syllogism's own mediation, however, the difference with which it starts is eliminated. Because this mediation establishes its own identity with its extremes, it ends up leaving nothing unaccounted for. The relation between universal, particular, and excluding individual has turned out to be contained within each terminus, for each has been determined to be the universal in its exhaustive particularization.

From Syllogism to Objectivity

Hegel points out that the transition from subjectivity to objectivity is achieved when the middle term in syllogism is occupied by all three elements of the concept.⁴⁰ In qualitative syllogism, the middle term was occupied by particularity, individuality, and universality, but only in succession in the three different forms (*I-P-U*, *U-I-P*, *P-U-I*) into which qualitative syllogism develops itself. In the syllogism of reflection, the middle term encompassed the extremes, but in a manner that retained its externality to them.⁴¹ The syllogisms of allness, induction, and analogy all contained the individual and the particular under a generality that remained burdened by contingency, leaving some discrepancy between the universal and the factors it embraced. Only with the

³⁹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 148; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 703.

⁴⁰ Hegel, *Werke* 8, Zusatz to ¶181, p. 332; Hegel, *Logic*, addition to ¶181, p. 245.

⁴¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 148; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 703.

culmination of the syllogisms of necessity does the middle term contain universality, particularity, and individuality in the same way in which its extremes do. When this occurs, the mediation has become the totality of syllogism, which constitutively mediates two terms of the concept by the third. In disjunctive syllogism, the mediation becomes the totality in conjunction with each extreme becoming identical to that mediation as well. Hence, through disjunctive syllogism, each term is a totality, uniting universality, particularity, and individuality and mediated by itself.⁴² This result warrants the label, “objectivity”, for both negative and positive reasons.

On the one hand, the totalities that have emerged have nullified anything formal and subjective about their determination. No longer is anything in their relation to factors of the concept indifferent to that relation. What is mediated has become completely identical with the process of mediation. By the same token, the determination of the erstwhile terms of syllogism has ceased to have any subjective character, in the sense of possessing an extraneous givenness that must originate elsewhere.

Positively speaking, this exclusion of formality and subjectivity consists in the achievement of a totality that is completely self-mediated, despite its relation to other similarly self-mediated totalities. Objectivity can be seen to have this character in light of how it stands distinguished from being, determinacy, and existence. Being is completely indeterminate, given how any specification would fall into the incoherence of characterizing being in terms of some determinate being. Any determinate being owes its determinacy to its contrast with what it is not, whereas existence involves things that are determined by one another. By contrast, objectivity is not relative to anything else, but determined in and through itself, exhibiting the independent character that requires universality, particularity, and individuality for its specification. These factors of the concept are constitutive of the independence defining objectivity insofar as self-determination is minimally determined in terms of universality, particularity, and individuality. The concept logically emerges when reciprocity eliminates the difference between determiner and determined that defines the two-tiered categories of the logic of essence. When determiner and determined become equivalent, determinacy is self-determined. Universality comprises the unity of what is self-determined in that it pervades its differentiations, whose particularity enables the universal to be at one with its differentiation, engendering individuality, determinacy that is determined in and through itself.⁴³ Although the concept involves individuality, it has not

⁴² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 148; Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 703.

⁴³ For a detailed examination of how this is so, see Chapters 4 and 5.

posited its own initial identity of determiner and determined. Although the concept is self-determination, its very emergence from the logic of essence leaves it with an immediacy giving it a subjective character. This subjectivity gets progressively diminished through judgment and syllogism, where the elements of the concept, universality, particularity, and individuality, become determined by one another. Objectivity is arrived at when what gets determined by the elements of the concept is no different from the process determining them.

Consequently, objectivity is eminently conceptualizable, though not through syllogism. Syllogism may pave the way for categorizing objectivity, but only by undermining the defining process of inference. This process consists in setting conceptual factors in a mediation that leaves some extraneously given content unaccounted for. Because objectivity is a self-mediated totality, conceiving objectivity requires overcoming the appeal to givenness that always encumbers inference.

Chapter 8

Objectivity in Logic and Nature

The Perplexity of Subjectivity and Objectivity as Logical Categories

The emergence of the category of objectivity from the closure of syllogism confronts systematic logic with a puzzle, all the more challenging when one recalls the basic insights that have driven the whole development up to this point:

Logic, being the thinking of thinking, stands apart from all other disciplines by proceeding upon the elimination of any difference between the subject and object of its investigation. Because logical thought is its own topic, the method and content of logic cannot be distinguished. For just this reason, logic can begin neither with a pre-established procedure nor with any pre-established content without question-begging. Insofar as philosophy only escapes dogmatism by operating with no unexamined presuppositions about its method and subject matter, philosophy must begin with the same overcoming of the distinction between subject and object that logic presupposes. More than any philosopher before, Hegel takes seriously these elementary prescriptions, as most evident in his recognition that access to philosophy requires liberating discourse from the opposition of consciousness, which confines cognition to the standpoint where the subject of knowing refers to an independently given object.

Nonetheless, with the unfolding of the Subjective Logic Hegel reintroduces subjectivity and objectivity into logic as distinct categories. Here, as we have seen, he first develops subjectivity as encompassing the concept, judgment, and syllogism. Then, through the self-dissolution of syllogism, he proceeds to determine objectivity as encompassing mechanism, chemism, and teleology.

At first glance, any logical treatment of subjectivity and objectivity seems to explode the distinguishing unity of logical determinacy. By addressing subjectivity and objectivity discretely, logic appears to operate with a subjectivity opposed to objectivity, in violation of the identity of knowing and object of knowing in logic's thinking of thinking. Naturally, if subjectivity can be determined before and without objectivity, subjectivity seems to fit the persona of consciousness, for whom objectivity is always something

independently given.

Further, the specific characterizations of subjectivity and objectivity seem hardly containable within the confines of logical categories. How can subjectivity be determined without bringing in extra-logical factors of psychological reality, with all its physical, biological, and cultural underpinnings? Can the concept retain its identity without involving representations of a certain kind? Can judgment or syllogism be characterized apart from the mental activity of linguistically competent conscious individuals? The prospects of a purely logical objectivity appear no less problematic. Can mechanism and chemism obtain specification without material bodies and the physical processes of motion and neutralization? And how can teleology be determined without subsuming these material factors to the designs of a conscious agent?

Subjectivity and Objectivity as Logical Categories

The first objection, that logic undermines its own unity of form and content by determining subjectivity and objectivity as discrete categories, is subject to a manifold rebuttal. To begin with, the logical distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not identical to a distinction between knowing and its object. This is because subjectivity and cognition are no more equivalent than are objectivity and object of knowing. Symptomatic of their disanalogy is Hegel's own determination of the category of cognition within the logic of the Idea, which incorporates both subjectivity and objectivity in their unity with one another. After all, even if cognition involves conceptual determination, it thereby aims at truth, the correspondence of concept and objectivity. This suggests that although cognition may involve subjectivity and objectivity, subjectivity by itself is not knowing proper.

Moreover, that consciousness can be a standpoint for which subjectivity and objectivity are independently given whereas logic's self-thinking thought removes their opposition indicates that subjectivity and objectivity must have a *per se* determination. Otherwise subjectivity and objectivity could not be alternately opposed or united.

In addition, the successive determination of subjectivity and objectivity in logic need not disrupt the unity of method and subject matter. What matters is whether the order of categorial development is bound to the content of the categories themselves. So long as that holds, *what* gets determined and *how* it is specified are tied together. Subjectivity and objectivity satisfy this requirement so long as they become topics of logic through the content of whatever category precedes them and then give rise to their successor

categories through themselves. If Hegel is right to treat subjectivity as the outcome of the logic of essence and objectivity as the outcome of subjectivity, their serial emergence only reaffirms the underlying connection of form and content.

These considerations may deflect immediate dismissal of a logical differentiation of subjectivity and objectivity, but they do not remove the suspicion that subjectivity and objectivity are unspecifiable without factors external to logic. To hold this suspicion at bay, the contents of subjectivity and objectivity must be addressed.

What is Logical and What is Subjective in Logical Subjectivity

Properly speaking, subjectivity is not so much an integral category as a categorial domain extending through the determinations of the concept, judgment, and syllogism. These three forms successively build upon one another. Judgment involves the elements of the concept – universality, particularity, and individuality, relating them externally so as to give them particular forms, just as syllogism relates forms of judgment to one another so as to further determine the elements of the concept. All depend upon the emergence of self-determination, into which the logic of essence collapses once what determines and what gets determined can no longer be distinguished. This collapse arises through reciprocity, where the identity latent in every pair of terms in the logic of essence becomes manifest when the cause of a derivative term is revealed to be determined as cause by what it determines, leaving its effect just as much a cause as the cause is an effect. The emergent equivalence of determiner and determined provides the threshold for self-determined determinacy. This must further develop since what is self-determined cannot be what it is until it has determined itself to have its own identity of determiner and determined. That is, self-determined determinacy must posit itself as it is immediately given by the outcome of the logic of essence. This incipient process of self-determination provides the element of subjectivity because it allows for a self, that is, a subject determined not solely in external contrast with something other, nor by some ground, nor as the ground of something derivative, but as an individual, determined in and through itself, giving itself new character without passing beyond its own dynamic identity. To the extent that subjectivity is self-informing, it is bound up with the self-development of self-determination and, thereby, with the elementary terms of self-determination: universality, particularity, and individuality. Subjectivity is defined by universality insofar as it remains self-identical in its self-differentiation, just as it exhibits particularity by acquiring determinacy that is

always a phase in its own development, which no less possesses individuality in that the identity of the subject is one with its self-differentiation, making it a law unto itself, unique and exclusive.

Significantly, all these basic ingredients in the self-hood of subjectivity are purely logical in character, bringing into play nothing but the identity of determiner and determined, with the universality, particularity, and individuality that this entails. Physical and psychological factors here make no contribution. Yet can the same be said when the categorial realm of self-determination becomes developed as concept, judgment, and syllogism?

Hegel himself admits that the categories designated by "concept", "judgment", and "syllogism" are so named insofar as they fit these terms' customary usages.¹ The "concept", of course, is commonly understood to be the basic element of thought, a special universal representation requiring language for its expression. In the Subjective Logic, however, the concept proper consists in the determination of universality, entailing particularity and then individuality. The connection between the concept and universality is straightforward, for if the concept as such is at stake, rather than any particular concept, what is at hand is no more than the universal *per se*. The special universal representation of discursive thought certainly involves the universal, that is, the concept, even if it brings along the non-logical baggage of mind, itself presupposing non-psychological nature as well as the psychological and intersubjective prerequisites of linguistic intelligence. In this respect, and this respect alone, the customary usage contains everything that the logical category entails. Yet, since the universal, or the concept, logically determined, does not suffice for determining what distinguishes physical or psychological nature from logic or from one another, the category of concept must be demarcated from everything else that its name connotes.²

Hegel draws the analogous discrimination between the logical determinacy of judgment and its customary sense. Judgment, as a logical outcome of the concept, presents the individual and the universal in immediate connection, both determining them by and leaving them external to one another. In each of the further forms into which judgment develops, the elements of the concept *per se*, universality, particularity, and individuality remain determined by one another in this immediate fashion. This remains the case even though the type of universality, particularity, and individuality at issue becomes progressively more concretely connected to its counterparts as judgment progresses through

¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 11–12, 154; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 582–3, 708–9.

² Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), p. 16; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 586.

the relationships of formal universal and immediate individual, class membership, genus, and species, and finally the conceptual normativity where the individual is determined by a universal already wholly containing its own particularity. As Hegel expressly points out, judgment's dual relationship of conceptual elements is exhibited in the linguistic form of a proposition, to the degree that the subject and predicate figure as individual and universal and the copula immediately connects them as external terms. The logical relationship is absent, however, in everything else about propositions that renders discourse a worldly phenomenon and qualifies subject and predicate with empirical content.³

Similarly, the category of syllogism fits the customary representation of inference insofar as syllogism determines one factor of the concept through another by means of the third. This leaves room for each pair of the threesome of universality, particularity, and individuality to be joined through the remaining term, and for these options to be further differentiated by the types of universality, particularity, and individuality distinguishing the forms of judgment. In this respect, syllogism connects each moment of the concept to another through a series of judgments, which can be linguistically expressed in the successive propositions of inference. Just as the concept and judgment involve relationships of universality, particularity, and individuality contained in conceptual discourse without determining its worldly physical, psychological, and cultural dimensions, so syllogism mediates judgments by one another without providing the real content that distinguishes the inferences of rational agents from their logical form.

Since subjectivity and objectivity both figure as logical categories, it would be a mistake to locate the subjectivity of concept, judgment, and syllogism in either the psychological or linguistic elements of conceptual representation, propositions, and inference. Moreover, insofar as subjectivity and objectivity are *logically* distinct, what makes concept, judgment, and syllogism subjective cannot lie in the difference between these categories as categories and the worldly baggage of their incorporation in real discourse. The subjectivity of concept, judgment, and syllogism is just as logical as is the objectivity of mechanism, chemism, and teleology.

Given the character of logical development, where prior terms are incorporated by their successors, the ordering of subjectivity and objectivity leaves subjectivity with two axes of identity. Because objectivity itself contains concept, judgment, and syllogism as constitutive, but non-reductive ingredients, their subjectivity involves something shared by subjectivity and

³ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 59, 61; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 624, 626.

objectivity as well as something subjectivity lacks in contrast to objectivity. The shared element of subjectivity is the already indicated self-development endemic to self-determination, whose basic structure is defined by the interconnection of universality, particularity, and individuality. All the successive shapes of subjectivity exhibit this feature, still absent in the categories of being and essence. Whereas the categories of being pass into what is other than themselves and those of essence determine what is a derivative tier of determinacy, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity involve processes in which factors transform themselves without forfeiting their underlying identity. To the degree that self-determination always requires universality, particularity, and individuality, the permutations of these terms in concept, judgment, and syllogism testifies to the pervasive presence of the self-development basic to subjectivity.

That objectivity shares self-development should not be surprising, given how objectivity is distinguished both from reality (as a category of being) and existence (as a category of essence). Whereas reality in being owes its character to its contrast with an other and existence is mediated by some prior ground, objectivity is determined in its own right, deriving its character from itself. If objectivity instead depended upon something other as requisite contrast term or as determining ground, it could never be the proper field of true knowledge, for it would always rest on something else that could not be known in the same way. If objectivity were merely real, knowing objectivity would depend upon knowing what is non-objective, just as if objectivity were merely existence, knowing objectivity would require apprehending a ground that is never itself objective. Either way, objectivity would become relative to something lacking objectivity, undermining its own objective standing. By being instead determined in and through itself, objectivity can be known on its own terms, without appeal to something non-objective.

Nonetheless, this self-sufficiency of objective determination does not distinguish objectivity from subjectivity, for concept, judgment, and syllogism all comprise structures in which the subject of determination is determined by its own constitutive factors – universality, particularity, and individuality, albeit in various ways. What separates objectivity from subjectivity is the overcoming of a deficiency in self-determination that renders concept, judgment, and syllogism “merely” subjective. This mere subjectivity resides not in the self-development shared by what is subjective and objective, but in the abiding difference between what is mediated and what mediates.

Such a discrepancy might appear completely superseded once the logic of essence gives way to the logic of the concept, where determiner and determined coincide. That coincidence of ground and grounded, of cause and effect does immediately present what is self-grounded, self-cause, or, more

specifically, self-determined. Yet, precisely because the minimal determinacy of self-determination has arisen from categories of essence, self-determination has not arisen from itself, as it must do to be what it is. In other words, an element of external determination still plagues self-determination as it makes its debut under the heading of the concept. Although self-determination is self-mediating, what mediates it at the outset are necessarily factors not wholly identical with it. Self-determination must supersede its own origins to be self-determined and each further development, from concept to judgment to syllogism, progressively removes the immediacy and external determination that accompanies its initial configurations.

The concept may exhibit how universality, particularity, and individuality develop into one another, but none of these features is itself the relation by which it is mediated by its counterparts. Judgment does enable each element of the concept to be determined by the others, but that determination is itself immediate, exemplified in the copula, whose connection of subject and predicate is a matter of being, rather than of self-determination. Consequently, judgment retains a subjective character in the deficient sense of not containing sufficient grounds for the relationship it posits. Each judgment may contain subject and predicate in their difference and identity, but no judgment overcomes the immediacy of the connection so long as subject and predicate are still joined by a copula. As a result, the determination of one factor of the concept by another rests on an externality. Subject and predicate do not connect entirely on their own. Their relationship is therefore not objective, but still merely subjective.

Syllogism does supersede the immediacy of the copula by mediating the connection of two terms of the concept by a third middle term. This gets expressed in the inferential series of judgments where the conclusion follows from the first premise by means of an intervening judgment. Nevertheless, because syllogism connects its extremes by a middle term distinct from them, there is still an externality at hand. Instead of the extremes mediating their own connection, they get related by something else, which may be a determination of the concept, but which still differs from them.

As a consequence, so long as self-determination is confined to concept, judgment, and syllogism, a discrepancy still remains between the terms that are determined and what determines them. This renders each "subjective" in the sense that the mediating connection of universality, particularity, and individuality is not fully contained within them and must be imparted from without. The abiding externality is, of course, part of the relationships of concept, judgment, and syllogism, and therefore does not require appeal to an agent to connect the terms. Nonetheless, it allows for embodiments in which the relationship of particular universals, particulars, and individuals depends

upon the manipulations of a subject.

This situation is superseded through the workings of syllogism once the middle term connecting the extremes contains them in their connection at the same time as they each contain their connection to one another. When that occurs, the discrepancy between mediated terms and mediation is eliminated, removing the “mere subjectivity” of that abiding externality. As Hegel shows, disjunctive syllogism achieves this supersession by relating extremes through a middle term that ends up rendering each factor equivalent to the whole relationship.⁴ The major premise comprises the universal in its complete particularization, as given in the disjunction of its possible particulars. The middle term specifies what possible particulars are excluded or included in the universal, and the conclusion indicates what particulars are respectively included or excluded in the universal. The disjunctive syllogism is still a syllogism because the three terms it relates are distinct and interconnected as separate determinations. Nevertheless, each term contains the same universal in its complete determination and the mediation of the syllogism ends up rendering each equivalent. Namely, since the universal of the disjunctive syllogism is determined to consist of a certain array of particulars and the middle term and conclusion both determine the universal as that same array, the difference between the extremes and their mediation is eliminated as a result of the conclusion. As we have seen,⁵ this eliminates the constitutive process of syllogism as well, for syllogistic determination depends upon the distinction of extremes and middle term.

What is Logical and What is Objective in Logical Objectivity

What arises from the self-elimination of syllogism can warrant the title, “objectivity”, in virtue of the features that relate and distinguish it from subjectivity. On the one hand, the outcome of the disjunctive syllogism consists of factors that are individuals, whose universality contains their complete particularity. In this respect, each is determined in and through itself, mediating its own character as a self-contained totality. On the other hand, they stand in relation to other individuals that are just as independently determined, rendering their relation something entirely external to their respective identities.

By consisting of factors that are independent totalities, structured in terms

⁴ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 146–49; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 653–7.

⁵ See Chapter 7.

of universality, particularity, and individuality, objectivity is not a relative "object" in the sense of a "*Gegenstand*", determined in reference to an underlying structure of consciousness that posits what it confronts. Objectivity instead comprises an absolute object, a "*Sache*", that can be the object of true knowing insofar as it is determined in its own right, possessing an objective character rather than a subjective description relative to whatever subject projects determinacy upon it. Although these distinctions between "*Gegenstand*" and "*Sache*" anticipate both the logic of cognition and the phenomenology of consciousness, they rest upon nothing but the outcome of syllogism. For this reason, objectivity is distinguishable from subjectivity on purely logical grounds.

Nonetheless, each shape of objectivity seems to transcend the limits of logical determinacy by involving processes difficult to describe without importing physical and psychological factors. Mechanism, as defined by activities of communication, attraction to a center, and self-perpetuating lawful centered interaction, appears all too wedded to the physical parameters of locomotion of bodies in their gravitational system. Chemism, as comprising the neutralization of objects with affinity and the reduction of their neutral product into objects tensed for further neutralization and reduction, seems already immersed in the physical transformations of chemically distinguished materials. As for teleology, the realization of an end seems bound up with the worldly relation of an agent aiming to realize a represented design in a physical world of mechanical and chemical processes.

Nevertheless, in each case, Hegel takes pains to forewarn readers that objective process has a logical determination that can have physical and psychological embodiments, but can just as well be detached from those realities of nature and mind.⁶ Precisely because mechanism involves independent totalities, defined in terms of universality, particularity, and individuality, whose external relationships allow judgment and syllogism to reenter as qualifying categories, these logical terms can do all the work in specifying the communication, centrality, and lawful systematics of undifferentiated objects. The same is true of chemism, where the tensed affinity of chemical objects is defined by the same independent totalities of mechanism, with the further qualification that they stand in external relation to one another through a complementary difference. By itself, this relationship contains no spatial or temporal parameters, nor any specific physical features that would make chemism equivalent to chemistry in nature. Consequently, the

⁶ See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 157, 162–63, 166, 169, 171–72, 175, 189; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 711, 716–7, 719, 723–4, 727, 740.

ensuing neutralization and reduction proceeds independently of natural properties. This independence allows application of chemism to the affinities of individuals and other spiritual interactions, an application precluded if chemical process were inherently physical.

By the same token, the independent logical determinacies of mechanism and chemism forestall any automatic naturalization of teleology, enabling the realization of the end to involve mechanical and chemical processes *per se*. This, does not, however, directly redeem the logical character of the end itself, nor the end's relation to its means, and thereby, to its result. The end must still be shown to be determinable without being a mental representation chosen to be fulfilled by an agent. Hegel achieves this by strictly defining the end in terms of the concept relating to an independent objectivity that is essentially determinable by the concept. What is at stake is not some particular end being realized in some particular context, but the end *per se* as it achieves objective realization *per se*. Accordingly, the end is the universal, further qualified by precipitating the process of informing an objectivity susceptible of taking on its determination. Although the ensuing relationship can be embodied in the technical activity of a living agent, the relation of end to objectivity through an objective means is determinate in its own right, irrespective of the further context in which it proceeds.

These considerations indicate how subjectivity and objectivity can be logically determined, but in so doing, they pose the question of how logical subjectivity and objectivity are distinguishable from subjectivity and objectivity in nature and mind. Since this question concerns the general relation between logical and "real" determinacy, which applies equally to subjectivity and objectivity, as well as to nature and spirit, its solution can be drawn from focusing upon what makes objectivity in nature distinct from objectivity in logic.

The Distinction Between Objectivity in Logic and Objectivity in Nature

If we take Hegel's treatments of logic and nature as a guide, it is easy to distinguish objectivity in logic from objectivity in nature by simply contrasting the succession of their respective configurations. Whereas objectivity in logic develops successively through mechanism, chemism, and teleology, objectivity in nature is restricted to the first two forms, whose natural analogues do not directly follow one another.⁷ Instead, nature's realizations of mechanism and

⁷ John Burbidge points this out. See John Burbidge, "Chemism and Chemistry", *The Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2002-03, p. 13.

chemism, the mechanics of bodies in motion and material chemistry, are separated by an intervening development of physical processes neither mechanical nor chemical in character. Moreover, nature culminates in the internal teleology of living organisms without first embodying the external teleology that follows chemism and precedes life in logic, but only resurfaces nonlogically in the technical activity of conscious individuals within the domain of spirit.

These discrepancies only pose problems if one rigidly presumes that nature and spirit are determined by successive application of each logical category to the logical totality of the absolute Idea.⁸ Then, one would expect an exact replay of the ordering of categories in the logic, with the difference that now they supervene upon the absolute Idea as the given substrate they further qualify. It is debatable, to say the least, that such an exact reiteration is required by the basic insight that a legitimate conception of nature and spirit must apply logical categories to the totality of logical determination.⁹ This insight largely converges with recognition that a non-metaphysical, non-transcendental conception of nature and spirit must follow from a self-development of the system of logical determinacy beyond itself, where the otherness of non-logical determinacy must consist of a self-externality of logical determinacy. Any other putative otherness would depend upon insupportable appeals to the "given",¹⁰ reinstating the problematic foundationalism afflicting the opposition of consciousness. The systematic conception of nature and spirit cannot rely upon anything other than the logical categories that have emerged presuppositionlessly, for no other determinacy is available independently of illicit assumptions. Any ploy to engage in some "logic of discovery", where one conceives non-logical reality by uncovering thought determinations as they are allegedly found in what is given, resurrects the dogmatism of metaphysical reference, which uncritically assumes that one can immediately think what is. Alternately, any recourse to transcendental constitution, constructing reality by treating cognition or, for that matter, logical categories as determiners of the real, only reinstates foundationalism in an epistemological guise. Here cognitive structure or logic gets treated as the privileged ground of a derivative domain whose reality is but a construction of some unjustified external

⁸ For a development of this position, see Edward Halper, "The Idealism of Hegel's System", *The Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2002–03, pp. 19–58.

⁹ Halper argues for such a reiteration. See Halper, "The Idealism of Hegel's System", pp. 19–58.

¹⁰ See William Maker, "Idealism and Autonomy", *The Owl of Minerva*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2002–03, pp. 62–71.

standpoint that employs categories to fabricate something else.

To escape recourse to either illegitimate appeals to the given or recourse to arbitrary construction, there is no choice but to employ the categories that have emerged presuppositionlessly in systematic logic. This employment, however, must provide for some determination that does not fall back into logical development. Moreover, the application of logical categories cannot be external to the logical development, but must rather follow from it without introduction of any other content and without sneaking in some agency to do the job. Logic must develop itself into something other and do so completely independently. As Hegel indicates, logical determinacy must determine itself as self-external.¹¹ That is, it must achieve closure by freely generating its own otherness with nothing but its concluded system of categories. To achieve such a non-reductive categorial development that can provide the threshold of non-logical determination, logical categories must apply themselves to the totality of logic, the absolute Idea. Only then can logic generate something that does not fall back into one of the categories of logic, achieving a non-logical irreducibility without surreptitiously importing any arbitrary content or agency.¹²

This does mean that the categorization of the real will involve logical categories further qualifying the totality of logical determinacy. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conceive this supervenience as a serial qualification of the absolute Idea by each of the categories of logic, taken in the order in which they appear in logic. First of all, such an application would depend upon an external application of each category to the same substrate, an application inherent neither in the category applied nor in the substrate receiving it. This would violate the methodological strictures of self-development by enlisting an illicit agency, wholly unaccounted for by logic, to select the proper category and connect it to the absolute Idea following a rule equally external to what gets determined. If instead the categorization of nature and spirit is to proceed in a non-arbitrary manner, the qualification of the absolute Idea by specific categories must be generated by the determinacy at hand. The development cannot then involve a simple supervenience of the entire logical sequence upon

¹¹ Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff* (1816), pp. 305–6; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 843–4.

¹² For a further discussion of this transition from categorial totality to reality, see “Conceiving Reality without Foundations”, in Richard Dien Winfield, *Freedom and Modernity* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 33–50, and “Space, Time and Matter: Conceiving Nature without Foundations”, in Richard Dien Winfield, *Autonomy and Normativity: Investigations of Truth, Right and Beauty* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 54–65.

the substrate of the absolute Idea. Rather, at each stage, further categories will qualify not the absolute Idea, but the absolute Idea as already determined by additional categories. Not only will the categories vary from one stage to another, but so will what they further specify. Since the sequence of logical categories is determined by their own content, that sequence cannot be duplicated when the content under development is a very different one comprised of the absolute Idea as qualified by other logical categories. This is why the course of the development from logic through nature and spirit can no more be reduced to the application of a given procedure than can the development from being through the absolute Idea. Although one may loosely anticipate that the systematic determination of nature and spirit is self-developing, and therefore autonomous, this does not signify that any abstract scheme of freedom applies, or, for that matter, that self-determination could have a form separable from the content it generates. To the degree that the categorial determination of nature is the self-constitution of the subject matter, what the development is a self-determination of is only established at the conclusion of the development. Moreover, since the resultant identity of what is underway determining itself presents the key to the order of the whole development, no pattern of determination can be continuously operative from beginning to end. Consequently, the absolute Idea does not figure as the perennial subject of development, to which isolated categories are applied. Rather, the totality of spirit proves itself to be the ultimate subject of the ensuing determination to the degree that it encompasses logical and natural determinacy as well as that of mind.

Objectivity in nature, as well as in spirit, figures within the context of this development. In the most elementary reaches of nature, where space and time become supplemented by matter in motion, mechanism gets embodied in the interaction of independent bodies, whose spatio-temporal dynamic relationships can exhibit the communication, centrality, and self-sustaining system of centrality that defines logical objectivity independently of the physical features of gravitational systems of material objects. Although empirical observation may supply a wealth of content illustrating the mechanism of matter in motion, it would be wrong to presume that the philosophy of nature must appeal to what is given in experience as the ultimate criterion for the correctness of concepts of nature.¹³ Because such "correctness" depends upon phenomena devoid of necessity and isolated representations of equivalent contingency, it can hardly provide a model for truth. To uphold the autonomy of reason, without which dogmatic presuppositions cannot be

¹³ Burbidge makes this suggestion in his essay, "Chemism and Chemistry", pp. 13-14.

overcome, empirical content can only be admitted into the systematic conception of nature by being detached from its origins and incorporated into the self-constitution of the concepts of nature and spirit. Within that immanent development, what may be originally found in observation becomes elevated to the form of thought, a self-determined form that extends beyond logic into the theory of nature and mind.

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